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Lawyers created the doctrine of informed consent for the medical profession.' This Article examines the possibility and wisdom
of turning that lawyers' creation back on the lawyers themselves.
Under informed consent, a doctor's failure to inform his patient
adequately of the consequences of a course of treatment, prior to
obtaining the patient's consent to such treatment, exposes the doctor
to the risk of liability for damages. 2 The development of the
doctrine may be viewed simply as an outgrowth, albeit one long
latent, of the law of battery; 3 as stemming from the need to assert
social control over the process of scientific (and particularly medical)
experimentation; 4 or as necessary to preserve the integrity of the
doctor-patient relationship in the face of increased specialization
and technological advance.5 From still another perspective, the
doctrine of informed consent may be viewed as an expression of
society's need to set limits on the domain of the professional.
It is this last view that gives rise to the question whether a
similar development is needed in the legal profession. 6 Several
commentators have advocated such a step, 7 and one major empirical
study has attempted to show the benefits of increased client control
I This is not to say that lawyers were the sole cause of the development of
informed consent, but that, at least in therapeutic situations, lawyers played a
significant part in making the doctrine an issue in medical practice. See Meisel,
The Expansion of Liability for Medical Accidents: From Negligence to Strict Liability by Way of Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REV. 51, 76, 131-32 (1977). Traditional medical practice was and still is opposed to the basic assumptions underlying the informed-consent doctrine. See Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairt Tale?
Law's Vision, 39 U. PrIr. L. REv. 137, 141 (1977).
2 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505
(1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972).
3 See notes 12-16 infra & accompanying text.
4 See generally HEW Regulations on the Protection of Human Subjects, 45
CFR §§ 46.100-.301 (1978); J. KATz, EXPERIM ENTATION WITH HuMAN BEINcs
(1972); Ethical Aspects of Experimentation With Human Beings, 98 DAEDAnus
219 (1969).

5 See generally Capron, informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research
and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. Rv. 340 (1974); Schneyer, Informed Consent and
the Danger of Bias in the Formation of Medical Disclosure Practices, 1976 Wis.
L. REv. 124.
CHAIRGE? (1974); Katz,
6See D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S I
On ProfessionalResponsibility, 80 CoM. L.J. 380, 384-85 (1975).

7 See, e.g., D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 6, at 154-61; Chused, Faretta and the
Personal Defense: The Role of a Represented Defendant in Trial Tactics, 65 CAL.
L. REv. 636, 668-72 (1977); Katz, supra note 6; Rosenthal, Evaluating the Competence of Lawyers, 11 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 257, 272-80 (1976). See also Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HumAN Pacrrs 9 (1975).
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over lawyers 3 In addition, the volume of legal malpractice litigation has increased significantly over the last several years, 9 fostering
speculation that it is only a matter of time before the doctrines
developed in medical malpractice litigation are used against lawyers.
Part I of this Article looks at the development of the informedconsent doctrine in the medical cases. Part II considers to what
extent, in civil cases 0 involving lawyers and their clients, current
legal doctrines and professional norms incorporate the standard of
informed consent. This part concludes that little attention has been
given to the decisionmaking issues which informed consent raises
and that the cases, by and large, focus on the lawyer's power to bind
his client vis-4-vis third parties. In these cases, a line is drawn that
purportedly gives the lawyer control over procedure and tactics and
gives the client control over the "subject matter" of the action.
Part III argues that this line is inappropriate and advocates development of an informed-consent doctrine that would take account of
the interests involved-the client's, the lawyer's and the public's.
Finally, part IV discusses both the application of this doctrine and
the limitations on its implementation.
8 D. RosENTHAL, supra note 6.

9 See, e.g., Report of the ABA National Institute on Professional Liability of
Trial Lawyers, in 45 U.S.L.W. 2535 (1977); Stanley, President's Page, 63 A.B.A.J.
155 (1977) (number of legal malpractice claims increased four times since 1973);
Scott, Lawyers Who Sue Lawyers, N.Y. Times, June 26, 1977, § 6 (Magazine),
at 74.
10 This Article is limited to civil cases for three reasons. First, the number of
cases made treatment of both civil and criminal cases in one article unwieldy.
Second, my own experience is primarily with civil cases. Third, the criminal cases
involve constitutional and statutory (habeas corpus) considerations that are not
present in the civil cases. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Chused, supra note 7.
The policies advocated here apply with at least equal force to criminal representation, but implementation in the criminal area presents somewhat different
problems, particularly because of (1) the greater number of court-enforced marriages between lawyer and client in criminal representation, and (2) the possible
relationship between the allocation of decisionmaking authority questions discussed
here and the doctrines of waiver or forfeiture of constitutional rights which apply
in habeas corpus cases. Other than Professor Chused's article, all of the articles
discussing the criminal area deal primarily with the latter question. See, e.g.,
Rosenberg, Jettisaning Fay v. Noia: ProceduralDefaults by Reasonably Incompetent
Counsel, 62 MmN. L. REv. 341 (1978); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural
Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. Rxv. 473 (1978); Tigar, The Supreme
Court 1969 Term, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 Hanv. L. REv. 1, 18 (1970); White, Federal Habeas Corpus: The
Impact of the Failure to Assert a Constitutional Claim at Trial, 58 VA. L. REv. 67
(1972); Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation,
Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1262 (1966). But see
Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of ConstitutionalRights
in Criminal Procedure, 75 Micnr. L. REv. 1214 (1977) (arguing that the allocation
of authority question is irrelevant to the habeas cases).
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I. WHAT IS INFORMED CONSENT?

The focus of the doctrine of informed consent is decisionmaking." The doctrine attempts to define the appropriate allocation of decisionmaking roles between doctor and patient.
The common law maxim that "every human being . . .has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body" 12
initially led to the conclusion that an operation performed by a
physician without the patient's consent gave rise to a cause of action
for battery. The meaning of "consent" was generally not considered problematic. In the paradigm case, the patient went to the
doctor, was told he needed an operation, and acquiesced, either
explicitly or by not protesting. Prior to 1960, most courts viewed
such a dialogue as sufficient. The adequacy of consent was scrutinized only if the patient lacked legal competence to consent, or if
the doctor either misrepresented the nature of the operation or
performed an operation different from that proposed. 1" As long as
the issue was framed this way, no conflict was perceived between
the common law norm giving the patient control over his body and
the professional norm giving the expert a dominant role. The
legal norm was preserved in form; in actuality, the professional was
in control.
Beginning about 1960, courts began to reexamine the consent
doctrine. They began looking beyond the explicit or implicit signal
from patient to doctor to examine the content of the "bargaining
process." They began asking whether the doctor had communicated
sufficient information to the patient about the proposed treatment
14
and possible alternatives.
". See Capron, Informed Decisionmaking in Genetic Counselling: A Dissent to
the "Wrongful Life" Debate, 48 IND. L.J. 581, 588 (1973); Goldstein, For Harold
Laswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and
the Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 691 (1975); Katz, supra note 1 passim.
In their discussions of informed consents applicability to lawyers, both Rosenthal and Chused fail to distinguish between participation and decisionmaking. They
both discuss increased client performance of lawyering tasks, and then discuss informed consent as if it were equivalent to performance. See D. RosaNTAY., supra
note 6, at 30-34, 154-61; Chused, supra note 7, at 651-61, 668-72. Performance
requires some decisionmaking, but one can be directed in almost all elements of
one's performance; conversely, one can make decisions and delegate the performance
to another. For the purpose of this Article, the issue is client decisionmaking, not
client performance.
12 Schloendorff v. Soc'y of the N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92,
93 (1914).
Is For a discussion of this history, see 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE Lw OF
TORTS § 3.10 (1956); Meisel, supra note 1, at 77-80; Plante, An Analysis of
"Informed Consent," 36 FoanDH,
L. lEv. 639, 657-58 (1968).
14 See Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); Salgo v.
Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170

(1957).
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The theory underlying this transformation seems simple and
straightforward. Consent is not meaningful unless a person understands what he is consenting to; understanding requires information, and it is the doctor who must supply the necessary information
because the patient lacks the expertise to procure and translate it
himself. As evidenced both by the emergence of conflicts between
cases and by the outpouring of commentary,' 5 however, this statement of the theory raises many questions: what information need
be communicated; how much information is enough; who determines the "what" and the "how much"; does the information have
to be understood by the particular patient; does the doctor retain
power to decide in particular cases whether to forego communication of information because of the resulting harm to the patient;
does the plaintiff-patient have to prove that treatment would have
been refused if the information withheld had been disclosed. Resolution of these questions would greatly affect the extent of the law's
commitment to patient decisionmaking.
In grappling with these questions, courts tended to substitute
negligence principles for the older battery rules. Although "unconsented touching," the key element of common law battery, arguably
was present in suits for lack of informed consent, battery cases did
not seem to provide a way of determining how much information
was enough. The choice seemed to be between a standard requiring "full disclosure" and one recognizing manifestations of consent
except in cases of fraud or misrepresentation. 1 6 Neither extreme
was acceptable. "Full disclosure" seemed unnecessary, possibly confusing to the patient, and wasteful of the time and resources of the
doctor, but a fraud or misrepresentation standard imposed no
affirmative duty to disclose.
A more precise way of balancing the doctor's and the patient's
interests seemed desirable. Once the problem was perceived in this
way, many courts naturally looked to familiar ways of balancing
35 Pre-1970 references are set forth in Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent
to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 628, 628 n.1 (1970). Since then there has been
extensive commentary. See, e.g., Alsobrook, Informed Consent: A Right to Know,
40 INs. CouNsE. J. 580 (1973); Capron, supra note 5; Goldstein, supra note 11;
Katz, supra note 1; Meisel, supra note 1; Riskin, Informed Consent: Looking for
the Action, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 580; Schneyer, supra note 5; Shartis, Informed Con-

sent: Some Problems Revisited, 51 NEB L. REv. 527 (1972); Comment, Informed
Consent: The Illusion of Patient Choice, 23 EmoRy L.J. 503 (1974); Note, Informed
Consent-A Proposed Standard for Medical Disclosure, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 548
(1973); Note, Informed Consent and the Dying Patient, 83 YALE L.J. 1632 (1974);
Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal Therapy for the Doctor-PatientRelationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533 (1970).
16 See Capron, supra note 5, at 405-06.
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interests-those of the law of negligence. Because the standard of
reasonableness in medical malpractice cases traditionally was set by
17
reference to the ordinary practitioner, not the reasonable man,
courts merged the question of the extent of required disclosure with
that of who sets the standard. Thus, during the first decade or so
of the development of informed consent, plaintiffs alleging a failure
to obtain informed consent were required to prove, with expert
testimony, that the information they received fell below the professional standard. 18
The use of the professional standard created new tensions.
Allowing physicians to determine what information reached the
patient did not fully protect the new right to information adequate
to make decisions concerning one's own body; the patient's right
to decide was made dependent upon the extent to which the medical
profession encouraged disclosure. 19
In a series of cases decided during the 1970s, courts recognized this tension and began to measure the appropriateness of disclosure against the "traditional" negligence standard. 20 The test
became "whether a reasonable person, in what the physician knows
or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach
17 See W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 162-63 (4th Ed. 1971);

RESTATEMENT

(SEcoND) OF TORTS §299-A (1965).

Although it has been argued that this standard does not require a sufficiently
high standard of conduct because it is tailored to minimum skill rather than to a
more normative standard, see Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General
Comments, 12 VAND. L. lEv. 535, 538 (1959), the important point for present
purposes is that the standard is determined by the profession's norms and behavior,
not the public's.
18 For example, in Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing
denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960), one of the first informed-consent cases,
the court stated that the degree of disclosure is "primarily a question of medical
judgment," and the duty to disclose, therefore, "is limited to those disclosures which
a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar circumstances." Id. at 409, 350 P.2d at 1106. In denying a motion for rehearing, the
court limited the need for expert testimony to those cases in which some disclosure
was given. If no disclosure at all was made, then no expert testimony would be
required. 187 Kan. at 189-90, 354 P.2d at 673 (1960).
19 If the need for disclosure were determined from the patient's perspective,
this distinction would not be crucial. The medical norm, though, is that physicians
should determine what disclosures are in the best interests of their patients. See
Katz, supra note 1, at 141-42; Note, 79 YALE L.J., supra note 15, at 1536-38.
Further, empirical evidence indicates that physicians underestimate their patients'
desires for information. See McKinley, Who Is Really Ignorant: Physician or
Patient?, J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAvioR, Mar. 1975, at 3-11.
20 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972). See also Riedinger v. Colburn, 361 F. Supp. 1073 (D. Idaho 1973);
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson
v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Holt v. Nelson, 11 Wash. App. 230,
523 P.2d 211 (1974); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 1, 227
N.W.2d 647 (1975).
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significance to the risk... in deciding whether or not to forego the
proposed therapy." 21 This test eliminated the professional standard's requirement of expert testimony and allowed a lay jury to
rely on its own experience and judgment.2 2 A privilege of nondisclosure was retained, however, when the doctor decided that dis,closure would harm the patient. 23 Interpreted broadly enough, this
privilege could eliminate any difference between the professional
-standard and the reasonable-person standard.2 4 In addition, these
courts held that failure to disclose was not a compensable harm by
itself; utilizing notions of proximate cause, they required the patient to prove that, if the required disclosures had been made, a
reasonable person in the patient's position would not have under25

gone treatment.

As Professor Katz has shown, this history reveals less than a
wholehearted commitment to patient self-determination. 26

How-

21 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 21064
(1972) (quoting Waltz & Scheuneman, supra note 15, at 639-40).
2
By not using a subjective standard of materiality-that is, what a particular
-patient would deem material-the court potentially subordinates the particular
patient's informational needs to efficiency concerns by allowing the jury to use the
reasonable-person tort standard. See Capron, supra note 5, at 404-18. Still this
potential divergence between the opinions of a lay jury and the needs of a particular patient seems less significant than the divergence between the professional
standard and some form of lay standard.
23 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S.24
1064 (1972).
See Katz, supra note 1, at 156-58; Riskin, supra note 15, at 588.
25 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1064 (1972). For discussions of this requirement, see Capron, supra note 5,
at 418-23;
Katz, supra note 1, at 160-64.
2
G See Katz, supra note 1.
Since Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), there have been few changes in the
case law, but the medical malpractice crisis has triggered a series of informedconsent statutes. Twenty-four states have such statutes; all but Georgia's were
enacted after 1974. Three states-Pennsylvania, Utah, and Washington-adopt a
reasonable person standard similar to Canterbury's. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit 40,
§ 1301.103 (Purdon Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (1977); WASH.
REv. CODE § 7.70.050 (Supp. 1977). In Washington, however, use of a prescribed
form constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with the informed-consent
requirement. See WAsH. REv. CODE § 7.70.060 (Supp. 1977). Seven states adopt
the medical standard. See DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 18, § 6852 (Supp. 1978); IDAHo
CODE § 39-4304 (Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §44-2816 (1978); N.Y. PuB.
HEALTH LA v § 2805-d (McKinney 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26-40.1-02(5)
(1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3417 (Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909
(Supp. 1979). Four states have a hybrid standard, in which the degree of disclosure is initially set by the professional standard, but which requires that the
professional standard allow a reasonable person a general understanding of the
procedures, alternatives, and substantial risks and hazards. See FLA. STAT. § 768.46
(Supp. 1978); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 304.40-320 (Supp. 1978); ME. RBv. STAT. tit.
24, § 2905; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (Supp. 1977). Another four states have
their own definition of informed consent. See ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.556 (Supp.
1978) (common risks and reasonable discretion because of adverse effect of disclosure); CoLo. BEy. STAT. §§ 13-20-301 to 13-20-305 (Supp. 1976) (likelihood
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ever, a core to the concept of informed consent has developed over
the last several decades. Physicians have been forced to consider
whether they have an obligation to do more than obtain assent to
their proposed treatment. They have had to consider the possibility
that they must disclose to their patients the nature of the disease,
the nature of proposed treatment, the risks of treatment, the probability of success, and possible alternatives.2 7 Lawyers at the least
have an obligation to consider whether there is a need for a similar
dialogue concerning disclosure within their own profession. 2s
II. THE LEGAL PROFESSION

AND INFORMED CONSENT

The doctrine of informed consent, then, combines the patient's
right to make a decision with a requirement that the physician proof death, serious injuries, likelihood of success, alternative procedures); IowA

CODE

§ 147.137 (Supp. 1979) (general terms of nature of procedures and the known
risks of certain serious injuries); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40 (1977) (general
terms of nature of procedures and known risks of certain serious injuries). Georgia
simply requires that the course of treatment be described in general terms, GA.
CODE ANN. § 88-2906 (Supp. 1979). Ohio has an informed-consent form appended
to the statute, Oiuo REv. STAT. ANN. § 2317.54 (Page Supp. 1978). Texas and
Hawaii have delegated to outside boards the promulgation of standards for particular types of treatment, H. wA REv. STAT. § 453 (Supp. 1978); TEX. REV. Cv.
STAT. ANN. art. 4590; § 6.01 (Vernon Supp. 1978), and Rhode Island has made
the question of informed consent a preliminary issue for the judge. R.L Gmz.
LAws § 9-19-32 (Supp. 1978).
Most of these statutes also deal with the questions of causation and therapeutic
privilege, paralleling Canterbury's approach to these issues. Finally, 13 of these
statutes make a written consent form either conclusive or presumptive proof of
informed consent. To the extent this approach channels informed consent into
ritualized exchanges of paper, it undercuts the values that informed consent is
attempting
to achieve.
27
Although this statement cannot be proved, it is supported in the proliferation
of statutes, see note 26 supra, and the outpouring of commentary in the medical
journals, see, e.g., Annas, Informed Consent, 29 ANN. REv. MED. 9-14 (1978);
Connors & Bianco, Comments on Informed Consent, 27 MD. ST. MED. J. 46-47
(Sept. 1978); Feldman, Is Informed Consent Possible in Psychiatry?, 6(7) LEGAL
ASPECTS MED. PrtAC. 29-31 (July 1978); Flannery, just sign here . . . , 31(5)
S.D.J. MED. 33-37 (May 1978); Moore, Consent Forms-How, or Whether, They
Should Be Used, 53 MAYo CrNic Paoc. 393-96 (June 1978); Morison, Informed
Consent or Contractual Absolution?, 71 J. TENN. MED. A. 293-94 (Apr. 1978);
Schwarz, The Use of a Checklist in Obtaining Informed Consent for Treatment with
Medication, 29 Hosp. COmMUNiTY Psycsi. 97-100 (1978); Sharpe, The Proper
Format and Function of Consent Forms, 118 CAN. MED. A.J. 1001-04 (1978).
Whether this attention produces significant change is an open question. See Katz,
supra note 1. But such a dialogue is the first step toward change.
28 This assertion derives from two aspects of similarity between doctors and
lawyers. First, the two have sufficiently similar roles as professionals to warrant this
statement. See note 6 supra. Second, even if a client's interest in controlling
decisionmaking is less "fundamental" than a patient's right to control decisions
relating to his body, it is sufficiently basic to make the inquiry necessary. See
notes 114-32 infra & accompanying text. But see Rueschemeyer, Lawyers and
Doctors: A Comparison of Two Professions, in SocIoLoGY OF LAW 267 (V. Aubert
ed. 1969) (discussing differences between professions, particularly with regard to
influence of clients).
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vide sufficient information to make the exercise of that right meaningful. No similar general doctrine applies to the lawyer-client
relationship. Neither the case law nor the Code of Professional
Responsibility 2 9 establishes a clear line between the lawyer's decisionmaking authority and the client's; even when the client is
clearly given the decision, there is confusion over what information
he must be given. This section will look at the case law and at the
Code of Professional Responsibility in order to discuss both of these
issues-the allocation of decisionmaking authority and the requirements that lawyers provide their clients with adequate information.
A. Whose Decision-Lawyer or Client?
I. The Cases
Because of the strong tradition of requiring consent to actions
involving the body, patients have usually had at least formal control
over the doctor's general treatment decisions.8 0 Thus, the question
addressed in the medical cases is whether the doctor provided the
patient with adequate information. In the lawyer-client cases, the
issue of decisionmaking authority is discussed at a more basic level:
whether the client has even formal control over the decisions in
question.81 For example, suppose a client insists on calling a witness at trial. Does the lawyer have the right to say: "No, I have
control over that decision. As long as I remain your lawyer you
29

The American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility, ABA

CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL REsPoNsmIry, although not legally binding on lawyers

unless adopted by the appropriate state authorities, has been adopted, with some
variations, in all jurisdictions. See A. KAurmw, PROBLEMS IN PnoFEssroNAL
RESPONsmLrY 29 (1977).
30 See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra. Except in emergency situations or
in cases involving refusals to accept treatment on religious grounds, see, e.g.,
Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964), the patient must at least give formal
consent to the proposed treatment.
As the medical cases demonstrate, one can have decisionmaking power with no
substantial right to information. See notes 1-25 supra & accompanying text. The
opposite may also be true. For example, the ABA standards for criminal-defense
lawyers require consultation with the client over tactical matters, but leave the
decision to the lawyer. See ABA STANi.mms REI.xr.TO TE ADMmSTRATION OF
Consultation may
CRmN uN JusncE: ThE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 5.2 (1971).
influence decisionmaking, see Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the
Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HAnv. L. REv. 410, 414-18
(1978), but it is not even a weak form of a decisionmaldng right.
31 Perhaps this basic issue of who has decisionmaking authority is addressed at
different levels in medicine and in law because in medicine, the patient has to
"consent" in some sense in order for the doctor to perform treatment, unless the
treatment is to be imposed by force; in contrast, much of what a lawyer does for a
client is done outside the client's presence.
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must do as I say on this question." Or may the client assert: "You
are my agent; you must follow my instructions."
The answer to these questions depends upon which group of
cases one consults. One line of cases states that the client has control over the subject matter of the action, but that the lawyer
controls procedure and tactics. 32 These cases suggest that the lawyer
can proceed in some areas despite his client's contrary instructions. The second line of cases-the instructions cases-require the
lawyer to follow his client's instructions 3-and thus suggest that
the client has ultimate authority.
The instructions rule was established in a line of nineteenth
century debt-collection cases.- Typically, the client would instruct
the lawyer to file suit on a note, but the lawyer would do nothing
beyond talking to the debtor about paying up.3 5 After the debtor
went bankrupt or the client lost patience, the client would sue the
lawyer, who would defend his decision not to sue as an exercise of
judgment for the client's benefit. The courts invariably rejected this
defense.3 6
Despite the courts' continued adherence to the instructions
37
rule, the rule may not apply to questions of procedure and
32
For the subject-matter/procedure rule, see 2 MEcHIEM oN AoENcy § 2160
(1914); 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client §80(b) (1937) and cases cited therein.
According to another formulation of this rule, the attorney has implied authority to
do everything necessary and proper in the conduct of a case, provided his actions
affect the remedy and not the cause of action. See W.A. Robinson, Inc. v. Burke,
327 Mass. 670, 674-75, 100 N.E.2d 366, 369 (1951). See also RoscoE PouND-AmaucAN TRIAL LAwmas FOUNDATION, ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARBREN
CoNFERNcE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNrED STATES: Enucs AND ADvocAcY (Final
Report) 14 (June 1978) [hereinafter cited as ETCs AND ADvocAcY].
3
3 See cases cited in notes 34-37 infra. See also R. MALLEN & V. LEvrT, LEcAL
MALPRACTICE § 218 (1977).
34
Wilson v. Coffin, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 316 (1848); Gilbert v. Williams, 8
Mass. 51 (1811); Cox v. Livingston, 2 Watts & Serg. 103 (Pa. 1841); Fox v. James,
14 S.W. 1007 (Tex. Ct. App. 1881); Crooker v. Hutchinson & Cushman, 1 Vt. 73

(1827).

35 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Williams, 8 Mass. 51 (1811); Cox v. Livingston, 2 Watts
& Serg.
103 (Pa. 1841).
36
See cases cited in note 34 supra.
37
See, e.g., Sarti v. Udall, 91 Ariz. 24, 369 P.2d 92 (1962) (failure to follow
client's instructions in drawing up property settlement pursuant to divorce); W.L.
Douglas Shoe Co. v. Rollwage, 187 Ark. 1084, 63 S.W.2d 841 (1933) (file garnishment action against insurance company); Shelley v. Hansen, 244 Cal. App. 2d 266,
53 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1966) (instructed to file suit); Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App.
2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954) (failure to appeal on time after client instructed
attorney to appeal); Lally v. Kuster, 177 Cal. 783, 171 P. 961 (1918) (file suit on
note); Caltrider v. Weant, 147 Md. 338, 128 A. 72 (1925) (file mechanic's lien);
Whitney v. Abbott, 191 Mass. 59, 77 N.E. 524 (1906) (attorney disregarded instructions to keep title of engine in client's name); Lichow v. Sowers, 334 Pa. 353,
6 A.2d 285 (1939) (failure to file papers to reopen proceedings); Ramage v. Cohn,
124 Pa. Super. Ct. 525, 189 A. 496 (1937) (instructions regarding delivery of
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tactics. First, clients usually lose suits against attorneys for not
carrying out the client's tactical instructions, although the typical
38
reasons given are the client's failure to prove causation or damages.
Second, numerous statements in another line of cases seem to reject
the instructions rule and affirm a lawyer's authority to make certain
"procedural" and "tactical" decisions.3 9
The cases citing the subject-matter/procedure rule fall into two
categories-a few malpractice cases 40 and a large number of cases
in which the client asserts his lawyer's lack of authority in order to
escape liability to a third party (the state in a criminal case or the
adverse party in a civil action).41
settlement check). See also Salopek v. Schoemann, 20 Cal. 2d 150, 124 P.2d 21
(1942) (attorney hired to contest will who disregarded instructions not to defeat
son's 3share may be dismissed; client not liable under fee agreement with attorney).
8 The only malpractice case involving procedure or tactics that directly discusses the authority question is Stricklan v. Koella, 546 S.W.2d 810 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1976), cert. denied, id. (1977). In that case, a client sued his lawyer for failing to
follow the client's instructions to request a change of venue and to have a deposition
transcribed. One of the grounds of the decision against the client was the absence
of showing of damages. An alternative ground was that in Tennessee a lawyer has
no obligation to follow the trial tactics his client demands.
The courts that have decided cases involving instructions with regard to
procedure or tactics have based their decisions on other grounds. See Walker v.
Kruse, 484 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1973) (instructions issue not discussed; no cause
of action on any of several grounds); Martin v. Hall, 20 Cal. App. 3d 414, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 730 (1971) (client instructed attorney to file double-jeopardy claim; instructions issue was not discussed; issue was whether attorney was negligent);
App. 3d 1009,
Trustees of Schools of Tp. 42 North, Cook County v. Schroeder, 2 Ill.
278 N.E.2d 431 (1971) (failure to raise issue on appeal; no damages shown);
App. 457 (1934) (client instructed lawyer to call alibi
Olson v. North, 276 Ill.
witnesses; client lost for failure to produce expert testimony); Nave v. Baird, 12
Ind. 318 (1859) (lawyer refused to put on witnesses or follow client's request for
change of venue; no damages shown).
39
See note 32 supra & accompanying text.
40 The cause of action for malpractice against a lawyer requires the client to
prove all the elements of negligence: duty, breach of the standard of care, causation,
and damages. The existence of a duty is established by showing an agreement for
services between lawyer and client, although even gratuitous undertakings can create
a duty of care. The standard of care for lawyers is similar to that for doctors-a
lawyer must exercise the skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by lawyers in
good standing in the profession. As for causation and damages, if a plaintiff in a
malpractice case complains that a lawyer's error resulted in the loss of a law suit,
familiar notions of causality are said to require that the client show that he would
have won the suit but for the lawyer's error. The plaintiff in the malpractice case
must therefore relitigate the first case by presenting the evidence that was (or would
have been) presented earlier and thereby prove that he would have won the first
case. As with the medical cases, the causation and damages requirements can
sharply reduce the possibility of successful informed-consent suits. See note 25
supra & accompanying text; text accompanying notes 397-407 infra. For general
discussions of the above requirements, see R. MLXX, & V. LEvrr, supra note 33;
Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REv. 755 (1959);
Note, Attorney Malpractice, 63 CoLTJm. L. REv. 1292, 1307-11 (1963); Comment,
Professional Negligence, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 627 (1973).
41
See notes 49-80 infra and accompanying text.
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The subject-matter/procedure rule has been applied in malpractice cases primarily to protect the client's authority to settle a
case or to approve an agreement or contract. In deciding that
lawyers have an affirmative obligation to bring those decisions to the
client,42 the courts have remarked that the client controls the subject matter of the case. They have either implied or stated explicitly, however, that some matters remain under the lawyer's
control.43 Yet these suggestions are neither binding nor very helpful in identifying the procedures or tactics that are controlled by the
lawyer. And, aside from these statements and applications, this case
law generally is of little assistance in determining which decisions
are to be made by an attorney and which are reserved for his
44
client.
42 See Burgraf v. Byrnes, 94 Minn. 418, 103 N.W. 215 (1905); Coopwood v.
Baldwin, 25 Miss. 129 (1852); cf. Vooth v. McEachen, 181 N.Y. 28, 73 N.E. 48&
(1905) (verdict for plaintiff reversed because of erroneous instruction on damages).
Harrop v. Western Airlines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1977), and Hayes v.
Eagle-Ficher Industries, 513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1975), represent refusals by two
courts to enforce settlements not agreed to by the attorney's clients, or, in the latter
case, by all of his clients. Two other cases involve the lawyer's liability for failure
to communicate settlement offers when conflicts of interest were also present. See
Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Johnston v.
Andrade, 54 S.W.2d 1029 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). In Rubenstein & Rubenstein v.
Papadakos, 31 A.D.2d 615, 295 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1968), attorneys sued their client for
legal fees. The client alleged noncommunication of a settlement offer both as an
affirmative defense and as a counterclaim. The defense and the counterclaim were
rejected because the client conceded that she would not have accepted the settlement
offer. In dictum, the court noted that, in "certain circumstances," noncommunication
of such an offer could constitute a defense to an action for legal services, but did
not afford a right to affirmative relief. Id. at 615, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 877. See also
. oN PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, OpmIOrs, No. 326 (1970).
ABA Co
But see Doff v. Belles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966). There, the court dismissed a negligence claim based on failure to communicate a settlement offer
because of plaintiff's failure to produce an expert witness who would testify that
communicating such offers was common practice within the profession. In Odom
v. Hilton, 105 Ga. App. 286, 124 S.E.2d 415 (1962), the court expressly refused to
decide whether a lawyer has a duty to transmit every settlement offer to his client.
The claim of noncommunication was dismissed on the grounds that the settlement
offer had been made not to the plaintiff in the malpractice case, but to a third party
who was the named plaintiff in the original action. Id. at 291, 124 S.E.2d at 418.
That distinction, however, does not take adequate account of the fact that the former
complainant was also the real party in interest in the original action.
43
In Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968), the
appellate court discussed the matter of client control over subject matter in the
context of multiple representation. The California rule was summarized as requiring "that the attorney must disclose all facts and circumstances which in the judgment of a lawyer of ordinary skill and capacity are necessary to enable his client
to make free and intelligent decisions regarding the subject matter of the representation." Id. at 147, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 414 (citation omitted).
44
A few malpractice cases hold a lawyer liable for agreeing to a dismissal or
consenting to a judgment without authority from his client. See Walpole's Administrator v. Carlisle, 32 Ind. 415 (1869) (judgment against attorney-defendant's
intestate for dismissing case without knowledge or consent of plaintiff); cf. Coon v.
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A client's loss of a claim or defense may be the product of any
of a nearly infinite variety of actions or omissions on the part of
his attorney. 45 Many of these actions or omissions could result from
the lawyer's unilateral decision and not from a decision made by the
client after consulting with his lawyer. The question here is
whether a malpractice suit may be based upon the fact that
these decisions were made unilaterally by the attorney. Except for
the instructions decisions, no malpractice claims have been based on
the fact that the attorney, rather than the client, made the decision. 48
The probable explanation for the failure to raise the issue of
allocation of authority in many cases is simply that the attorneys'
actions were the product of inadvertence rather than any deliberate
decision. For instance, an attorney who filed after the deadline did
not actually decide to do so, but simply neglected to keep track of
Ginsberg, 32 Colo. App. 206, 509 P.2d 1293 (1973) (sufficient evidence that
attorney was liable for stipulating to judgment without express authority, but plaintiff-client failed to show that he would have won suit absent attorney's negligence).
45 The attorney may fail to file an appearance, see Maryland Cas. Co. v. Price,
231 F. 397 (4th Cir. 1916), or an answer, see Masters v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 250,
124 S.E.2d 574 (1962), or may fail to take certain procedural steps to protect his
client's interests, see Case v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 352
(E.D. La. 1971) (failure to file timely suit); Meagher v. Kavli, 256 Minn. 54, 97
N.W.2d 370 (1959) (rejection of allegation that attorney unnecessarily contested
issue of client's liability at trial); Hodges v. Carter, 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144
(1954) (improper service). He might file suit in the wrong court, see Meredith
v. Woodward, 16 Wkly. Notes Cas. 146 (Pa. 1885) (lack of professional care
where bill filed improperly in equity rather than at law); Hill v. Mynatt, 59 S.W.
163 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900) (action should have been filed in federal rather than
state court; no liability because good faith error); he might waive or fail to raise
certain of the available legal claims or defenses, see Martin v. Burns, 102 Ariz. 341,
429 P.2d 660 (1967) (failure to raise defense on appeal); Kimen v. Ettelson, 303
Ill. App. 230, 24 N.E.2d 871 (1940) (failure to raise specific substantive distinction on appeal not actionable); Sikora v. Steinberg, 40 Misc. 2d 649, 243 N.Y.S.2d
766 (1963) (failure to sue appropriate parties); Patterson v. Powell, 31 Misc. 250,
64 N.Y.S. 43 (1900) (failure to specially plead statute of limitations not actionable
where result in original action was radical change in law); or he might harm his
client's case by stipulating to certain facts, see Duffy v. Griffith Co., 206 Cal. App.
2d 780, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1962). The attorney might fail to call specific witnesses, see Woodruff v. Tomlin, 423 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), reo'd 593
F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. American Life Ins. Co., 237 Ala. 70, 185 So.
409 (1938), or might refrain from asking certain questions, see Woodruff v. Tomlin,
423 F. Supp. 1284 (W.D. Tenn. 1976) (failure to properly cross-examine witness),
re"'d, 593 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1979). Finally, he might fail to introduce certain
documents into evidence, see Case v. Ricketts, 41 A.2d 304 (D.C. Mun. App. 1945).
Beyond the trial stage, an attorney might. file an appeal too late or not at all
See Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686 (1968) (no appeal filed);
Welder v. Mercer, 247 Ark. 999, 448 S.W.2d 952 (1970) (appeal filed late);
Pete v. Henderson, 124 Cal. App. 2d 487, 269 P.2d 78 (1954) (appeal filed late);
Collins v. Wanner, 382 P.2d 105 (Okla. 1963) (appeal filed late).
46 The malpractice cases that challenge errors like those described in note 45
supra all involve contentions that the attorney's actions were negligent, not that
they were made without authority. See Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 5 (1956) for a review
of such cases.
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time. In such situations, it is misleading to argue that the attorney
should have brought the decision to the client. Malpractice actions
are used here as a check on an attorney's diligence and on the quality
of his work; the issue of decisionmaking authority is beside the
point.47 No conclusions regarding the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority may therefore be drawn from these cases. Yet,
the imbalance in the case law is difficult to explain. Why has the
issue of decisionmaking authority been so infrequently litigated?
Is the rule that attorneys presumptively have control over procedure
and tactics so well-settled that it has not been worth testing,48 or is
the rule really less firm than the secondary sources indicate?
The subject-matter/procedure rule has been cited most often in
cases involving third parties. When a lawyer-agent acts without the
authority of his client-principal, the issue of third-party benefit may
arise. Must a third party who profitted from the lawyer's actions
47
The allocation of decisionmaking power and the problem of improving the
quality of lawyers' work are linked, however, in two ways. First, as a matter of
litigation strategy, a client seeking to avoid the consequences of his lawyer's decisions will argue (1) that the lawyer was incompetent or negligent because he did
not consider the issue in question, and (2) that, if he did think about the issue,
he should have reserved decision for the client. In the past, at least in criminal
habeas cases, complainants have been more successful in making the latter argument. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); sources cited in note 10 supra.
Recent cases, such as Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), indicate, however,
that this second ground may be foreclosed. See note 50 infra. Commentators have
speculated, therefore, that courts will be forced to confront more seriously the
competency issues raised by such lawyer dereliction. See Cover & Aleinikoff,
Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1083-86
(1977); Rosenberg, supra note 10, at 430-39. Second, to the extent that informed
consent performs a monitoring function, see text accompanying notes 263-66 infra,
mistakes grounded on inadvertence may become less frequent.
48 If this is the reason, a better explanation of the theory behind the subjectmatter/procedure dichotomy is still necessary. The test for distinguishing subject
matter and procedure could be a literal one, giving clients control only over actions
that by themselves constitute dismissal of a claim or defense, but not over those
actions that result in dismissal. If this is the test, why use such a narrow construction of "compromise of the subject matter?" The rationale cannot be the
effect of the action on the client's case. From the client's perspective, both types
of actions may be equally important If, then, the line is not one of importance to
the client, is it one of competence? Perhaps the attorney should decide certain
matters because they are uniquely within his "technical" competence, while other
matters are suitable for decision by the client. See text accompanying notes 229-39
infra. Yet, if this is the rationale, questions of relative competence should be
addressed directly, not by defining "compromise of the subject matter."
The subject-matter/procedure dichotomy may be viewed, thirdly, as resting on
some implicit probability judgment. Whenever a claim is settled or compromised,
a client is deprived of the "subject matter" of the action. Procedural or tactical
decisions are less likely to have such an effect. Hence, the rule addresses the
ordinary case, eschewing the finer or more difficult discriminations involved in
determining when an action results in loss of the subject matter. The rejoinder to
this abstention is, of course, that similarly fine discriminations are made all the
time. This instance, no more difficult than the others, can be distinguished only
by the involvement of the legal profession.
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disgorge his benefit, or is the client bound by his attorney's actions?
Courts have grappled with this issue by trying to determine the
4
limits of the lawyer's authority to act in behalf of his client. 0
They have failed, however, to specify whether the issues of allocation of authority and withdrawal of third-party benefit are separable,
and, if they are, how the two are interrelated. Although these cases
frequently state that the client may be bound as against a third party
because the client had given the lawyer express or implied authority
to act as he did, the cases are more consistent with the theory that
considerations of fairness and efficiency require binding the client
regardless of the lawyer's authority.50
49 See Mazor, Power and Responsibility in the Attorney-Client Relation, 20
L. REv. 1120 (1968), for a general discussion of the issues of allocation of
authority and withdrawal of third-party benefit.
The lawyer's role as his client's representative in dealings with third parties is
significantly different from the doctor's role in servicing his patient. Hanna Pitkin
points out that, although political theorists have used the doctor-patient relationship
as an analogue for the politician who represents his constituents in dealings with
third parties, the analogy is really extremely limited. H. Prrmx, Tim CONCEPT OF
REP sENTATiON (1967).
She states that
generally specialists and professional people (other than lawyers) do not
represent their clients. Their actions are not to be attributed to the client.
Theorists may tell us a physician "is the agent of the patient," but do we
ever have cause to say, "The patient cured himself by the agency of Dr.
Smith?"
Id. 139.
5
o Many state statutes identify the circumstances in which an attorney can bind
his client. Most of these statutes bind the client to agreements made on the record
of the court. See, e.g., ALAsxA STAT. § 22.20.050 (1962); CAL. Crv. PToc. CODE
§ 283 (West Supp. 1978); IDAiO CODE § 3-202 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-60-5
(Burns Supp. 1978); MoNT. REv. CODE ANN. § 37-61-403 (1978); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-51-32(2) (1977). Some statutes also bind the client to written agreements. See, e.g., Amuz. B. Crv. Paoc. 80(d); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-605 (1973);
MwNr. STAT. ANN. 481.08 (West 1971); WAsH. REv . CODE § 2.44.010(1) (1961).
A third group of statutes binds the client to agreements within the scope of the
powers and duties of the attorney. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 610.16(2) (West
1975); NEB. REv. STAT. §7-107(2) (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. §36-2-11 (1978);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-13-02(2) (1974); 7 S.D. Comp. LAws ANx. § 16-18-11
(1967). This last group incorporate the common law standard. Their principal
effect, therefore, is to specify the evidence acceptable for proof of the existence of
the attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 7-107(2) (1977)
(accepting the "statement of the attorney himself, his written agreement signed
and filed with the clerk, or an entry thereof upon the records of the court"). The
other groups of statutes have, by and large, been interpreted similarly. For exampIe, in Preston v. Hill, 50 Cal. 43 (1875), the court stated that the statute "is only
declaratory of the common law rule . . . . It was not intended to enlarge or
abridge the authority of the attorney; but only to prescribe the manner of its exercise, by requiring the agreement to be filed with the clerk or entered upon the
minutes." Id. 53. See also Nelson v. Nelson, 111 Minn. 183, 126 N.W. 731
(1910). Even if these statutes did depart from the common law, however, they
still would address only the attorney's power to bind his client. The presence of
considerations such as judicial economy and fairness to third parties distinguishes this
question from that of the proper allocation of decisionmaking authority.
These issues have been discussed extensively in the context of criminal habeas
actions. See sources cited in note 10 supra. For example, they were raised in
STr.
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Most of the third-party cases involve one of three situations:
settlement, tactics at trial, or the attorney's default or misconduct.
With regard to settlement, it is said, in keeping with the malpractice cases: "[i]t is fundamental that an attorney does not by reason
of his employment have authority to compromise his client's cause
of action absent an emergency requiring prompt action." 51 As
applied, the rule is subject to other exceptions as well. The client
will be bound when his actions have given his attorney apparent authority.52 In some jurisdictions, he will have to overcome a presumption that his attorney had authorityP3 Further, if sufficient
time has elapsed so that reversal would prejudice the other party,
the settlement may not be repudiated.54 Finally, if an attorney has
reached a settlement without authority and has then absconded with
the proceeds, his client may be able to seek recovery of the proceeds
only in an action against the attorney.55 These deviations illustrate
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), in which a criminal defendant's attorney
failed to file pre-trial motions and to make contemporaneous objections to the admission into evidence of inculpatory statements made by the defendant to police. The
Supreme Court, reversing the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, determined that the
defendant was barred from challenging the admissibility of the statements in a
federal habeas action. Justice Rebnquist's majority opinion held that the failure of
defendant's counsel to raise the issue forfeited the defendant's right to object to the
admissibility of the statement. Under this view, whether the lawyer or the client
has the authority to make the decision is irrelevant. Chief Justice Burger, in a
concurring opinion, strongly implied that, regardless of whether the client had
wanted to raise the confession issue, decisions such as these are "necessarily entrusted to the defendant's attorney, who must make on-the-spot decisions at virtually all stages of the criminal trial." Id. 93 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice
Stevens' opinion is more cryptic. In a footnote, he states that a decision by counsel
may not be binding if made over the overt objection of the defendant Id. 94-95
n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring). But see Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966)
(Harlan, J., concurring) ("I believe a lawyer may properly make a tactical determination of how to run a trial even in the face of his client's incomprehension or
even explicit disapproval:').
51 Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Indus. Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 893 (10th Cir. 1975).
See generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 944, 945 (1953).
52
See Yanchor v. Kagan, 22 Cal. App. 3d 544, 99 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1971)
(client told other party to discuss case with attorney, took party to attorney's office
for that purpose); accord, Rader v. Campbell, 134 W.Va. 485, 61 S.E.2d 228
(1950). Contra, Pokorny v. Stastny, 51 Wis. 2d 14, 186 N.W.2d 284 (1971)
(dictum), relying on Fosba v. Prosser, 120 Wis. 336, 97 N.W. 924 (1904) (attorney can bind client in accord and satisfaction only upon express authority).
53 See Church v. Church, 40 Cal. App. 2d 701, 705, 105 P.2d 643, 645 (1940);
Carroccio v. Thorpe, 230 Md. 457, 463, 187 A.2d 678, 681 (1963); Kahn v.
Brunswick-Balke Collender Co., 156 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Mo. 1941). See also Howell
v. Reimann, 77 Idaho 84, 288 P.2d 649 (1955) (reversing trial court for refusing
to allow presentation of evidence to rebut presumption).
54 See Yamall v. Yorkshire Worsted Mills, 370 Pa. 93, 87 A.2d 192 (1952);
cf. Northwest Realty Co. v. Perez, 80 S.D. 62, 119 N.W.2d 114 (1963) (judgment
based on settlement vacated where prompt motion for vacation and no injury to
other party). See generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d 957 § 13 (1953).
55 See Whittier Union High School Dist. v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County,
66 Cal. App. 3d 504, 136 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1977); Cohen v. Goldman, 85 R.I. 434,
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that authority is not the sole issue; justifiable reliance by the other
party may cause the client to be bound even when the attorney
lacked authority.
The second set of cases, those involving trial tactics and procedure, present similar considerations. Two pairs of cases, each pair
involving similar factual patterns, illustrate how considerations of
reliance and efficiency lead courts to manipulate the subject-matter/
procedure rule. In the first pair of cases-Duffy v. Griffith Co.56 and
Harness v. Pacific Curtainwall Co.57-an attorney stipulated, without
his client's consent, to withdrawal of an issue from consideration by
the trier of fact. The withdrawn issue in each of the cases was one
on which the client might have prevailed. Each client, appealing
from an adverse judgment, asserted his attorney's lack of authority
to make the stipulation.58
In Duffy, the California District Court of Appeals affirmed,
stating that counsel had the right, without consulting his client, to
132 A.2d 414 (1957); of. Navrides v. Zurich Ins. Co., 5 Cal. 3d 698, 488 P.2d 637,
97 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1971) (action against insurer for proceeds already paid to plaintiffs attorney dismissed; debt treated as paid).
56 206 Cal. App. 2d 780, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1962).
57 235 Cal. App. 2d 485, 45 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1965).
58
In Duffy v. Griffith Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 780, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1962),
the attorney for Griffith Company, at the close of the evidence, stated that, on the
basis of research completed during the weekend, he believed that the co-defendant,
the driver of a truck involved in a fatal accident, had been within the scope of his
employment with Griffith at the time of the accident. Id. at 785, 24 Cal. Rptr. at
163. He then stipulated to that conclusion. Closing arguments and jury instructions were based on this concession. The jury returned a verdict against Griffith.
The company then filed a post-trial motion, stating that no authority had been
given or requested for the concession and, had such authority been requested by
the attorney, it would have been refused. The motion for a new trial was denied
and the Griffith Company appealed, arguing that the driver was not within the
scope of his employment at the time of the accident and that the company should
not be bound by the attorney's unauthorized stipulation.
In Harness v. Pacific Curtainwall Co., 235 Cal. App. 2d 485, 45 Cal. Rptr. 454
(1965), one issue in the original litigation was whether the employer's workmen'scompensation insurer was entitled to a lien against any judgment recovered by the
plaintiff-employee. This question had two sub-issues: (1) whether the primary
employer had failed to provide a safe place to work, and (2) whether the unsafe
condition was a concurrent cause of plaintiff's injuries. If either of these questions
were answered in the negative, the insurance company would have its statutory
lien. Originally these issues were submitted to the jury, but, to avoid requiring
the jury to return for another day of deliberation, both attorneys stipulated that
the judge decide the lien question. Plaintiff's attorney, who was also retained by
the insurance company to protect its lien interest, then stipulated that the court
could make a finding that "at the time of the accident [the place of primary employment] was an unsafe place to work." Id. at 488, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 455-56.
Rejecting the insurer's petition that the stipulation on the safety question be set
aside as entered into without proper authority, the trial court upheld the validity
of the stipulation and on the basis of that stipulation denied the insurer's application for a lien against the employee's judgment. The insurer, on appeal, argued
once again that the findings were the result of a stipulation which, as construed
by the court, was one that the attorney had no authority to make.
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withdraw the defense that an employee had acted beyond the scope
of his employment: "The trial attorney is in full charge of his
client's cause or defense. . . . Specifically his is the prerogative of
withdrawing one of two defenses when he concludes that it cannot
be sustained and that its fruitless pursuit may prejudice the other
sound defense." 59 In Harness, the court reversed, basing its decision in part on a finding that the attorney's stipulation was unauthorized. The attorney had no authority, the court concluded,
to stipulate away the client's interest in the litigation. 60
Considerations of prejudice and judicial economy offer the best
explanation for the discrepancy between the two cases. First, the
possibility of prejudice (or unfair advantage), that was present in
Duffy because the case was tried before a jury, was absent in
Harness,a decision by a judge. To the extent that an attorney in a
jury case is dissatisfied with the trier of fact, he might gain an unfair
advantage by stipulating an issue away as a means of obtaining a
new trial-and a new trier of fact-on grounds of lack of authority.
The same ploy will not work when a case is tried before a judge,
because the same judge will normally decide the case on remand.
In order to deter such conduct, courts will not allow lack of
authority to be a sufficient reason for reversal.
Second, a reversal in Duffy would have required that the case be
retried in its entirety before a new jury, whereas Harness did not
involve the costs of empanelling a new jury. The decision was
made by a judge on a record, and the case was to be remanded, in
any event, on other grounds.6 1 The costs of releasing the insurer
from its attorney's unauthorized stipulation were therefore mini62

mal.

59 206 Cal. App. 2d at 787, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 165.

Although the quoted state-

ment might be read as implying that the withdrawn defense was frivolous, the
later part of the opinion notes that the agency issue was one not previously decided
by the courts and so offered "room for difference of opinion." Id. at 795, 24 Cal.

Rptr. at 169. This case illustrates the potential impact of an informed-consent rule.
The court genuflected to the possibility that a malpractice suit would lie against
the attorney if he were negligent in the matter. Yet, as long as the issue to which
the attorney stipulated is unclear as a matter of law, the attorney remains protected
because he has the prerogative of deciding whether to present the issue. See notes

99 & 189 infra. On the other hand, if the lawyer must obtain his client's consent
before withdrawing the issue, the legal uncertainty will no longer relieve the attorney of liability. If the withdrawn issue ultimately would have been decided in his
client's favor, by however close a margin, the attorney would be liable under a

theory of informed consent.
60 The appellate court's reversal was also grounded in its conclusion that the

trial judge's finding of concurrent negligence on the part of the insured was
insufficient.
61 See note 58 supra & accompanying text.
62

Other cases involving stipulations also suggest that the analysis offered here

has more explanatory capability than the subject-matter/procedure

line.
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These conclusions find additional support in the second pair of
cases.

Gasior v. Wentz,63 an action to cancel mineral deeds, was

tried before a judge, who died before rendering a decision. Both
attorneys stipulated that a new judge could decide the case on the
basis of the existing record. After dismissal of the action and denial
by the second judge of a motion for a new trial, the plaintiff appealed, contending that the stipulation had prejudiced certain of
his substantial rights. The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected
this argument, stating that the stipulation referred only to the
remedy and procedure at trial and therefore was within the attorney's authority.0 4
Linsk v. Linsk,5 a divorce proceeding, was heard by a judge
who became disabled before he could render a decision. A mistrial
was declared, and the attorneys stipulated, over the plaintiff's objection, that the case could be decided by another judge on the
record made at the previous trial. The plaintiff was denied a
divorce 61 and, on appeal, argued that the stipulation against her
directions was ground for reversal. The California Supreme Court
agreed, holding that the right to a hearing before the trier of fact
mond Springs Lime Co. v. American River Constructors Co., 16 Cal. App. 3d 581,
94 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1971), plaintiff's counsel stated during closing argument that
he did not believe that one of the two defendants should be found liable. The
jury returned a verdict solely against the other defendant. The exoneration of one
of the defendants led to an appeal by the plaintiff. The argument that plaintiff's
attorney was without authority to make this concession was rejected on appeal on
the ground that the concession was a tactical maneuver within the attorney's
authority. Arguably, the court's determination that the concession was a tactical
maneuver was based on a distinction between a partial concession and one of the
entire case. In Bailey v. McGill, 247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957), however,
a concession that the plaintiff did not rely on a cause of action for abuse of process
was held not to be binding on the plaintiff even though several other theories and
causes of action, albeit not meritorious, were advanced. And in De Long v.
Owsley's Ex'rx, 308 Ky. 128, 213 S.W.2d 806 (1948), an attorney stipulated before
trial not to plead a certain statutory defense. When the party tried to raise the
defense at trial, the court, relying on the stipulation, refused to permit amendment
of the pleading. Again, despite the presence of other defenses, the appellate court
reversed, holding the stipulation a surrender of a substantial right. Such a surrender, the court said, required express authority from the client.
Bailey and De Long, then, involve concessions of less than the entire case.
Once again, notions of fairness and judicial economy provide a rationale for the
results in the three cases. Retrial of the case would be costly and also would
provide the plaintiff with advance knowledge of the defendant's case. In Bailey,
the appeal was from a demurrer. Hence, the stipulation created no substantial
problems of judicial administration, finality or prejudice. Unlike Bailey, De Long
involved a full trial. Yet, the request to overturn the stipulation and to permit the
defense to be raised had been made at trial. It would seem unfair, in such an
instance, to penalize the defendant for any waste of judicial resources.
63 89 N.W.2d 886 (N.D. 1958).
64 Id. 889.
6570 Cal. 2d 272, 449 P.2d 760, 74 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1969).
66 The husband was granted a divorce on his cross-complaint. Id.
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who makes the decision is a substantial right which cannot be stipulated away by the attorney over his client's objection. Once again,
the question arises why the same stipulation should be said to involve a substantial right in only one of the two cases.67
A significant difference between the cases is the timing of the
client's objection. In Gasior, the objection to the attorney's stipulation was not made known until after a decision had been rendered;
in Linsk, the client refused to sign the stipulation even before the
case had been assigned to another judge. Yet why should this difference matter? If "tactical or incidental" matters are within the
scope of the attorney's authority regardless of the client's instructions, an explanation for the different results is still lacking.68 If,
however, the critical factors are the degree of potential prejudice to
the other party and the need for finality and judicial efficiency,
timing does provide an explanation. As in Duffy, allowing a party
to object to an unauthorized stipulation after a decision has been
reached raises the possibility of manipulation, of withholding an
objection unless and until an unfavorable decision is announced.
In contrast, the adverse party in Linsk knew of the client's objection
to the stipulation, but elected to proceed. 69 In this situation, the
opposing party fairly may be said to have assumed the risk of a new
trial. Additionally, the presiding judge who reassigned the case
was aware of the client's refusal to sign the stipulation. He had the
opportunity, therefore, to correct the alleged error early enough to
save the expense of retrial. If the objection had been withheld
pending the decision, there would have been no opportunity to
correct the error at minimal expense, and the costs of delay would
0
have been attributable solely to the client's inaction7
67

The right to have the evidence heard by the trier of fact who decides the
case arguably becomes substantial only when credibility is at issue. Whether or

not a distinction based on the significance of credibility could be drawn between
a divorce proceeding and an action to cancel mineral deeds claimed to have been
obtained from the plaintiff through fraud, other difficulties with this approach arise.

Leaving aside the objection that neither court viewed its decision as dependent on
this distinction, acceptance of it would largely undermine the subject-matter/procedure division.
68 The initial question would remain, of course, whether the particular right
was substantial or procedural. Justice Mosk's opinion for the California Supreme
Court in Linsk v. Linsk, 70 Cal. 2d 272, 277, 449 P.2d 760, 763, 74 Cal. Rptr. 544,

547 (1969), assumes that, if the right were incidental or affected only procedure
or remedy, the client's objection would carry no weight.

69 Id. at 276, 449 P.2d at 762, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
70 Two other general types of cases may be analyzed under both the analysis
offered here and the subject-matter/procedure rule: choice-of-decisionmaker cases
and cases involving failures to object to errors at trial. In the former, a client
argues that he should be awarded a new trial because his attorney without authority
waived the client's right to jury trial or agreed to referral to a master or auditor.
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The results in the settlement and trial-tactics cases thus seem
more easily explained by a theory focusing on the interests of affected third parties-the court and the adverse party-than by the
supposed subject-matter/ procedure distinction. The former theory
finds additional support in the attorney default cases. The attorneys in these cases failed to file an answer or appear for trial, failed
to file a suit within the applicable statute of limitations, or failed
to take action in the case for such a long time that it was dismissed
for want of prosecution71 In determining that the client should
be bound in these instances by his attorney's default, courts have
not focused on the question of client authorization.7 2 Rather, considerations of judicial economy and fairness to third parties once
again govern.73 Courts have rejected as impractical a system in
See, e.g., Long v. Ariz. Portland Cement Co., 2 Ariz. App. 332, 408 P.2d 852
(1966); Middleton v. Stavely, 124 Colo. 88, 235 P.2d 596 (1951); Better Home
Furniture Co. v. Baron, 243 N.C. 502, 91 S.E.2d 236 (1956). Typically, courts
reject this argument because the right involved is merely incidental or procedural.
Id This rationale seems wrong. The right to a jury trial is a substantial right
and, although it can be labeled procedural, the Supreme Court in a leading federal
diversity case has refused to accord controlling significance to this labeling. See
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
A better rationale is 'that in civil cases, interests of efficiency justify state's
requiring that jury demands be made within certain time periods. See, e.g., McKay
v. Fair Haven & Westrille R. Co., 75 Conn. 608, 54 A. 923 (1903); Foster v.
Morse, 132 Mass. 354 (1902); F.R.C.P. 38. Under this rationale, failure to meet
the time requirement works a forfeiture of the right, making the question of
authority irrelevant.
Cases involving timely objections at trial present not only considerations of
administrative efficiency, but also the problems of strategic advantage discussed
above in the text. See, e.g., Under v. Cooley, 216 Cal. App. 2d 390, 31 Cal. Rptr.
271 (1963) (failure to object to jury instruction binds client); Schleiger v.
Scbleiger, 137 Colo. 239, 324 P.2d 370 (1958) (failure to object to hearing without
court reporter); Brindle v. Brindle, 77 R.I. 115, 73 A.2d 770 (1950) (client bound
by attorney's failure to object to irregularities in deposition, particularly where
raised for first time on appeal. Although the substance/procedure distinction may
be used to explain the cases, again, they may also be explained on the basis of the
underlying interests involved in each case.
71 These cases are collected in Mazor, supra note 49, at 1121-27.
See
72The leading case is Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
note 73 infra. One court has gone so far as to label "wholly frivolous" the contention that the client's lack of consent to his attorney's failure to appear at a
hearing on a summary judgment motion justified vacating the judgment entered
against the client. The client had asked that the judgment be set aside under
Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect." Nederlandsche Handel-MaatSchappij, N.V. v. Jay
Emm, Inc., 301 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1962).
73
An examination of two cases decided one hundred fifty years apart indicates
the durability and substantiality of these considerations. The first case, Denton v.
Noyes, 6 Johns. 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1810), contains an early discussion of these
issues by Chief Judge Kent. In Denton, a defendant moved to vacate a confessed
judgment on the grounds that the attorney had no authority to act on his behalf.
Judge Kent sought a compromise between the interests of the defendant-client,
wronged by the attorney, and the plaintiffs, who were "as innocent as the defendant," 6 Johns. at 300, and who were in danger of losing their preference over other
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7
which principals can totally disavow the acts of their agents. 4 It is
not contradictory, however, to require both that principals be bound
by their agents' actions and that the agents follow their principals'
directions. Indeed, the ability to control the agent's conduct is a
necessary condition for tort liability.75

creditors if the judgment were vacated. Kent also was concerned that "if the
opposite party, who has concerns with an attorney, in the business of a suit, must
always, at his peril, look beyond the attorney, to his authority, it would be productive of great public inconvenience." 6 Johns. at 301. Kent characterized his
solution as a liberalization of the previous English rule, which left the client only
with an action against the attorney. The Chief Judge refused to open the judgment (hence preserving the plaintiff's priority as to the debt), but afforded the
defendant an opportunity to plead to the merits, presumably with the intention of
vacating the judgment if the defense proved meritorious.
Over one hundred fifty years later, the United States Supreme Court addressed
similar considerations in Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). The
trial judge in Link dismissed a diversity negligence action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b) for lack of prosecution when plaintiff's counsel failed to
appear at a pretrial conference. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, stated:
Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action,
and he cannot now avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of this
freely selected agent. Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with
our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed
bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have "notice of
all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney."
370 U.S. at 633-34 (citation omitted). In a footnote he remarked that "[K]eeping
this suit alive merely because plaintiff should not be penalized for the omissions
of his own attorney would be visiting the sins of plaintiff's lawyer upon the
defendant." 370 U.S. at 634 n.10 (emphasis in original). In both of these cases,
then, judicial economy and fairness to third parties displace the attorney's authority
to act unilaterally as the governing considerations.
Many cases involve the issue of relief from attorneys' defaults. As Professor
Mazor has pointed out, an examination of trial court records must be undertaken
before an accurate appraisal of these cases can be made. See Mazor, supra note
49, at 1123. In Link, for instance, the Supreme Court noted that the lower courts
had evaluated the attorney's failure to attend the pretrial conference in light of
several earlier postponements and "the drawn-out history of the litigation." 370
U.S. at 633, 635. It would be imprudent therefore to consider the above a
definitive picture of this type of case.
Finally, a recent note argues that the concern about not penalizing the other
side may go too far. Note, Negligent Litigation and Relief from Judgment: The
Case for a Second Chance, 50 S. CaL. L. REv. 1027, 1225-26 (1977). Fairness
may require that the cost of an attorney's negligent action be assigned to the party
hiring the attorney, but it does not answer the question of what the cost should be.
Frequently fairness to an opposing party can be achieved by awarding costs, rather
than by giving the party a judgment the size of which may bear no relation to the
"costs" of the error. Id.
74 But see Justice Black's dissent in Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626
(1962), in which he contended that a client properly may be penalized for his
lawyer's mistake only when the client has been notified that the court is contemplating dismissal 370 U.S. at 648 (Black, J., dissenting). Compare Chief Justice
Burger's rejection, on grounds of impracticality and inconsistency with the adversary
system, of the suggestion that a trial judge be required to ask whether a prisoner
desired to be tried in jail clothes. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976).
75 See RESTATEM[ENT (SEcoN")
OF AGENcY §§ 219, 220 (1958); Harper &
Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886 (1934).
As Professor Anderson has noted, agency relationships are usually analyzed from
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The theory presented here does not fit all the cases. In Nahhas
v. Pacific Greyhound Lines,76 for example, the request of one of the
plaintiffs to testify at trial was overridden by his attorney. Upholding the attorney's decision on appeal, the court stated that "[i]t is the
prerogative of counsel, if not his duty, where he is of the opinion it
would be detrimental to the best interests of the case he is presenting to have a certain witness testify, to refuse to call such witness
. ... ,,7 The Nahhas opinion thus seems an application of the
rule that the attorney, perhaps because of his special skills and
knowledge, can unilaterally control procedural matters.7 8 Yet the
subject-matter/procedure dichotomy proves too much. As has been
demonstrated, a theory based upon considerations of judicial efficiency and fairness to third parties is not only consistent with most
of the case law, but also explanatory of many of the inconsistencies.
This theory is also more consistent with general principles of agency
law than those subject-matter/procedure decisions that allow an
79
agent to ignore his principal's instructions.
the point of view of the principal's liability for the agent's acts. But there has
been little analysis of the control implied by such liability. Anderson, Conflicts of
Interest: Efiiciency, Fairness and the Corporate Structure, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 738,
765 (1978).
76 192 Cal. App. 2d 145, 13 Cal. Rptr. 299 (Dist. Ct App. 1961).
771d. at 146, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
78 See also Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977), for a discussion of similar considerations in the determination whether habeas relief should be granted. The difficulties implicit in such
an assumption of professional competence are surveyed in the text accompanying
notes 152-268 infra.
79 Coexistent with the malpractice standards of conduct is a line of authority
that examines the lawyer's role as agent See F. MECHEM, OrrLnUms OF THE LAW
As an agent a lawyer has a duty to
OF ACENCY 371 (P. Mechem 4th ed. 1952).
follow his principal's instructions. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AcENCY § 385
(1958). The commentary and illustrations state that, absent special agreement,
a lawyer is in charge of the "minutiae of court proceedings" and can withdraw
if he is not allowed to act as he thinks best. Id. § 385, Comment a, Illustration 2.
Thus, although the client is given something less than total control through instructions, the lawyer cannot act contrary to explicit instructions.
Furthermore, although the rules of agency are most often relied upon to bind
the principal when the agent's actions are within the latter's express, implied, or
apparent authority, see id. §§ 7, 8, the Restatement also acknowledges that the
principal may be bound because of inherent agency powers "derived not from
authority, apparent authority or estoppel, but solely from the agency relation and
existfing] for the protection of persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or
other agent" Id. § 8A. With regard to the types of issues considered here, the
Restatement does limit the application of § 8A to general agents, id. §§ 8A, 161,
Comments, but cases and commentators have taken the principles of § 8A beyond
this limitation. See Kidd v. Thomas A. Edison, Inc., 239 F. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1917);
Means, Vicarious Liability for Agency Contracts, 48 VA. L. REV. 50 (1962); Munro,
The Agent's Status: The Kidd Case, 20 U. Prrr. L. REv. 33 (1958). In choosing
between a third party and a principal whose conduct has not contributed to his
liability, these "inherent power" agency cases raise the same conflict noted by
Justice Harlan in Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). See note 73
supra.
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The cases, therefore, do not establish the decisionmaking authority of the lawyer over the client. Rather, they address the power
of the lawyer to bind his client. The subject-matter/procedure line
does, however, have significance. It helps identify those situations
in which the lawyer does have an affirmative obligation to obtain
his client's consent. The Code of Professional Responsibility and a
few cases also establish that, in situations involving conflicts of interest, the lawyer has an affirmative obligation to obtain his client's
consent to continue representation. 0 Absent such circumstances,
80 See ABA CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RESPONSmLITY, Canon 5, Ethical Consideration 5-1, Disciplinary Rules 5-101(A), 5-104, 5-105, 5-106, 5-107. Malpractice suits involving conflict-of-interest claims in a variety of factual settings all state
a variant of this general rule. One class of cases involves suits by attorneys for
their fees. Clients' malpractice defenses have been rejected in these cases, with
the courts stating that dual representation is not a bar to the collection of a fee as
long as there has been consent to such representation. See, e.g., McClendon v.
Eubanks, 249 Ala. 170, 30 So. 2d 261 (1947); Lessing v. Gibbons, 6 Cal. App. 2d
598, 45 P.2d 258 (1935).
A second set of cases involves attempts by clients to overturn transactions with
either their attorneys or third parties. These cases often include allegations that
the attorneys failed to reveal material information. In Ishmael v. Millington, 241
Cal. App. 2d 520, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966), and Gardine v. Cottey, 360 Mo. 681,
230 S.W.2d 731 (1950), attorneys represented both husband and wife in divorce
proceedings. In both instances, the wife successfully overturned an unfavorable
property settlement after the discovery that the attorneys had not revealed critical
information. The attorney in Ishmael had neglected to reveal that he had not
confirmed the husband's property representations; in Gardine, the attorney failed
to inform the wife of her ownership rights in certain real estate. Cf. Brosie v.
Stockton, 105 Ariz. 574, 468 P.2d 933 (1970) (no liability for joint representation
where no showing that property settlement unfair).
In several other cases, attorneys either represented both parties to a transaction
or had personal interests in a transaction. Litigation in these situations resulted
in rescission by the clients or an award of damages. See Hicks v. Clayton, 67 Cal.
App. 3d 251, 136 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1977) (unimproved property sold to attorney
and wife); Holley v. Jackson, 39 Del. Ch. 32, 158 A.2d 803 (1959) (representation
of both parties to real estate transaction); Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Comstock, 23
Md. App. 280, 327 A.2d 891 (1974) (representation of both parties to transaction);
Olitkowski v. St Casimir's Say. & Loan Ass'n, 302 Mich. 303, 4 N.W.2d 664
(1942) (representation of both parties to transaction); Johnston v. Andrade, 54
S.W.2d 1029 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (representation of both parties to transaction).
A final group of cases addresses the problems arising when an attorney for an
insurance company simultaneously represents the insured. See Lysick v. Walcom,
258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968); Ivy v. Pacific Automobile Ins.
Co., 156 Cal. App. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 140 (1958). These cases involve the additional element of a duty on the part of the insurance company, also a defendant
in the client's suit, to act in good faith on behalf of its insured. See Keeton,
Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 1-Mv. L. REv. 1136

(1954).

The rationale for a disclosure requirement in all of these conflict cases is simple: the presence of a conflict of interest negates the assumption that the lawyer
will use his professional judgment to advance the client's interests. EC 5-1 states
that, "[t]he professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised within the
bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromises,
interests and loyalties." Yet, who should determine whether the conflicts of interest
will impair representation to an extent necessary to retain separate counsel? Professor Gibson is among those who question the client's ability to make such a
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the burden of initiating consultation between attorney and client
falls upon the client. In most instances, therefore, the lawyer may
act upon his own judgment unless the client instructs otherwise.
2. The Code of Professional Responsibility
The Code of Professional Responsibility 8 1 seems to envision
that the client's role in decisionmaking extends beyond making
settlement decisions and deciding matters directly affecting the subject matter of the action. Unfortunately, however, both the meaning of the governing provision and its relationship to other sections
of the Code are unclear.
The primary Code section that deals with the allocation of
decisionmaking authority is Ethical Consideration (EC) 7-7,82 which
states:
In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the
merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights
of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his
own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is
exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer.
The important phrase is "affecting the merits of the cause."
Limiting lawyer decisionmaking to matters not "affecting the merits
of the cause," if the clause is read broadly, could grant clients control over almost every step taken in litigation. Almost any question,
any objection, any tactical decision could affect the merits of the
cause. It seems highly unlikely, however, that the Code meant to
go that far, given that this reading would work a drastic change in
determination. He argues that, because the impairment of professional judgment
is being evaluated, the decisionmaker must understand that judgment process. Does
the client possess the expertise to undertake such an evaluation? See Ceer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional
Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MNf.u L. lav. 119, 154 & n.136
(1978); Gibson, ABA Code Canon 5 Professional Judgment, 48 TEx. L. REv. 351,
363 (1970). The client's competence to make such decisions is considered in
notes 265-83 infra & accompanying text.
81 The Code of Professional Responsibility, as adopted in 1969, comprises
nine sections, each consisting of a canon, ethical considerations, and disciplinary
rules. The canons set forth standards of conduct in general terms; the ethical
considerations are "aspirational," and the disciplinary rules are mandatory, stating
the "minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being
subject to disciplinary action." ABA CoDE OF PnosssioNA R.B:sPo,4siBuy,
PREAmBLE AND PRmAmARY STATEIzNT

at I.

82 Although the ethical considerations are merely aspirational, they have been
used by courts as authority for imposing standards of conduct. See, e.g., Estate
of Weinstock, 40 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 351 N.E.2d 647, 649, 386 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1976).
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past practices.8 3 In addition, the examples given in EC 7-7 of
decisions that should be made by the client are whether to accept a
settlement offer and whether to waive an affirmative defense. The
latter may go beyond the case law, s but neither of these illustrations
supports an expansive reading.8 5
Moreover, EC 7-9 states: "In the exercise of his professional
judgment on those decisions which are for his determination in the
handling of a legal matter, a lawyer should always act in a manner
consistent with the best interests of his client." 86 This provision
rebuts the notion that EC 7-7 was meant to limit the lawyer's
decisionmaking role to purely ministerial tasks.
The problem, then, is to find a more limited reading of "affecting the merits of the cause." This language might be read as
promulgating a retrospective test-did the particular decision in fact
affect the merits of the cause? Such a reading makes no sense, however, if the purpose of the section is to give lawyers guidance in
allocating decisions before they are made.
Perhaps the language should be interpreted as reflecting the
case law. If so, why did the draftsmen not use the terminology
most often used by the courts-the "subject matter of the action"?
Further, the case law itself is less than clear,8 7 and other sections of
the Code grant a broader decisionmaking power to the client than
that suggested in the cases. EC 7-26, for instance, states that a
lawyer should "present any admissible evidence his client desires to
have presented unless he knows, or from facts within his knowledge
should know, that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent,
or perjured." s Although EC 7-26 is not necessarily inconsistent
with a more limited reading of "affecting the merits of the cause,"
it is difficult to discern an overall policy to guide the interpretation
of this vague language.
The phrase "substantially prejudicing the rights of the client"
introduces additional problems. Aside from the difficulty of interpreting "substantially," the term "rights" is ambiguous. In this
context, "rights" could mean legal rights in situations outside of
83 See text accompanying notes 40-46 supra. The Code has no legislative
history, just a series of annotated footnotes, none helpful in interpreting EC 7-7.
84 See text accompanying notes 56-60.
85 Rosenthal argues that these examples allow attorneys "so inclined" to interpret EC 7-7 and EC 7-8 to apply only to settlements and perhaps to waiver of
basic rights to the claim. D. RosmrHrA, supra note 6, at 115.
86 ABA CODE OF PROFEssSONAr REspoNsmmrrY, Ethical Consideration 7-9.
87 See text accompanying notes 42-50 supra.
88

ABA

CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL REsPoNsIBILrY,

Ethical Consideration 7-26.

1979]

INFORMED CONSENT AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

67

litigation, in view of the fact that the preceding phrase-"affecting
the merits of the cause"-covers rights involved in litigation; or
"rights" could refer to important interests of a client that are affected
by litigation but that are not directly part of its outcome; or it
could refer to both of these. In its broadest reading, "rights" could
refer to important interests of a client, regardless of whether those
interests are labelled "legal rights" or are involved in litigation.
Disciplinary Rule 7-101(B)(1) creates further confusion by providing that a lawyer may, "[w]here permissible, exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of his
client." 89 Even a narrow reading of EC 7-7 would allow such
waiver only when the client agrees; if the client must agree, the
phrase "where permissible" is superfluous.
One possible explanation lies in the distinction between disciplinary rules and ethical considerations. Because the latter are
merely aspirational, they may extend further than the disciplinary
rules. Even so, nothing in the disciplinary rules explains when the
lawyer may choose to exercise his judgment to waive his client's
right.
In summary, the Code contains language that goes beyond the
case law, but the exact contours of that language cannot be determined because no overall policy is discernible to guide its interpretation.
B. The Lawyers Obligation to Provide Information
1. The Cases
Hornbook agency law states that the agent has a duty to disclose
all material information to his client.9 0 In applying this law to
lawyers, courts have faced two problems. The first is similar to the
one discussed above: concerning what issues must a lawyer disclose
information to his client? The second was faced in the medical
cases: assuming a duty to disclose, how is "material" defined? Should
the standard of materiality be that of the profession, the lay public.
the particular client, or the court? 91
89 ABA

CODE OF PRoFEssIONAL RESPONSmILITY,

Disciplinary Rule 7-101(B)

(1).
90F. MECHEm, supra note 79, at §541. Cf. RESTATEmmNT (SECOND) OF
AGENcY § 381 ("agent is subject to a duty . . . to give his principal information
which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him"). The comments on § 381, however,
use "material" interchangeably with "relevant." See id. § 381, Comment b.
The duty to disclose material information can also be derived from the lawyer's
fiduciary obligations. See R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 33, at § 96.
91
See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra. A court could attempt to define
the components of adequate disclosure with a set of more precise rules. See Note,
79 YALE LJ. 1533, 1561 (1970).

68

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 128:41

The issues about which the lawyer must inform his client are
the same as those which the lawyer must allow the client to decidethat is, the lawyer must disclose information related to the subject
matter of the action and to conflicts of interest.9 2 This answer reintroduces the problem of distinguishing subject matter from procedure and tactics. In addition, some courts have confused the
question of determining the subject matter of the action with the
question of degree of disclosure. If a particular disclosure was not
explicitly required by the agreement between the lawyer and client,
the courts have imposed on the lawyer no duty of disclosure. 3 For
example, one court dismissed the contention that an attorney had
any obligation to disclose to his client the right to appeal by finding
that the contract between the attorney and client did not require the
attorney to appeal the case. 94 The court never asked itself whether
a client may reasonably expect an attorney to reveal options for
pursuing the case even though the attorney has no intention of
continuing representation. 95 The court's approach puts an affirmative burden on the client to know enough law to require certain
disclosures in his contract with the attorney. As discussed later,
this is a poor way of approaching the problem.9 6
The second question-the standard of materiality-has not been
answered consistently in the cases. In Spector v. Mermelstein,97
the court defined "material facts," which an attorney must reveal
to his client, as those "which, if known to the client, might well have
caused him, acting as a reasonable man, to alter his proposed course
92 R. MALLFN & V. LEVIT, supra note 33, at 140 (client must be informed of
any acts or events concerning the subject matter of the retention as to which the

client has right to exercise discretion or control).
see id. 139-40.
93

Regarding conflicts of interest,

See Grand Isle Campsites, Inc. v. Cheek, 262 La. 5, 30, 262 So. 2d 350,

359 (1972); Burr v. Hays, 240 N.Y.S. 83, 136 Misc. 369 (1930); Young v. Bird-

well, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686 (1968).

See also L.

BRowN

& E.

DAurR,

PLANNUIG By LAwYESs 233-62 (1977).
94 Young v. Birdwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686 (1968). The court did
say that, if the ruling was "manifestly against the general law on the subject," a
duty to advise might conceivably arise, 437 P.2d at 690, but not when, as in that

case, the law was uncertain. The court thus confused the reasonableness of the
lawyer's judgment about the desirability of an appeal with the issue of duty to
disclose.
95 Compare the cases which have held that an attorney has an obligation to
notify his client of his withdrawal from a case, e.g., Zitower v. Holdsworth, 200
F. Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 270 A.2d
662 (1970); Rice v. Forestier, 415 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967).
96 See text accompanying notes 394-96 infra.
97 361 F. Supp. 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on other grounds, 485 F.2d 474
(2d Cir. 1973).

1979]

INFORMED CONSENT AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

69

of conduct." 98 This standard is similar to that stated in Canterbury v. Spence,9 9 the leading medical informed-consent case. 100
Directly contrary to Spector are two cases that require expert
testimony to prove that the alleged failure to disclose information
to the client fell below the ordinary standards of the profession. 1' 1
In one case, the attorney allegedly failed to disclose a settlement
offer; 102 in the other, the lawyer failed to explain the meaning of a
clause in a purchase contract. 03 Although one can explain these
cases by looking more closely at their facts, 0 4 acceptance of the
standard they adopt would eviscerate any meaningful informedconsent requirement.
Certainly, the existence of a settlement
offer or the meaning of a proposed agreement is the minimum
information a client needs.
Other than in this smattering of cases, courts have not focused
on the question of what standard governs disclosure. Because recovery in most cases is based on a theory of negligence, the profes98 Id. 40. The facts in Spector suggest the possibility of a conflict of interest
between the lawyer and his client, a factor which may have influenced the court.
Two other cases appear to adopt client-oriented standards similar to that set forth
in Spector in order to avoid statute of limitation problems. See Hendrickson v.
Sears, 365 Mass. 83, 90, 310 N.E.2d 131, 135 (1974) (dictum); Passanante v.
Yormark, 138 N.J. Super. 233, 350 A.2d 497 (1975).
99 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
100 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
101 Whether expert testimony is required for a prima facie case of lawyer malpractice is not settled. Although at one time the rule appeared to be that it was
not required, see Wade, supra note 40, at 776, except in Illinois, see Olsen v. North,
276 Ill. App. 457 (1934), recent decisions have moved toward a rule that distinguishes between cases in which the claimed malpractice is within the understanding
of laymen and those cases in which the alleged complexity of the situation requires
an expert to educate the jury. See Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Iowa
1975) (dictum); Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 270 A.2d 662, 667 (Md. 1970); Hill
v. Okay Construction Co., 252 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Minn. 1977); Stewart v. Sbarro,
142 N.J. Super. 581, 362 A.2d 581 (1976); Hanson v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App.
78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975). One California case has held required expert testimony
in cases involving a legal specialty. Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121
Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975) (admiralty). Finally, some cases still adhere to the old
rule that expert testimony is not necessary because the trial judge's knowledge can
substitute for the expert's. See Muse v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d
698 (La. 1976).
102 Dorf v. Relles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966).
103 Wright v. Williams, 47 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975).
104 For example, the court in Doff v. Relles, 355 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1966),
obviously did not believe the plaintiff, remarking:
If a judgment against an attorney, on a record such as is before us, can
be justified the legal profession could be more hazardous than the law
contemplates. An attorney can hardly afford to take the chance of communicating with his client by any means other than in writing or by
having a record made of every conversation between them.
Id. 494.
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sional standard is used, and the question of an alternative standard
neither raised nor discussed.
This lack of attention to the issue of disclosure raises particularly significant problems with regard to cases involving the lawyer's
exercise of judgment. In these, courts generally do not impose an
obligation on the attorney to tell a client of the uncertainty of the
results of a particular course of action. Rather, as long as the
attorney has researched the issue and has found the law uncertain, he
has the discretion to weigh the costs and benefits of alternative
courses of action. 105 To some extent, these cases are related to the
previously discussed problem of who should make a given decision.
If the decision belongs to the attorney, one could argue that he need
not inform the client. 0 6 Even in cases of settlement or agreements,
however, no clear-cut obligation has emerged to inform the client
07
of any uncertainty in the attorney's recommendations.
105 The general rule is that a lawyer is not liable for errors in judgment unless
the error results from a failure to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge. B. MALrThe
LEN & V. LEr, supra note 33, at § 212; Wade, supra note 40, at 764-65.
exception for failure to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge applies mainly to a
failure to do adequate research. See Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d 349, 530 P.2d
But very few cases even discuss whether an
589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975).
attorney, once he decides "correctly" that a decision is in the area of "judgment,"
has an obligation to inform his client that such a judgment is involved. See cases
cited in notes 106 & 107 infra. Perhaps the absence of such a duty is justified
when no competing considerations are involved in choosing between alternative
readings of the law. In most situations there are such considerations-for example,
the uncertain cost of pursuing a matter, see Meagher v. Kavli, 256 Minn. 54, 97
N.W.2d 370 (1959), or the possibility of taking additional steps to avoid a risk,
see Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283 (M.D. La. 1973),
aff'd, 500 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1974); Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106 (Iowa 1975).
106 In many of the judgment cases that involve tactical decisions, the court
does not reach the question whether the client should be informed of the uncertainty of the lawyer's judgment, presumably because nobody questions the propriety
of the attorney's making the decision. The only issue is thought to be whether
the decision was made correctly. See Mazer v. Security Ins. Group, 507 F.2d 1338
(3d Cir. 1975), aff'g on other grounds, 368 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (decision regarding joining a third party); Sprague v. Morgan, 185 Cal. App. 409, 8
Cal. Rptr. 347 (1960) (decision regarding timing of filing claim before Industrial
Accident Commission); Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106, 112-13 (Iowa 1975)
(decision regarding what statutes to file claim under); Meagher v. Kavli, 256 Minn.
54, 97 N.W.2d 370 (1959) (decision regarding defending lawsuit); Hill v. Mynatt,
59 S.W. 163 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900) (decision regarding what court to file in).
107 Where the law is unsettled, cases have held the client has no malpractice
action for incorrect advice even when no evidence indicates that the lawyer explained the risks of uncertainty to the client. See Gimbel v. Waldman, 84 N.Y.S.2d
888, 889 (Sup. Ct. 1948). When liability has been found, it has been based on
either the lawyer's failure to advise his client with regard to a clear point of law,
see Ramp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 254 So. 2d 79 (La. Ct. App.),
amended, 263 La. 774, 269 So. 2d 239 (1971); Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581,
328 P.2d 164 (1958), or on the lawyer's failure to read the agreement about which
he advised his client, see Dillard Smith Constr. Co. v. Greene, 337 So. 2d 841 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976). But see cases holding that a lawyer has a duty to advise
his client of the risks of failure to take a lien, Rhine v. Haley, 238 Ark. 72, 378
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2. The Code of Professional Responsibility
The Code is more helpful in specifying what information the
attorney must disclose to his client. EC 7-8 states:
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made only after the client has been
informed of relevant considerations. A lawyer ought to
initiate this decision-making process if the client does not
do so. . . . A lawyer should bring to bear upon this
decision-making process the fullness of his experience as
well as his objective viewpoint. . . . In the final analysis,
however, the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or
methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the
108
client and not for himself.
This provision is a good general statement of what a lawyer's obligation under informed consent might be. It clearly puts the burden
on the lawyer to initiate discussion. Of course, in order for this
provision to be meaningful, closer analysis is needed of what disclosure is required in specific situations. 10 9 But this is a secondary
consideration. The main problem is that, until rules are developed
for deciding what decisions belong to the client, lawyers will not
know in what situations EC 7-8 is meant to apply.
This excursion into the cases and the Code has shown that no
explicit doctrine of informed consent applies to lawyers. The subject-matter/procedure line of cases defines the lawyer's obligation to
seek the client's consent and to provide his client with information.
This division between subject matter and procedure is confusing,
however, and recreates the problems faced by similar attempts to
S.W.2d 655 (1964); failure to execute a mortgage, Stewart v. Sbarro, 142 N.J.
Super. 581, 362 A.2d 581 (App. Div. 1976); and failure to record a chattel mortgage, Theobald v. Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961). Courts
also have held that an attorney must inform his client of any risks that the client's
title to real estate may not be marketable. See, e.g., Byrnes v. Palmer, 18 App.
Div. 1, 45 N.Y.S. 479 (1897), aff'd, 160 N.Y. 699, 55 N.E. 1093 (1899);
R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 33, at § 376.
108 ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
09

Ethical Consideration 7-8.

1 See text accompanying notes 386-402 infra. The few cases citing EC 7-8
all involve third-party situations, not actions against the attorney. See Clarion Corp.
v. American Home Products Corp., 494 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
870 (1974); McDonald v. Hutto, 414 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. Ark. 1976); People v.
Mason, 29 Il. App. 3d 121, 329 N.E.2d 794 (1975). Although there have been
disciplinary proceedings against attorneys for failure to communicate with their
clients, these involve flagrant failures to contact clients about their cases, not questions of what information must be communicated. See Annot. 80 A.L.R.3d 1240
(1977).
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divide substance from procedure in other areas of the law." 0 More
important, the general lack of explicit attention to the issue of allocation of authority between lawyer and client leaves open the question of what theory explains this distinction. Absent some justification, the question arises whether additional affirmative obligations
should be placed upon the lawyer to seek his client's consent. In
the medical area, the informed-consent cases proceeded from the
assumption that a right to control decisions was meaningless in the
absence of some affirmative obligation on the physician to disclose
information."' The next section discusses whether similar considerations call for placing general affirmative obligations on lawyers
to obtain the consent of clients.
III. TOWARD

A THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT FOR
LAWYER AND CLIENT

This section begins by arguing for a presumption that all decisions belong to the client. It then examines the argument that
clients consent to professional control, concluding that this argument does not support the delegation of control to professionals,
but rather supports the requirement of informed consent. Just as
in the medical cases, the value of the right to decide is questionable
if the client is not told when decisions must be made and that he
has the power to make them."

2

The next several subsections look

at two major arguments against the presumption in favor of client
decisionmaking: that professional control results in better decisions
for the client, and that informed consent is too costly. These argu110 The problem of dividing procedure from substance has a long history in
the conflict of laws, see, e.g., W. Coor, THE LocrCA AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF

LAWS 154-83

(1942),

and in

federal diversity

cases, in which the

question whether federal or state law applied, depends, at least in part, upon how
one draws the procedure-substance line, see, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This history demonstrates the difficulty involved in
drawing that line and the need for a theory to guide such attempts. See, e.g.,
Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HAnv. L. REv. 741 (1974); Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HAav. L. REv. 693 (1974); Ely, The Necklace, 87 Hanv. L. REV.
753 (1974). Subject matter may not be identical to substance, but the problems
do seem analogous.
111 See text accompanying notes 14-22 supra.
112 One aspect of decisionmaking power is the client's (principal's) ability to
direct the actions of the lawyer (agent). A second dimension involves what might
be called agenda control-the cient's power to have a decision submitted to him.
See P. BACHAnACH & M. BArATz, POWER AND POVERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE
cb. 1 (1970). This control could be treated as a requirement that the lawyer
transmit to the client the information that a decision must be made. The less likely
the client is to have independent knowledge of what decisions must be made, the
more important his right to have decisions submitted to him.
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ments do not indicate that client decisionmaking should be abandoned, but do suggest that the presumption be modified: 113 a
lawyer should be affirmatively required to obtain informed consent when client values or lawyer conflicts of interest are involved.
This requirement would maximize the scope of client decisionmaking without imposing its costs in cases in which such decisionmaking would not likely be desired. Clients who wanted more or
less decisionmaking control in particular cases would still be able to
accommodate their interests. Finally, this section examines the interests of the lawyer and the public and finds significant ones that
must be taken into account. Discussion of ways in which the various
interests might be accommodated is deferred until the next section
of the Article.
A. The Prima Facie Case for Client Decisionmaking
Unless the client chooses to delegate decisionmaking authority
to the lawyer, the client should be presumed to have control over
all aspects of his case. The very label "his case" is suggestive. A
claim, a case, or a problem belongs to the client; this claim of
ownership gives the client a presumptive right of control.1 14
By itself, however, this claim of ownership establishes only a
weak presumption in favor of client decisionmaking. In the medical cases, control was linked to a fundamental aspect of personal
integrity-control over one's body.:1 5 In considering the application
113 This approach, then, lies somewhere between a strong rights-based argument, see, e.g., R. DwoRKIN, TAKING BIGHs SmuOUSLY 90-100 (1977); C. FnraD,
BIGHT AND WRONG (1978), and a simple balancing of the interests. It requires
that strong, affirmative reasons be shown for abandoning the presumption of client
decisionmaking. Compare Buchanan, Medical Paternalism, 7 Pae. & PUB. AFF.
370 (1978).
114 Although legal claims are not treated the same as property rights, see
Developments in the Law--Class Actions, 89 HAnv. L. REv. 1318, 1404-05 n.73
(1976) (plaintiff's legal claims are not "property" in the constitutional sense unless
underlying claim is a "vested" right), they are sufficiently analogous to property
to warrant the statement in the text. Indeed, the reasons for not allowing a market
in legal claims relate more to questions of propriety and to fears of stirring up
litigation than to problems related to "ownership." See Reder, Contingent Fees in
Litigation with Special Reference to Medical Malpractice in THE EcONOMIcs op
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 211, 225 &n.40 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978).
115 See note 12 supra & accompanying text. Decisions related to one's body
have generally received more protection from state interference than ordinary
property rights. See generally L. TRIBE, AmERCAN CONSTrrUoONAL LAw §§ 15-9
to -11 (1978). See also Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservationof Life, 26 RUTGERs L. REV.
228, 238-39 (1973). Compare Professor Epstein's statement regarding the informed
consent doctrine in medicine: "[the patient is entitled to the exclusive control over
what is done to his own body. That is the fundamental property right which each
of us has in himself." Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract 1976
Am. B. FouND. REs. J. 87, 126.
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of informed-consent doctrine to lawyer-client relations, the question
arises whether the client's interests similarly justify client control.11
As discussed below, strongly held values related to the operation of
the legal system and to the relationship between lawyer and client
do support the presumption of client control.
First, the legal system is a representational system for the
substantive claims of clients. The system assumes that a client's
claim is his, just as the political system assumes that a citizen's
vote is his.1 1 7 Indeed, access to the legal system is an a priori assump-

tion of the proper functioning of economic

118

and political institu-

116Bodily integrity is not the only justification for the patient's claim to
autonomy in the informed-consent medical cases. There is a second and more
expressive aspect to the claim for patient control: making and accepting responsibility for decisions affirms one's humanity. Professor Capron, in discussing doctorpatient relationships, has described this second aspect of autonomy as protecting
the patient's status as a human being. See Capron, supra note 5, at 346-47.
Charles Fried, discussing medical experimentation, has termed this "lucidity"-"the
patient's rights to know all relevant details about the situation he finds himself
in . . . [because] it is crucial to a fully human process . . . of choosing what
kind of person one will be." C. FrnED, MEncAL EXPERIMENTArTION: PEaSONAL
IN=Gn=
rr, AND SocIAL PoLicy 101 (1974).
Neither Fried nor Capron makes explicit whether this second aspect of autonomy relates to all decisions that affect individuals, or just to decisions involving
important human concerns. They are not likely asserting a strong autonomy interest
in all decisions, however, for such an interest would be equivalent to a generalized
interest in decisionmaking and would thus run the risk of dilution. See Wilkinson
& White, ConstitutionalProtection for Personal Lifestyles, 62 CONELL L. REV. 563,
615-16 (1977). This generalized interest would be no more than an assertion of
the values underlying freedom of contract. Without diminishing the importance
of contractual autonomy, Capron and Fried seem to be making a more particularized
and stronger autonomy claim.
This more particularized claim could be related to the likelihood of serious
consequences. If so, some legal matters-particularly in criminal cases-involve
consequences as serious as those in medical cases. The presence of this strong
autonomy interest would then be dependent upon the type of case. Since neither
Capron nor Fried distinguishes between types of cases in discussing their claim
for patient autonomy, it seems more plausible to assume they are arguing not on
the basis of the importance of the particular medical case to the individual, but
rather from the significance which medical care itself has for individuals and for
society.
Part A of the text argues that a client's participation in the legal system is
important enough to justify client decisionmaking.
117 See Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right
to Protect One's Rights-Part I, 1974 DoxE L.J. 527, 535-40.
118 This statement seems correct in two ways. First, parties who bargain presumably assume that, if a significant enough dispute occurs, they will have access
to some dispute-resolution system. Tullock, On the Efficient Organization of Trials,
28 KYKLos 745 (1975).
If cost or other factors stifled this expectation, concern
that our system was defective would appear to be justified. See generally Nader,
Second, legal
Disputing Without the Force of Law, 88 YALE L.J. 998 (1979).
rules made by courts shape the economic bargaining that occurs. See R. PostNr,
EcoNouc ANALYsIS OF LA.w passim (2d ed. 1977); cf. Mnookin and Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950,
968 (1979) (legal rules create bargaining endowments for divorcing parents).
Therefore, equal access to the system that makes these rules would seem to be a
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tions." 9 If the legal system is intended to facilitate client autonomy
and self-determination in spheres outside that system,'120 it would
be anomalous if choosing a representative in order to gain access to
the legal system entailed surrender of control.
Second, the principles of party presentation and party prosecution which underlie the adversary system embody the notion that
"parties should be master of their own rights." 121 These principles
are valued because they increase the moral force and acceptability
of the decisions made by the system,1 22 in that each party has had
the opportunity "to choose his strategy, plot his fate, and rise or
fall by his own choices." 123 Whether this conclusion reflects some
empirical guess regarding commonly held values in our society,12
or some moral imperative,es its acceptance in the legal system gives
autonomy interests special weight,126 weight which is denied if the
minimum requirement of fairness. Cf. C. FRED, supra note 113, at 100 ("the
central validating process of bargaining in [economic analysis of rights] must assume
some background entitlements which guarantee the integrity of the bargainers as
intelligent free agents").
119 See Michelman, supra note 117, at 536-40; Note, A FirstAmendment Right
of Access for Indigents, 82 YALE L.J. 1055, 1059-60 (1973).
20
o See L. FuLLE, THE MOR,A=m OF LAW 162-77 (rev. ed. 1969); H. HART
& A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAw 183-85 (tent. ed. 1958); Fuller, Law as an Instrument of Social Control
and Law as a Facilitationof Human Interaction, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 89.
121 F. Jivms & G. HAzARD, Crvui PnocEnuun § 1.2 at 4 (2d ed. 1977).
122 Id. § 1.2 at 5. Another justification for these principles is the familiar
argument that "truth is more likely to emerge from bilateral investigation and
presentation, motivated by the strong pull of self-interest, than from judicial investigation motivated only by official duty." Id. This justification is fundamental and
depends, in part, upon the assumptions that the advocates are well trained, approximately equal in resources and ability, and motivated to act in the client's best
interest. Transferring decisionmaking power to the client may further this goal, but
only because of the arguments discussed below relating to conflicts of interest, not
because of any interests linked to autonomy.
123 Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge,
64 VA. L. Rv. 1, 17 (1978).
The other major reason for greater acceptability is that party presentation and
prosecution help insure that the parties perceive the decisionmaker as neutral. Id.
24
1 See J. TmBAuTr & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JusTcIE chs. 8-11 (1975).
125 See L. FuLLEB, supra note 120, at 162:
[Legal morality] cannot be neutral in its view of man himself. To embark
on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules
involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can
become, a responsible agent, capable of understanding and following rules,
and answerable for his defaults.
126 Some commentators have argued that these statements about party control
and autonomy are ideological trappings, and that the reality of the system is exposed
by what it does-give control to the professionals. See Simon, The Ideology of
Advocacy: Proceduraljustice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29; Abel,
From the Editor, 12 LAw & Soc'Y. REv. 189, 197-98 (1978). Abel argues that the
ideology of the legal system may be accepted only by the privileged classes, who
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attorney is allowed to make decisions for the client without the
27
client's consent.
Finally, the client has an autonomy interest that derives from
his relationship with the lawyer. 128 In most lawyer-client relationships, the lawyer's role is to stand in for the client 129-to represent
him before the courts and in his dealings with other parties. When
a lawyer, as representative, acts without authority, he violates the
client's integrity by presenting the client falsely to others. 30 In
addition to portraying the client inaccurately, the lawyer may also
be using the client as a means, a harm which is most obvious (and
most criticized) when a "public interest" lawyer uses his client for
ends that serve the lawyer's personal interests or that represent the
lawyer's conception of the public good. 1 1 This harm also occurs
need such an ideology to justify their position. He argues that people in the lower
classes understand the reality and therefore opt out of the legal system, if possible.
Abel and Simon may be right. To some extent this Article is based on the perception of a "gap" between some perceived ideal and reality.
127See Abel, A Comparative Theory of Dispute Institutions in Society, 8 LAw
& Soc'y. REv. 217, 273 (1973) ("[Rlepresentation by a professional . .. increases
the control of the [dispute] institution over the dispute.").
As Professor Epstein has noted, the complicated notice provisions in the class
action rules make sense if party control and autonomy must, in the first instance, be
exercised by the party; if attorney representation would suffice, the rules seem mere
impediments to the efficient administration of justice. Epstein, Privacy, Property
Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. R-Ev. 455, 459 (1978). But see note
131 infra.
12s Interests other than those presented here may also favor client decisionmaking. The rituals of the legal system, particularly a trial, are arguably an
important expression of self. Involvement in the legal process can be both another
source of acceptance of the process and a connection between the community and
the litigants. The more the professionals' control separates the parties from the
process, the less these ritualistic needs are met. See generally Ball, The Play's the
Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAq.
L. RE V. 81 (1975); Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision & Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1329, 1370-7.t, 1376, 1391-92 (1971). But see Simon,
supra note 126, at 94-99.
129 See H. PrKN, supra note 49.
130 In contrast, the patient's autonomy interest in the doctor-patient relationship
prevents the physician from doing something to the patient without his consent.
An unauthorized touching directly violates the patient's physical and personal
integrity. See note 116 supra. These harms are more tangible than those caused
by an attorney's unauthorized actions, see accompanying text, but this difference is
not dispositive of the question raised at the beginning of this section. The client's
interests in controlling decisions may still justify client decisionmaking, even if those
interests are not as strong as the interest in controlling one's body.
11 See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YArL L.J. 470, 493-515 (1976); Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HAItv. L. REv. 1667, 1762-70
(1975). If it is the use of the client, rather than the use of litigation for political
ends, that is objectionable, then perhaps the legal system should stop insisting on
using a nominal client as the "public interest" attorney's key to the courthouse door.
Why not acknowledge that attorneys have designated themselves private attorneys
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in other cases if a lawyer advances his own interests while acting in
13 2
the client's name.
B. Contract As Consent
The traditional model of professional-client relationships does
not explicitly deny that clients have the presumptive right to make
decisions, but argues instead that clients consent to professional
decisionmaking. By choosing a lawyer (or a physician), this argument goes, clients elect to delegate the authority to make decisions
183
on their cases or problems.
general, for economic or other reasons, see generally PUBLIc ITER.EST LAw (B.
Weisbrod, S. Handler & N. Komesar eds. 1978), and then grapple openly with the
problems this type of representation presents. See R. PosNER, supra note 118, at
450, 462-67; cf. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv.
L. RFv. 1281 (1976) (legitimizing the expanding role of the judiciary in publicinterest litigation).
As Chayes points out, once the legal system breaks out of the traditional modes
of litigation, it should expand the scope of the interests represented, particularly
at the remedial stage. Id. 1310-13. See also Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 426-31.
Maintaining the fiction of an attorney who is controlled by his nominal client and
who represents the affected interests may impede this expansion.
The difficulties of nominal representation have been faced in class actions.
Under the majority rule, the attorney cannot be the class representative because of
the allegedly inherent conflict of interest between the two roles. Susman v. Lincoln
Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 90-91 (7th Cir. 1977) (and cases cited therein). But a
conflict of interest between the attorney and the class is possible whether or not
the attorney is the named plaintiff. See Pettway v. Amer. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576
F.2d 1157, 1177 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1020 (1979); Saylor v.
Lindsley, 456 F.2d 896, 900-01 (2d Cir. 1972); Dam, Class Actions, Efficiency,
Compensation,Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEG. STop. 47, 56-61 (1975).
Some courts, perhaps recognizing this dilemma, have tried to determine whether the
named plaintiffs have sufficient competence to supervise their attorney. See, e.g.,
Seiden v. Nicholson, 69 F.R.D. 681, 688-89, settlement approved, 72 F.R.D. 201
(N.D. Ill. 1976); In re Goldship Funding Co., 61 F.R.D. 592, 594-95 (M.D. Pa.
1974). Cases inevitably will arise in which the action cannot be brought
if the named plaintiffs must possess enough knowledge to control the whole
class action, but in which the public interest requires at least a hearing on the
merits. See Hernandez v. United Fire Ins. Co., 79 F.R.D. 419, 426-28 (N.D. Ill.
1978). Moreover, named plaintiffs may have conflicts with the class. See
McDonald v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 565 F.2d 416, 420-23 (7th Cir.
1977). Again, recognizing the difference between these kinds of cases and
ordinary litigation might prove a better resolution of these problems. See Pettway
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d at 1176-78; Developments in the LawClass Actions, 89 HAnv. L. REv. 1318, 1592-1604 (1976). Compare the proposal
of the Justice Department's Office for Improvements in Justice for splitting class
actions into "public" and "class compensatory" actions. Meador, Proposed Revision
of Class Damage Procedures, 65 ABA J. 48 (1979).
182 Obviously, in some sense, the attorney acts for his own ends much of the
time in any exchange relationship, but it is the unauthorized "use" of the client
that is objectionable here.
133 The foremost proponent of this point of view is Talcott Parsons. See, e.g.,
Parsons, Research With Human Subjects and the "Professional Complex," 98
D.AmLus 325, 341-345 (1969); cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93-94
(1977) (Burger, CJ., concurring) (decisions whether to make constitutionally based
objections during a criminal trial are of necessity entrusted to the defendant's
attorney).
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Richard Epstein, writing about physicians, recently offered a
variant of this view. He argues that, in general, medical malpractice
problems should be approached as questions of contract: 4 "[T]he
basic rules governing the relationship between physician and patient
are then best understood as approximations of the rules which the
parties themselves would choose to govern their own relationship." 13 A doctrine such as informed consent should be rejected, 2 86
Epstein says, because it is "at war with the mutual expectations of
the parties." 137
If these views about clients' demands for informed consent are
correct, then it would not only be justifiable for lawyers to make
decisions on behalf of their clients, but silly and wasteful to impose,
in the name of autonomy, a requirement that clients do not want.
Particular clients wishing to exercise greater decisionmaking authority would be free to contract with those lawyers willing to submit to that authority. The role of legal rules would be to enforce
the parties' bargain and to facilitate the contracting process. The
law would not impose rules specifying who controlled whom.
Epstein's assertion that informed-consent doctrine may be at
war with the expectations of the parties is not based on any empirical data.138 His conclusion seems to follow from the fact that the
custom of the profession is narrower than the legal obligation to
obtain informed consent. He assumes that, if consumers desired
deviations from these customs, they would have demanded such
29
changes, and market forces eventually would have produced them.
This reasoning reflects more faith in the market than most commentators on professional-client relationships have expressed. 40
'34 Epstein, supra note 115. See also Epstein, Medical Malpractice: Its Cause
and Cure, in TiE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 254-257 (S. Rottenberg
ed. 1978).
135 Epstein, supra note 115, at 95.

136 Epstein also rejects the informed-consent doctrine because of the difficulties
involved in its application, particularly with regard to the problems of causation.

Id. 125.
137 Id.

127.

138 There is little data on the agreements that lawyers make with their clients;
the information existing must be extrapolated either from practical "advice" sources,
see, e.g., E. ENT, D. DoAR & L. PERLsWEIG, LAWYER-CLIENT EMPLOYMENT AcREEmEurcs (1967), or studies of lawyers' behavior made for other purposes, see, e.g.,
LAwYERs AND>
J. CARIN, LAWYERS ON TnEm OWN (1962); H. O'GoumsAI,
MATRIMONIAL CASES (1963); D. RosENTIrmAL, supra note 6.
139
140

Epstein, supra note 115, at 127.
See, e.g., Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,

53 AM. ECON. REv. 941, 967 (1963); Calabresi, The Problem of Malpractice: Trying
to Round Out the Circle, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 131, 132 (1977); Mechanic, The
Medical Marketplace and Public Interest Law, pt. 1, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW,
supra note 131, at 350, 351-56.
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Beside the general objections to the economic argument that the
status quo reflects people's desires, 141 such reasoning is not descriptive of professional-client relationships, even if acceptable in other
contexts.
The major difficulty is that the lawyer and client do not have
equal information about the possible structuring of the relationship
and about the decisions that are involved. 1 42 Indeed, a client often
comes to a lawyer because he lacks such information.1 43 At least
at the beginning of the relationship, therefore, the buyer-client
cannot realistically be expected to tell the seller-lawyer what decisions he wants to control. But, by Epstein's reasoning, failure to
144
do so indicates acceptance of the customs of the profession.
Second, clients may not perceive the issue of allocation of decisionmaking authority to be a legitimate item on the agenda for
discussion. 145 Today's "customs" regarding that agenda are to
some extent a result of laws and expectations created in the past. 146
If, as appears likely, professionals have exerted disproportionate
control over these past laws and expectations, 147 then clients' "true
expectations" cannot be ascertained until the past set of laws, customs, and expectations has been changed.
Third, even when clients perceive control to be an issue, status
and power differences between themselves and their lawyers may lead
them to accept less information and control than they might like.148
41

See Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60
L. RBv. 451, 456-58, 462-64 (1974).
142 See Arrow, supra note 140, at 946; Mechanic, supra note 140, at 352-53.
1

VA.

'

4 3

See Arrow, supra note 140, at 946.

144 Cf. RESTATE

ENT

(SEcoND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 247 (Tent. Draft No. 5,

1970): "A reasonable usage with respect to a type of agreement supplements or
qualifies an agreement of that type if each party knows or has reason to know of
the usage .

.

. "

See also Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omissions in Contracts, 68

COLum. L. REv. 860 (1968).
145 Allocation of decisionmaking authority may be a background "fact," inappropriate for discussion, similar to physicians wearing white coats or judges
wearing black robes. For a general discussion of the importance of the agenda of
issues, see P. BAcEACH & M. BARATz, supra note 112, at 3-16.
146 Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 Pm. & PuB. AFF.

3, at 37-38 (1975). Compare the writings of Lawrence Tribe, who argues that the
choices made today inevitably restrict the way we and future generations perceive
the world and, therefore, restrict the range of choices that can be thought about in
the future. See, e.g., Tribe, Technology Assessment and the Fourth Discontinuity:
The Limits of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 650-51 (1973).
147

See generally B. BEDsTmn,

THE CULTURE OF PROFEssioNArsm

(1976).

For a discussion of doctors' influence on setting expectations in the past, see
E. FREmsoN,

PRoFEssIoN

OF

MEDICI-

(1970);

E. FrmsoN,

PoFEssIoNAL

DomuixNcE (1970).
-148A

recent American Bar Foundation survey reported that 50% of those

responding agreed that "[1]awyers are generally not very good at keeping their
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To the extent this is true, the status quo may in some sense reflect
the "expectations" of the parties, but those expectations should not
be controlling.
This critique of Epstein's market approach explains why clients
might not initiate requests for more control. Epstein argues further, however, that, if consumers truly desired more information
and control, lawyers would supply it on their own in an effort to
attract more customers. The argument concludes that, because
lawyers do not offer such information and control, clients must not
want it.

This version of the market argument is no stronger than the
first. Given their lack of knowledge, clients will have difficulty
valuing decisionmaking authority. Even assuming good faith on the
lawyer's part, it may be impossible, at the onset of the relationship,
to "educate" the client sufficiently to allow him to understand the
"true" value of decisionmaking. Alternatively, the transaction costs
involved in educating the client may be too high.149 Striking an
appropriate bargain may thus be impossible. Moreover, the formal
and informal constraints on advertising 150 and price-setting,5 1 as
clients informed of progress on their cases"; 36% agreed with the statement that

"[llawyers do not care whether their clients fully understand what needs to be
done and why." B. Cum3AN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF TH PuBrac 230 (1977).
The results remained relatively constant when these data were sub-divided
according to the frequency with which the respondents had used lawyers.
Assessments of the most recent consultation with a lawyer were more favorable,
however. Seventy-nine percent of the respondents rated their most recent lawyers
excellent or good at keeping them informed of progress. Id. 210. The explanation
for the discrepancy is unclear.
149 Even if the client can be educated at the beginning of the relationship,
giving him sufficient knowledge at that time may be too costly. By breaking down
decisionmaking issues into smaller units and allowing the possibility of education
over time, informed consent may reduce these transaction costs. See Williamson,
Governance Structures and Contractual Relations (Discussion Paper No. 37, Center
for the Study of Organizational Innovation 1979); See also Comment, Guidelines for
Extending Implied Warrantiesto Services Markets, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 365, 382 n.49
(1976) (efficiencies may also result because the professional's ability to communicate
with a particular client improves over time).
150
But see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down
a complete prohibition of advertising). Bates, however, left open the question of
regulating information on the quality of services. Id. 366. Further, it will take
time for the lifting of the ban to have any substantial effect; in the short run, at
least, the profession's expectations about the inappropriateness of advertising, derived
from past history, will inhibit advertising. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1979 at 12,
col. 3 (Report of ABA Comm'n-only three percent of lawyers have done any
advertising).
151 But see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (striking down
rigid minimum-fee schedules).
The Goldfarb Court did not consider the legality of a purely advisory fee
schedule. Id. 781. Moreover, the Court's decision may not have much impact on
the legal profession for some time. See note 150 supra (survey on lawyers' advertising).
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52
well as the lawyer's incentives to distort the valuation process,
make such bargaining even less plausible.
Finally, the market argument ignores the professional's own
expectations. Expectations about the definition and role of a professional influence the lawyer, as well as the client, and may foreclose thinking, and therefore bargaining, about an alternative
world. 53
Perhaps, though, I have been taking Epstein too literally. Regardless of whether the client's silence indicates agreement with
traditional decisionmaking roles, Epstein's insight that the parties
contract over decisionmaking may be useful. Epstein ends his discussion of informed consent by suggesting that the burden should
be placed on the professional to make explicit the terms of the
agreement. 154 This proposal has the virtue of requiring the more
knowledgeable party to place decisionmaking on the agenda, 155 but
it does not by itself solve the information and transaction-cost problems. Absent a more demanding rule, professionals would likely
draft form contracts in order to fulfill the requirement of making
explicit the issue of decisionmaking authority. 56 These forms
would reduce the costs of individualized negotiation but would
usually retain for the professional control over the terms. Only in
15 2 See D. RosENmAL, supra note 6, at 170-172, for a discussion of lawyers'

manipulation of client's perceptions of valuation of cases. See also Alschuler, The
Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE LJ. 1179, 1191-92, 1194-95
(1975) (describing techniques some lawyers use to get their clients to plead guilty).
153 In contrast, one of the arguments in favor of informed consent is that it
makes the parties aware of the possibilities for structuring their relationship, thus
allowing development of alternative conceptions of decisionmaking. Cf. Tribe, The
Supreme Court, 1972 Term,-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due
Process of Life and Law, 87 HAIv. L. REv. 1, 12-13 & n.70 (1973) (criticizing the
Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), on the
grounds that it allocated roles between private and public spheres according to
immutable, outdated doctrine).
-1 Epstein, supra note 115, at 128.
155 R. PosNER, supra note 118; cf. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information,
and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL Sru. 1, 32 (1978) (reconciling diverging
lines of cases with principle that imposes risk of mistake on contracting party who
acquires knowledge of the mistake as a matter of course).
156 Epstein seems to assume the creation of forms. Epstein, supra note 115,
at 128.
Forms would likely emerge for two reasons: first, they are cheaper than
individualized bargaining, and, second, they enable the lawyer to retain control over
the relationship by implicitly communicating that these are "take it or go elsewhere" terms. The one "text" I have found that is devoted to lawyer-client agreements strongly suggests lawyers should prepare their own form contracts for just the
latter reason. See E. ENT, D. DoAI, & L. 1'Enrswms, supra note 138, at 5.
Compare the emergence in the medical field of prepared "informed consent" contracts. See, e.g., the forms produced by In-Forms, Inc., of Albuquerque, New
Mexico (copy of order form on file with author).
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those cases in which the form itself induced a dialogue about
decisionmaking authority would this solution seem to solve the contractual problems discussed above. In all other cases, the absence
of a dialogue about the terms of the agreement would be ambiguous
-meaning either client agreement or lack of knowledge. Epstein's
solution of making terms explicit therefore seems designed more to
enhance efficiency ' 57 than to achieve the objectives of contractual
autonomy.
If, however, individualized bargaining is required regarding
some or all decisionmaking issues, the solution begins to resemble a
contractual version of the informed-consent doctrine. Indeed, as
long as both parties are free to choose whether to enter the relationship, and as long as the client's right to make decisions can be
waived,15 8 the informed-consent solution seems to mirror Epstein's
contractual bargaining. Yet a significant difference remains. 15 9
Epstein seems to assume that decisionmaking authority will be
allocated at the beginning of the relationship, whereas informedconsent doctrine postpones this dialogue until particular decisions
become necessary. The latter does not permit blanket waivers of
the right to make decisions; any waiver must be substantially contemporaneous with the relevant decision. 60
157 See Anderson, supra note 75, at 754; Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REv. 1053, 1067-71 (1977).
158See note 160 infra & accompanying text.
15 9 In addition to the difference discussed in the text, there is a possible
symbolic difference compared to contract doctrine. Informed-consent doctrine makes
a stronger "statement" that the decision to relinquish decisionmaking authority is the
client's. If the goal is to ensure that clients' decisions to relinquish authority are
truly consensual, then, given the history of professional-client relations, see note 147
supra, this symbolic effect is important. Indeed, the question is whether, even with
informed consent, the client's control of decisionmaking would remain merely
symbolic. See M. EDELm_A, Tim SYmBoic UsEs OF PoLiTics (1964); S. ScHEINcOLD, THE PoLrrcs OF BicE'rs (1974).
See also Baker, Posners Privacy Mystery
and the Failure of Economic Analysis of Law, 12 GA. L. REv. 475, 487-88 (1978).
160A patient can waive his right to informed consent. See Cobbs v. Grant, 8
Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972); Putensen v. Clay
Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1083-84, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319, 333 (1970). A
blanket waiver of decisionmaking authority made upon entry into a hospital would
not likely be valid. See C. FartED, supra note 116, at 24. Similarly, blanket waivers
of decisionmaking authority made by the client at the beginning of the lawyer-client
relationship should be void. At least at the beginning of the relationship, the client
possesses insufficient information to relinquish knowingly decisionmaking authority.
See text accompanying notes 53 & 54 supra. This prohibition of blanket waivers is
only a minor infringement on client autonomy. See text following note 165 infra;
cf. Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 TEx.
L. PEv. 193, 205 & n.37 (1977) (criminal defendant's waiver should be substantially contemporaneous with infringement of right waived); Anderson, supra note 75,
at 755-56 (waiver between merchants allowed where rule is devised for efficiency
reasons but prohibited where rule is devised for equity reasons).
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Postponement of the decision about decisions is more likely to
facilitate realistic client decisionmaking. The client is least able
to evaluate the right to decide certain issues at the beginning of the
relationship. 61 Instead of concrete terms, the client may be left to
weigh only the vague proposition that the lawyer can do his best if
left alone. Indeed, the professional himself may lack sufficient
knowledge at that time to predict the future with any accuracy.
Postponement of the decision enables the client to learn more about
the significance of decisionmaking and about the extent to which
162
the particular professional is worthy of his trust.
In contrast, a one-time contractual solution compresses the
burden of information transmittal and evaluation into one short
time span. It thereby minimizes the client's chances of making informed choices.16 3 This solution also seems to assume, as Ian
If informational disparities prohibit inferring consent at the start of the
relationship, would they not also prohibit fee arrangements made at that time? For
practical and theoretical reasons, however, setting a fee and allocating decisionmaking
authority are distinguishable. The practical reason is that lawyers and clients are
less likely to enter into their relationship without knowing the fee arrangement than
they are to enter the relationship not knowing who will make a particular decision.
The theoretical rationale stems from the notion that fee regulation can serve as a
protective device in lieu of informed consent. At least in theory, fees in lawyerclient relationships are more closely regulated than are those in general commercial
matters. A lawyer's fee must be reasonable. See ABA CoDE 01 PaoFsSSioNAr..L
lEspoNsmurry, DR 2-106(A) & (B). The price of commercial transactions with
consumers, on the other hand, is regulated by an unconscionability standard that is
looser than "reasonableness." See J. WHirE & B. SuMmRs, HANmBoox OF TaE
4-5 (1972) (suggesting prima
LAw UNDEn = UNiFoRM Comnmcr. CODE:
facie case of excessive price under U.C.C. § 2-302 requires showing markup of two to
three times wholesale price, id. 124). In addition, the lawyer has a duty to disclose
material facts that go to the basis of the compensation. R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr,
supra note 33, at 156. The potential effect of DR 2-106, however, is lessened by
its requirement that the showing of unreasonableness leave a 'lawyer of ordinary
prudence . . . a definite and firm conviction" that the fee is not reasonable.
DR 2-106(B). The laxity of enforcement of the disciplinary rules also undercuts
the rules impact. See notes 219-22 infra.
161 Cf. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory, 6 PHm. & PUB. AFF. 317, 322 n.9 (1976) ("In general, there is
no reason to presume that the future interests [of a person] as assessed today will
coincide with those interests as assessed in the future.").
16 2 See Buchanan, supra note 113, at 384-85.
163 Overload of information can be a major impediment to understanding. See
Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Out
Capacity for Processing Information, 63 PsYcH. REV. 81 (1956); H. ScrmoDF,
M. DRuiE, & S. STREUERLT, HUMAN, IoNFoRmAoN PnoCEssING (1967); Jacoby,
Speller & Kohn, Brand Choice Behavior as a Function of Information Load, 11
J. Mx=rn. R sE.Rcn 63 (1974). But see Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis,
127 U. PA. L. Rv. 630, 675-76 n.100 (1979) (arguing these studies do not prove
that overload is a significent problem). Any lawyer seriously trying to involve his
client in decisionmaking has difficulty avoiding giving either too little or too much information. See generally G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, Tym IAwYEamr PnocEss
1033-42 (1978).
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Macneil has written with regard to classical contract doctrine, that
the whole future of the relationship can be expressed in the first
meeting.6 4 If client involvement in decisionmaking is to be anything more than ratification of decisions already made, or the signing of prepared forms, it must be part of the continuing relationship
between professional and client. 16 5
On the other hand, postponement of the decision about decisionmaking also creates difficulties. First, a forced postponement
rule would deprive some clients of the ability simply to drop their
problems off with their attorney and say, "Don't bother me." This
seems a minimal interference with client autonomy, requiring at
most that the lawyer periodically ask the client whether he still
wanted to delegate authority to make all decisions.
Second, postponement of the decision about decisions might
deprive both the lawyer and client of information about the other's
expectations. Negotiating over decisionmaking authority at the
start of the relationship would, in theory, enable clients and lawyers
to mesh their expectations in a more realistic manner. Given that
withdrawal from the relationship later may be costly,16 6 and perhaps
even prohibited, 167 the parties should be encouraged to communicate their expectations as early in the relationship as possible. To
the extent that clients' expectations change as information becomes
more meaningful, however, mutual expectations exchanged at the
beginning of the relationship may be misleading. Furthermore,
nothing about informed consent prohibits an early exchange of
64

The epitome of discrete contract transactions: two strangers come into
town from opposite directions, one walking and one riding a horse. The
walker offers to buy the horse, and after brief dickering a deal is struck
in which delivery of the horse is to be made at sundown upon the handing
over of $10. The two strangers expect to have nothing to do with each
other between now and sundown, they expect never to see each other again
'

thereafter, and each has as much feeling for the other as has a Viking

trading with a Saxon.
Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentation,60 VA. L. Buv. 589, 594
(1974). Macneil argues that contract law is revising its assumption that all agreements are fixed at the beginning of the contractual relationship. He concludes that
the relational aspects of some agreements must be integrated into reformulated contract law. Id. 610; Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854

(1978); Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. lEv. 691 (1974).

165 In contrast, informed consent emphasizes the relational aspects of the
lawyer-client relationship. See generally Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts,
supra note 164, at 763 n.209 ("Services are inherently relational, and inherently less
subject to exact prior planning.").
166 See text accompanying notes 364-66 infra.
167 See notes 361-63 infra & accompanying text.
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expectations. 6 Indeed, because informed-consent doctrine requires
that the lawyer be concerned with his client's expectations, an early
dialogue may be encouraged. 69
Epstein's contractual solution makes clear that much more can
and should be done to make explicit the mutual expectations of
lawyers and clients. By emphasizing that an important criterion
should be the parties' expectations, this solution helps focus the
search for a decisionmaking rule.'7 Epstein's theory erroneously
assumes, however, that a one-time contract, made at the beginning
of the relationship, will accurately reflect those expectations. Informed consent, by postponing the allocation of decisionmaking
authority until necessary, rejects this assumption and therefore seems
more likely to foster an accurate exchange of expectations.
C. The "Better Results" Argument
Another major justification for professional decisionmaking is
that it produces better results for the client.171 From the clients'
-68 Binding waiver of decisionmaking rights at the beginning of the relationship
is prohibited. See note 160 supra.
169 There may also be differences in cost. For a discussion of cost issues, see
notes 284-98 infra.
170 Cf. V. CouNTrYmN, T. FnmrAN, & T. Scmrsmnx,
THE LAvnva In MODpEr
Socmt (2d ed. 1976) ("[Mlany of the dilemmas and problems of legal practice
are best understood by emphasizing the employment aspects of the lawyer-client
relationship." Id. 81); May, Code, Covenant, Contract or Philanthropy, 5 HAsTIG
CENTm
'P. No. 6, at 29 (1975).
May points out the virtues of the contractual
approach, but he is concerned that total adherence to it would reduce the professional-client relationship to a totally commercial venture.
171 Chief Justice Burger discussed this viewpoint as follows:
Very quickly we came to the question .. .of who controls the case
S... These distinguished criminal defense lawyers were very firm in the
proposition that the lawyer must control the case . . . . I remember one
of these lawyers using as an analogy, that any other standard would be as
ridiculous as having a man go into the hospital, to have his appendix taken
out by [sic] a local anesthetic, telling the doctor, "No, don't cut there,
cut here. Don't clamp that vein, clamp this one. Don't do this, do that."
Burger, Counsel for the Prosecution and Defense-Their Roles Under the Minimum
Standards, 8 Am. CGnM. L.Q. 2, 4-5 (1969). Compare Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, CJ., concurring) and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 838-40, 844-45 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) with In re President of
Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1015-18 (Burger, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964). See also T. P.nsoNs, THE Soc.4AL SYsTEm 437-39
(1964); Arrow, supra note 140; Hughes, Professions, 92 DAEDA IUS 655-57 (1963).
As with all exchange transactions, the client comes to the professional because
he believes either that the "exchange" will produce better results for him than if he
acted alone, or that the "exchange" will enable him to devote his time to another
activity that will reward him more than lawyering. See Anderson, supra note 75,
at 748-49. The question here, however, is whether the exchange must include
substantial or total delegation of decisionmaking authority to the lawyer in order to
produce those "better results."
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perspective, if delegation of decisions to lawyers produces better
results, the assumption that clients consent to professional control
becomes more reasonable. 1 2 From the lawyer's and society's perspectives, proof of better results introduces the possibility of justifying professional decisionmaking on paternalistic grounds. 1 13 Although paternalism can be attacked directly, 174 this Article will not
attempt that task. Instead, it will explore whether delegation of all
or most decisions to the professional actually does produce better
results. If the answer to that question is negative or unclear, then,
given the arguments in the preceding sections, decisionmaking authority should be allocated to the client.
Whether the lawyer or the client is the better decisionmaker
depends on who has superior information and who can better use
that information to make decisions. 1 5 The lawyer presumably has
superior legal knowledge, and his training and experience may give
him superior competence to make decisions about a particular case.
For two reasons, however, these professional skills might not
lead to better results for the client. First, although the professional
is better equipped to use the relevant information, one who is not
completely loyal to his client might not use that information for the
client's benefit. 71 Second, the client has superior knowledge of the
facts of his case and of the relation between his values and objectives
177
and those facts.
2
17 One might argue that the important criterion is not whether professional
decisionmaking actually produces better results but whether clients think it does.
If a client's perceptions are sufficiently unrealistic, however, intervention may be
necessary on protective grounds.

173 In addition to its interest in the client's welfare, the public has independent
interests in the results of cases. See note 339 infra & accompanying text. See
Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MWN.
L. RFv. 1175, 1196-97 (1970) (arguing that the public's interests should override
a criminal defendant's decision to proceed pro se). (This argument was rejected in
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).) To the extent that good results increase
a lawyer's sense of self-worth or better his reputation, he may also have an independent interest in the results of cases.

74 Even if one accepts the premise that professional decisionmaking produces
better results for the client, one could construct a theory of rights which argues that
a client has a right to make certain decisions regardless of the results. See generally
J.S. MiL., Ox LIBnTY (Fontance Library ed. 1962). See J. RA Is, A THrony
OF JusTicE, 143 n.14, 248-49 (1971) (for arguments against paternalism which are
more limited than Mills'); Dworkin, Paternalism,56 MONIST 64 (1972).
175 See Schneyer, supra note 5, at 129-30.
176

Id. 130, 136-41.

.77Id.

132-33.

See also Buchanan, supra note 113, at 381-82.
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This section will first discuss the extent to which professional
disloyalty1 78 and superior client knowledge exist and then the extent
to which they qualify the view that the professional is the better
decisionmaker.
1. Professional Disloyalty to the Client
Although professionals are presumed to be loyal, that presumption is cast aside when a particular professional faces a conflict of
interest. 7 9 The requirement that settlement decisions be made by
the client may be rooted in fears of professional disloyalty and
potential conflicts of interest. 8 0 In a contingent-fee case, the
lawyer's prediction of the verdict may make a trial seem beneficial
for either the lawyer or the client, but not necessarily both.' 8 ' In a
178 The problem of disloyalty arises whenever the lawyer sacrifices one client's
interests for his own interests or for those of another client. "Self-interest" describes
the former situation; "conflict of interest" describes the latter (when a lawyer favors
one client over another, however, he may also be favoring himself).
179 Fear of professional disloyalty is the most obvious explanation for the
OrrEssIONAzL RECode's provisions on conflict of interest. See ABA CODE OF
sPoNslnram=, Canon 5. For an excellent theoretical analysis of conflicts of interest
and fiduciary duties, see Anderson, supra note 75, at 738-61.
18oThe cases do not explain why settlement decisions are different from other
decisions. One possibility is the importance of the decision, but others-for instance,
the decision whether to call a particular witness-may be equally important. See
note 48 supra. Another explanation might be the client's expectations. But the
English rule, at least in cases involving the lawyer's ability to bind his client as
against third parties, has been said to give the lawyer authority to make settlement
decisions, See Denton v. Noyes, 6 Johns. 297 (N.Y. 1810); Whipple v. Whitman,
13 R.L 512 (1882). The American rule may have arisen from the greater distrust
of lawyers in the United States, see, e.g., R. PouND, TnE LA-,wYE FRom ANTIQUITY
To MoDERN Tnvms 135-36 (1953); Gawalt, Sources of Anti-Lawyer Sentiment in
Massachusetts, 1740-1840, 14 Am!. J. LEGAL HIST. 283 (1970); or perhaps American
judges were simply more willing to react to the unfairness of the situation, see
note 73 supra (discussion of Denton v. Noyes, 6 Johns. 297 (N.Y. 1810)). In any
event, no court has cited conflict of interest as the reason for giving clients the
authority to make settlement decisions, except in class actions, see cases cited in
note 131 supra. See also text accompanying note 282 infra for discussion of
administrative ease as another possible rationale for this dividing line.
181The lawyer's decision turns on his estimate of the expected recovery if the
case proceeds to trial, the amount of additional lawyer time necessary to prepare
for and conduct a trial, the alternative uses of his time, and his valuation of risk.
Assuming that the lawyer is risk-neutral and that the alternative use of his time is
worth $50, his economic interest is to proceed to trial if the number of hours necessary to achieve a particular result multiplied by $50 is less than the difference between the expected recovery at trial (the likelihood of winning times recovery) and
the settlement figure. If the difference between trial value and settlement is less
than the cost of his time, his interest lies in settlement. The client's interest in settlement may well diverge from the lawyer's. For example, if the expected recovery at
trial is $1,800, if the settlement offer is $1,000, and if the additional expenses associated with trial are less than $800, then, assuming risk-neutrality, the client would
elect to proceed to trial. The lawyer hired for a contingent fee of 1/3 will realize an
additional $277 from trial. If preparing for and doing a trial exceeds five and one-
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criminal case, in which the lawyer works for a fixed fee, the economic temptation to plea-bargain is strong, notwithstanding the
client's interest. 18 2 In legal-services work, with its usually heavy
case load, the lawyer may place a much greater value than does the
client on expeditious disposition of a case. 8 3 Even in corporate
practice, lawyers' and clients' incentives for settlement may
diverge.

1 84

Problems of professional disloyalty are not limited to the settlement context. In many of the decisions a lawyer makes on behalf
of his client, there is a potential divergence of the lawyer's and
client's interests18s For example, the decision not to seek out a
half hours, the lawyer would prefer to settle. For fuller discussions of this argument,
see Clermont & Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63 Comqr-m L. REV. 529
(1978). See also Schwartz & Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent
Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 ST.AN. L. REv. 1125 (1970).
The model above is overly simplistic, of course. The lawyer probably cannot
calculate expected recovery too precisely. Even if he can, there is probably a range
of expected recoveries. The choices are not always binary-they may include
settle, attempt further negotiations, or go to trial. The timing of the settlement
offer is important. The question of associated costs is more complex. Furthermore,
the client's and the lawyer's valuations of risk are likely to diverge. The client is a
one-shot player in a lottery, while the lawyer has a portfolio of claims. Most likely,
therefore, the client will be more risk-averse than the lawyer. Thus, the client
might want to accept a smaller settlement, while the lawyer might want to gamble
on a larger recovery at trial. See Reder, Medical Malpractice: An Economists
View, 1976 Am. B. FouNm. REsEARcH J. 511, 553-55.
But these complexities do not change the basic point-the lawyer's and the
client's economic incentives to settle do not necessarily converge. Clermont and
Currivan propose a combination contingent-fee/hourly fee schedule, which they
argue will change this situation. See Clermont & Currivan, supra, at 546-50, 578-93.
182 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 152, at 1181-206; Skolnick, Social Control
in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT BESOLUrION 52, 61 (1967). See generally
A. BLUmBEnG, Cn.mL JusTicE (1967). A criminal lawyer who has a portfolio
of cases may also have incentives to trade a more favorable disposition in one case
for a less favorable one in another. See D. RosNTHAL, supra note 6, at 103;
Alschuler, supra note 152, at 1210-24. There may be nothing more sinister about
this behavior than a desire to split the difference to resolve conflict. See
T. SCHELLING, THE STRTEGY OF CONFLICT 67-68, 71-73 (1960). But here, rather
than split the difference for one client, the lawyer is choosing between clients.

34

183 See Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience,
AD & DEFENDER A. BRIEFCASE 106, 118 (1977).

NAT'L LEGAL

184 The hourly fee, although it removes the financial incentive for the lawyer
to select a particular settlement that diverges from the client's interests, does not
guarantee that the lawyer will put the appropriate time and effort into a case. See
Clermont & Currivan, supra note 181, at 540-43. In addition, anecdotal evidence
suggests that corporate lawyers tend to over-deliver services relative to the client's
interests. See note 220 infra.

185 See Anderson, supra note 75, at 739-53, 758, for development of the thesis
that all exchange transactions inherently involve problems of disloyalty because one
side can take advantage of the other by providing lower quality work than bargained
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witness may involve a trade-off between the lawyer's use of his time
and the client's desire for that witness's testimony. The choice of
the forum may involve a trade-off between the lawyer's convenience
and the client's. The lawyer's decision to present a novel legal
argument or his decision not to offer a foolish one also may involve
a trade-off between the lawyer's and client's needs. 18
All this would merely be interesting footnote material if society
could control disloyal behavior through its usual mechanisms-the
market, legal regulation, and systems of norms.18 7 Both theoretical
and empirical evidence suggests, however, that these mechanisms do
not effectively control the behavior of lawyers.
for by doing less work (shirking), or by doing unneeded work. These problems are
particularly prevalent in service transactions in which expertise is an integral part
of the service.
The analysis offered here is not limited to economically motivated disloyalty,
although such disloyalty constitutes a large part of the problem. See Patterson,
The Lawyer and The Potential Client, in PROFESSIONAL RlsPoNsmiBrrY 19 (D.
Ream ed. 1978): "[The] dilemma between service and profit is unavoidable." Disloyalty may also arise because of differing ideological views, see Bell, supra note
131; because of differing needs to deal with the legal system on an ongoing basis,
see D. RosENTHAL, supra note 6, at 103; Alschuler, supra note 152, at 1210-24;
Crowe, Complainant Reactions to the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 12 LAw & Soc'v BEv. 217, 228-29 (1978); Fitzgerald, The Contract Buyers
League and the Courts: A Case Study of Poverty Litigation, 9 LAw & Soc'v REv.
165, 175-79 (1975); because control is a potential conflict issue, see generally
E. F"EIDsoN, DOCTORING ToGTER (1975); E. FnEmsoN, PROFESSION OF MEDnIN
(1970); E. FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE (1970); and because the professional and client possess different systems of values which influence the way they
view the world. Cf. G. HAzARD, ETmcs IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 8 (1978)
(relationship between lawyer and client, like any other human relationship, is shot
through with conflict; the sensitive handling of such conflict requires more and
less disclosure).
' 8GSee

N. REDLICH, PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmmrrr 35-39 (1976).

187One might argue that certification requirements, such as graduating from
law school or passing the bar exam, are also guarantors of quality. But even assuming that these requirements are correlated with the skills necessary for good
lawyering (an assumption that has not been proven, see, e.g., Gee & Jackson,
Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 695, 712 n.15 (1977)), the certification requirements cannot begin to guarantee loyal behavior if likelihood of loyalty to clients is not a criterion for certification. There is no reason to believe that law school or bar exams do this.
To the extent law school inculcates the professional norms of client service, it appears to have only a small effect on students. See Eron & Redmount, The Effect
of Legal Education on Attitudes, 9 J. LEGAL EDuc. 431 (1957) (third-year law
students scored slightly higher on the humanitarian scale of a personality inventory
test); Thielens, The Influence of the Law School Experience on the Professional
Ethics of Law Students, 21 J. LEGAL EDuc. 587 (1969) (small change during
law school toward agreement with ethical norms). See also Erlanger & Klegon,
Socialization Effects of Professional School: The Law School Experience and Student Orientationsto Public Interest Concerns, 13 LAw & SoC'Y REv. 11, 20-21 (1978)
(decline in interest in doing pro bono work between entry into law school and
graduation).
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a. Market Controls
In theory, market controls work if consumers can accurately
evaluate what they get for their money and can adjust their decisions
accordingly. If consumers are being "cheated," 188 they will either
switch suppliers or demand lower prices. Suppliers will then modify
their behavior so that, at equilibrium, the price of a product will
reflect its value. To the extent this theory describes reality, the
problems of professional disloyalty will be of no significance.
As argued earlier, however, market principles may not be applicable to lawyer-client exchanges. 18 9 The information disparities
between lawyer and client negate the usual market assumption that,
at the beginning of a transaction, the buyer can tell the seller exactly
what he wants and thereby "control" the seller. Moreover, even if
the client could specify his desires, prior valuation of the services
to be provided would be extremely difficult because of the uncertainty of the results of these services.190 And legal services, like
most other services, cannot be tested or inspected before purchase,
so this means of consumer control is also lacking in the market for
legal services.' 91
Consumers might resort to a more general kind of information
-reputation-to correct these deficiencies. Most clients, however,
cannot evaluate the quality of the legal services they receive. 192
Lawyers' incentive and ability to build reputations as providers of
high-quality services are thus weak.193
188 "Being cheated" means receiving a substandard product or service, paying
too much for an acceptable one, or receiving and paying for above-average goods
or services when average quality would suffice. See Anderson, supra note 75,
at 745-53.
18 9 See text accompanying notes 140-53 supra. Furthermore, there is reason

to doubt the market paradigm itself. See Baker, supra note 146; Leff, supra note
141.
19 0 See Arrow, supra note 140, at 951; Mechanic, supra note 140, at 354.
11-See generally Arrow, supra note 140, at 949; Comment, Guidelines for

Extending Implied Warranties to Service Markets, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 365, 367-68
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Extending Implied Warranties].
192 See notes 142 & 190 supra & accompanying text; Anderson, supra note 75,
at 752 ("the buyer cannot readily determine whether poor results were caused by

the fiduciary's cheating, by good faith errors or judgment, or by external factors
beyond the fiduciary's control").
The focus here is on quality rather than disloyalty because reputations are
more likely to be based on quality rather than on whether lawyers engage in the

subtle forms of disloyalty discussed earlier.

Further, the disloyalty problems dis-

cussed here are only relevant if they result in clients receiving poor quality services.

If clients could control the quality of the services they received, the problems
that disloyalty causes would disappear.
L93 See Extending Implied Warranties, supra note 191, at 373-74. Lawyers
might desire such reputations for other reasons, such as self-image or peer recog-
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Because consumers obviously can judge their own satisfaction,
lawyers arguably have incentives to perform in ways that would
enhance their reputations for satisfying clients.'9 But "satisfaction,"
in order to work as an effective market control, would have to be
correlated with quality work. Particular clients would have to
have repeated needs for legal services, or some mechanism would
be necessary to transmit accurately old clients' experiences to new
clients. The evidence supporting the correlation between satisfaction and quality is inconclusive, 195 however, and the communication channels between consumers are rudimentary.' g6 Beyond that,
satisfaction is likely to be subjective and thus to vary from client to
nition. But although such concerns might encourage lawyers to provide higherquality services, the power of this encouragement is not dependent upon communication of reputation to clients. Compare the discussion of reputation in
Reder, supra note 114, at 211. Reder suggests that reputation is most at stake
when the potential value of a claim is high, because the case will attract considerable attention. Id. 222-23. He is assuming that in most instances lawyers obtain
referrals from other lawyers. Both of these points may be true with regard to
high-figure personal-injury litigation, in which referrals to lawyers specializing in
big-money cases are common. But referrals also may be based not on reputation,
but on considerations that present conflicts of interest. See note 200 infra.
194For discussion of satisfaction as a measure of lawyer performance, see
Brakel, Free Legal Services for the Poor-Staffed Office versus Judicare: The
Client's Evaluation, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 532; Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 279.
195 This question is particularly complex because we lack agreed-upon standards of quality. See Carlson, Measuring the Quality of Legal Services: An Idea
Whose Time Has Not Come, 11 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 287 (1976); Rosenthal, supra
note 7. See also, discussions of competency in Carrington, The University Law
School and Legal Services, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 402, 422-25 (1978); Gee & Jackson, supra note 187, at 924-25.
The empirical evidence on the relation between client satisfaction and quality
of lawyer performance is very sketchy. Based on his study of judicare, Brakel
argues that the two are closely correlated. S. BRAXEL, JUDIcAmE: PRiVATE FUND,
PirvAT LAWYERS AN PooR PEoPLE (1974).
But his argument is at best circular, for he never offers an independent means of measuring quality. See id.
94-97.
In two studies done by Rosenthal, rough parallels were reported between degree of client satisfaction and the appropriateness of the outcomes of cases (as
evaluated by an independent panel of attorneys). See D. RosmirlAL, supra note
6, at 60; D. RosENTr, R. KAGAN, & D. QuATRoNE, VOLUNTEER ArroRNys ATD
LEGAL SaVICES FOR THE POOR: NEw YoaR's CLO PnocnA_ 65 (1971). In both
studies, however, only aggregate data were reported; no data was offered to support a correlation between particular clients' satisfaction and the evaluations of
their cases. Compare J. CAsPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTIcE: THE DEFENDANs'S
PERSPEcTIVE 100 (1972) (defendants preferred criminal lawyers to public defenders despite little difference in outcomes of cases).
196 See B. CuRnAN, supra note 148, at 200-02; D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 6,
at 128-29. Curran's study for the American Bar Foundation showed that 30%-35%
of clients sampled had reached lawyers through friends' or relatives' referrals, and
that another 33% had employed lawyers they knew from non-professional situations. See also Lochner, The No Fee and Low Fee Legal Practice of Private
Attorneys, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 431, 437 (1975). See generally Ladinsky, The
Traffic in Legal Services: Lawyer-Seeking Behavior and the Channeling of Clients,
11 LAv & Soc'Y REv. 207 (1976).
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client; hence it is likely to be a poor cue for other clients selecting
lawyers. 197
The market could also work via lawyer intermediaries, with
lawyers evaluating their peers. Even if reputation among other
lawyers were a reasonable indicator of quality,' 98 available evidence
indicates that few consumers reach lawyers through lawyer referrals 199 and that many of those referrals themselves raise conflict20°
of-interest problems.
The market paradigm of the informed consumer making tradeoffs between price and quality is thus largely inapplicable in the
area of legal services. It is most likely to be accurate for repeat
purchasers of legal services, who can afford to invest heavily in becoming experienced. 201 Even assuming this exception for repeat
202
users, market control is lacking over the bulk of legal practice.
b. Legal Regulation
A second method of controlling professional disloyalty is regulation by law. The primary regulatory devices are malpractice suits
for negligence and disciplinary actions.
197 See Extending Implied Warranties, supra note 191, at 372 & n.25.
19 8 Not only do clients have difficulty in evaluating legal services, but little
useful -work has been done by lawyers themselves in setting standards. See Carlson, supra note 195; Rosenthal, supra note 7.
1

99

B. CusmuN, supra note 148.

200 The primary conflict arises from the referring lawyer's interest in receiving
part of the fee. See J. CARLiN, supra note 138, at 162-163; D. Rosmnr'IA., supra
note 6, at 99-100; cf. ETmcs AND ADvocAcy, supra note 32, at 16-19 (recommending change in the Code to acknowledge widespread practice of fee splitting
and arguing that practice would be in best interest of clients because it would give
lawyers incentive to refer cases to competent lawyers). The present Code provision on fee splitting requires (1) client consent, (2) a division of fees in proportion to work done, and (3) a total fee no higher than reasonable compensation
for the work performed. ABA CODE OF PRoFEssioNAL REsPONsm]Lrry, DR 2-107.
201 See generally Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974).

202 The suggestion of developing separate rules for different segments of the
legal-services market is not new. See ETIcs AND ADvOCACY, supra note 32, at
10-11 (1978) (recommending that standards of professional conduct for lawyers
who represent large corporate clients should differ from those for lawyers who
represent less affluent, one-time clients); Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to
Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L.
See also Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client InREv. 337 (1978).
terests, Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 1111 (1978)
(arguing on the basis of survey of Chicago Bar that legal profession is highly differentiated by client type). Heinz and Laumann also argue that this structuring
by client interests deprives lawyers of autonomy because it allows clients to set
the boundaries of their work.
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Little information is available with which to gauge the effectiveness of malpractice litigation as a regulatory mechanism. 20 3 The
difficulty of proving causation 204 and the infrequency of suits 205 suggest that the threat of a malpractice action is not an effective
deterrent. Moreover, malpractice doctrine protects the lawyer's
exercise of his "judgment," 206 even though it is in situations calling
for the exercise of the lawyer's judgment that the need to monitor
his decisions is greatest. The more the decision involves the lawyer's
judgment,20 7 the more likely he will unthinkingly pursue his selfinterest without confronting the norm of client service and the less
likely that an evaluation of his decision will reveal the impact of
self-interest.20 8 Finally, the standard of liability in malpractice
203

See Note, Improving Information on Legal Malpractice, 82

YALE

L.J. 590

(1973).
204

See text accompanying notes 397-98 infra.

205

The frequency of suit has been increasing. See sources cited note 9 supra.

200

The liability standard in legal-malpractice cases is the duty to exercise the
skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by lawyers in good standing. See, e.g.,
See also
Hansen v. Wightman, 14 Wash. App. 78, 538 P.2d 1238 (1975).
B. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 33, at 164-165; Wade, supra note 40, at 763-65.
In applying this standard, courts sometimes have carved out areas of lawyer conduct,
labelled those areas "judgment," and stated that there is no liability for mistakes of
judgment. See Wade, supra note 40, at 765. Two areas in particular have been
treated in this fashion-tactical decisions made during litigation and opinions or
actions based upon interpretations of unclear law. See id. 763-65; Note, Attorney
Malpractice, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1292, 1298-1301 (1963). At times this use of the
label "judgment" has seemed to be only a declaration that where there are at least
two or more reasonable courses of action, the choice of one over another is not
unreasonable (or negligent). At other times, however, courts seem to be saying
that all tactical decisions and all decisions based on unclear law are insulated from
scrutiny, regardless of whether the lawyer's conduct arguably was negligent. Id.
207 As used here, judgment is the process by which knowledge and skill are
applied to reach a decision. See E. FBmmsox, DocToaNG TOGETHER 130 (1975).
As Freidson points out, the label "judgment" can be used to justify what nonprofessionals would call mistakes. Id. 127-31. See also M. MILm", THE
Because judgment
UN=DEST Cur 10-11, 129 (Morrow paperback ed. 1978).
exists to varying degrees, see Engel, The Standardization of Lawyers' Services, 1977
Am. B. Fouun. REsEAmcH J. 817, 821-22, the concern with judgment may obscure
the issue of whether a choice was reasonable under the circumstances. Deference
to judgment may also foreclose investigation into whether the appropriate steps were
taken before the judgment was made. See generally Smith v. Lewis, 13 Cal. 3d
349, 530 P.2d 589, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1975) (imposing obligation to perform
research before making judgment). Finally, even if deference to judgment is
proper, the question remains as to whose judgment should govern. This question is
the major concern of this article.
208See Anderson, supra note 75, at 757-58, 760-61. In addition, as Professor
Alschuler notes with regard to claims of incompetent counsel in criminal cases,
judges are reluctant to make judgments about members of the bar. Focusing on
whether the decision is the result of the client's choice avoids any intimation of
professional insult. Alschuler, The Supreme Court, The Defense Attorney and the
Guilty Plea, 47 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1, 43 (1975).
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cases 209 does not necessarily encourage the optimal degree of care.210
21
The standard may be biased in favor of lawyers' decisions. 1
Direct regulation by the profession is no more effective in controlling professional disloyalty.212 The only provision of the Code
of Professional Responsibility directly related to quality of performance is Canon 6, requiring a lawyer to represent a client competently. The effectiveness of this provision as a regulatory device
depends upon the definition given to competence and upon the
adequacy of enforcement. 213 Competence has largely been left undefined, however. 214 DR 6-10A, which implements this canon,
prohibits a lawyer from "[n]eglect[ing] a legal matter entrusted to
him." 215 Neglect, however, has been defined as a "consistent failure
to carry out . . . obligations," 216 usually involving "more than a

single act or omission," 217 and does not include "an error of judgment made in good faith." 218 This provision, then, is largely
directed at blatant failures to provide adequate representation.
The enforcement process accentuates this skewing. 219 Quality
problems often are seen as contractual and therefore deemed outside
the reach of the disciplinary process. Disciplinary agencies are
209 See note 206 supra.
210 See Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences,

84 YALE L.J. 1141, 1148 (1975)
medical malpractice cases).
211 See id.

(discussing the customary conduct defense in

See also, Calabresi, supra note 140, at 134 (if custom standard is

undesirable the solution is simply to change it).
212 Of course, there is the possibility of indirect regulation--to limited and

uncertain effect-through peer and supervisor pressure, at least in large-firm and
institutional practice. For a study of this phenomenon in the medical field, see
C. BosK, FORGrVE AND REMEMBER (1979).

213 Canon 6 could be effective simply as a norm that lawyers will conform to
regardless of enforcement. See notes 228-32 infra & accompanying text. Whether
Canon 6 operates as a norm because of enforcement, the scope and clarity of the

definition of "competence" will be major variables affecting the Canons success.
See F. ZmnunG & G. HA-vIwNs, DE RmENCE (1973); Geerken & Cove, Deterrence:
Some Theoretical Considerations, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 497 (1975).
214
See ETmcs AND AVOCAcY, supra note 32, at 11-13 (recommending that
standards defining competence be developed); Marks & Cathcart, Discipline Within
the Legal Profession: Is It Self RegulationP, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 200-01. See
also sources cited in note 220 supra.
21
ABA CODE OF PaOFEsSioNAL RESPoNsmiLrrY DR 6-101(A) (3).
216 ABA CoaM. ON PROFEssIoNAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS, Inf. Op. No. 1273 (1973).
217

Id.

218 Id.
219 For general descriptions of the disciplinary enforcement process, see Marks
& Cathcart, supra note 214; Steele & Nimmer, Lawyer, Clients and Professional
Regulation 1976 Am. B. FouND. REsEAcnH J. 917, 921-33; ABA SPEcrLa CoMMrrnu
ON EVAL-uATiON OF Discn,r.Ynv ENFORCEMENT (Tom C. Clark, chairman) PROBLEMS AND RECOMENDATIONS rN DiScipLNARY

[hereinafter cited as CLAuc REPORT].

ENFORCEMENT (Final Draft 1970)
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looking only for deviant members of the profession.22 0 As a result,
quality problems often are not addressed or are characterized as
frivolous. For example, Marks' and Cathcart's interviews with
members of disciplinary agencies revealed that a breakdown in
communication between lawyer and client, the single largest source
of complaints, was seen largely as a public-relations problem, rather
than one of discipline or quality, even when attributable to the
lawyer

2

21

Canon 5 may also be relevant: the language of EC 5-1 is broad
enough to cover not only traditional conflicts of interest but also the
forms of professional disloyalty discussed above.2 22 If clients recognize such problems, however, they are more likely to perceive them
as quality problems. 2

23

They will not know whether the lawyer

acted out of self-interest, but only that they did not receive the
"services" to which they felt entitled.2-4 And quality complaints are
largely ignored by disciplinary agencies.,2 2
Even if such complaints were not ignored and were recognized
as potential conflict-of-interest problems, the type of disloyalty discussed above is, by and large, not susceptible of proof after the fact.
No tangible evidence proves the conflict, such as purchase of the
client's property or representation of clients with differing interests. 2 2 6

Indeed, it is the combination of the exercise of the lawyer's

220 Marks & Cathcart, supra note 214, at 221, 225-26; Steele & Nimmer, supra
note 219, at 923, 932-33, 981.
221 Marks & Cathcart, supra note 214, at 210.
222
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the
bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of
compromising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the
interests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be
permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
ABA CoDE oF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmIry, EG 5-1. See also id. DR 5-101(A)
(except with consent and full disclosure, lawyer should refuse employment if his
judgment will be, or reasonably may be, affected by his own interests); id. EC 7-1
(lawyer should represent his client zealously).
2 23
See Steele & Nimmer, supra note 219, at 923 (client complaints tend to
present not allegations conforming to profession's definitions of unethical conduct,
but disputes concerning quality of services or failure to meet expectations as to cost
or promptness).
224 Id. 950. But see the discussion at id. 957, in which a client characterizes
the problem as his case getting lost because it was small in relation to other clients'
cases. It is interesting to note, however, that this client failed to report the problem
to a disciplinary agency.
2 25
See notes 219-21 supra & accompanying text.
226 The difficulties here lie in discovering whether the conflict affected the
lawyer's representation. See Geer, supra note 80, at 137; Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 VA. L. REv. 939, 977-78
(1978).
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judgment and the possibility of self-interest which creates the need
for the prophylactic device of client decisionmaking. 2 7 Although
no definitive conclusion can be reached without a study of disciplinary-agency actions, Canon 5 will not likely be useful in resolving
these disloyalty problems.
c. Regulation by Norms
Many commentators argue that, even if the market and legal
regulation do not provide adequate monitoring of lawyer performance, lawyers, as professionals, adhere to a set of internalized norms,
including undivided loyalty to the client's interests and a commitment to quality performance. These norms are said to play the role
market and legal regulation play in other areas, making external
monitoring largely unnecessary, except in cases of deviants.228

In a

sense, this argument rebuts the "normal" assumption of selfinterested behavior.
The absence of reliable data makes this claim difficult to evaluate. The burden of proof should rest on those who argue that
lawyers are more altruistic than others. Certainly, published studies
of lawyers' values do not support this hypothesis.2 29 Both the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the disciplinary process suggest
that lawyers are as self-interested as the rest of society.230
227

See notes 206-08 supra & accompanying text.
See, e.g., Parsons, supra note 133, at 335-36; Extending Implied Warranties,
supra note 191, at 406, 411.
229 Data on this subject are limited, but they support the statement in the
text. A recent study of the prestige that lawyers associate with various types of
law practice concludes that the "higher a speciality stands in its reputation for
being motivated by altruistic . . . considerations, the lower it is likely to be in
the prestige order," Laumann & Heinz, Specialization and Prestige in the Legal
Profession: The Structure of Deference, 1977 Am. B. FoUND. RzsF- cH J. 155, 202.
While the authors "doubt that altruism is directly or consciously derogated, ...
it seems clear that the profit motive and the values associated with it are given
precedence in the allocation of prestige within the profession." Id. 204. One other
empirical study of lawyers that looked at this question is an unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation. It is reported to reach the same conclusion-that lawyers value moneymaking. Zahedi, An Analytical Study of Attorneys" Occupational Values and Satisfactions (1962) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California),
cited in 0. MAnu, RESEARCH ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 44 nn.109 & 110 (1972).
Furthermore, two studies conclude that there is little increase in law students'
commitment to altrustic goals during law school. See Comment, A Survey of
Chicago Law Student Opinions and Career Expectations, 67 Nw. U. L. Rfv. 628
(1972); Thielens, The Socialization of Law Students (1965) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Columbia University).
For a discussion of doctors' altruistic behavior, see E. FRmsoN, PROFEsSION
(surveying the literature and concluding "that while
OF ME CiNE 172-78 (1970)
physicians do not lack a service . . . orientation, it does not seem to be a very
prominent value compared to others." Id. 178). See also note 187 supra.
23
o See sources cited in note 219 supra; Morgan, The Evolving Concept of
228

Professional Responsibility, 90 HAny. L. REv. 702 (1977).

The argument then is
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The arguments for regulation through internalized norms
prove, on examination, to be either tautologies or arguments of
necessity. According to the former, professionals are those who
regulate the conduct of their work according to internalized values.
Because lawyers are professionals, the argument goes, they regulate
their conduct according to such values. Whether or not it is desirable to define professionals in this way, such definitions say
nothing empirically or logically about lawyers' behavior.2 1 Arguments from necessity infer that, because neither the market nor
regulation by law adequately monitors professional performance,
the client must trust the professional to provide effective service.
From this necessity for trust, it is argued that the profession must
manifest a service orientation. 232 Again, whether or not this reasoning reflects desirable normative goals, it says little about the actual
existence of a service orientation.
Finally, the meager evidence on the quality of lawyers' performance suggests that the combination of the market, legal regulation,
and internalized norms has produced a level of quality that leaves a
good deal of room for improvement. Rosenthal's study of personalinjury decisionmaking, which set out to prove that client participation improves outcomes, demonstrates at least that lawyer performance is frequently suboptimal. 233 Bellow, who studied approximately
not that lawyers are solely concerned with profit but that, like everybody else, they
experience conflict between self-interest and more altruistic motives. Therefore we
should no more be willing to rely on the lawyer's service orientation than we are
to rely on the garage mechanic's.
231 See E. FREmsoN, supra note 229, at 79-81; Rotunda, The Word "Profession"
is Only a Label-And Not a Very Useful One, 4 LE
ea & L. 16, 19, 53
(Summer 1977).
232 Parsons, supra note 133, at 335-36. See also E. CAssELT, TnE HEALER's
ART (1976) (discussing the patient's trust in the physician as an element of healing).
233
See D. RosEuruHA, supra note 6, at 61.
Rosenthal submitted the case files from a sample of 60 personal-injury cases to
a panel of five experts for an evaluation of the cases' worth at three different times:
one year after the accident, four years after, and at trial. Id. 37. A composite
evaluation figure was computed by averaging the five responses for the time period
which most closely approximated the actual time of dispositions. In 77% of the
cases, the client's recovery was less than the panel's evaluation figure; in 42%, the
actual recovery was more than 30%lower than the evaluation figure. Id. 59.
It might be argued that an equally plausible explanation for these data is that
the defendants' lawyers performed exceptionally well. There are two reasons, however, for thinking that below-average performances by the plaintiffs' lawyers is the
more likely explanation. First, the qualitative descriptions provided by Rosenthal
illustrate instances of poor lawyering. Id. 30-33. Second, the defendants' lawyers
were all insurance company lawyers, a group that can be viewed as consisting of
buyers who offer prices (settlements) that vary with the skill of the sellers. See
generally Reder, supra note 114, at 216-26.
Moreover, to the extent that insurance company settlement policy was a variable, Rosenthal attempted to account for it by telling the expert panel the name
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150 case files of legal-services lawyers, 234 concludes that, by and
large, cases were processed routinely, that lawyers often failed to
take steps that a competent lawyer should take, and that the clients
obtained inadequate results. 235 Studies of criminal-defense work
show the same patterns. 23 6 Finally, one study has suggested that, in
23 7
probate practice, the level of competence varies greatly.

Admittedly, none of this evidence conclusively proves quality is
below the appropriate level. The studies are empirically insufficient
to "prove" anything, even in the respective areas of practice each
addressed. 238 More important, perhaps, all of the above studies
examined areas of practice in which the "normal" discipline of the
market-hourly fees-was absent. The problem may not be that
lawyers deliver suboptimal service, but that, in increasingly large
areas of practice, either bureaucratic structures or "nonoptimal" fee
arrangements dominate.239

Without studies of hourly fee practice, evaluating this argument
is difficult. Economic theory, however, does not necessarily suggest
that hourly fee arrangements are superior control devices. Nothing
of the company. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 6, at 206. Finally, it is possible that
Rosenthal's data understates the "loss" to the client. The evaluation at different
time periods was to control for case value increasing over time because insurance
companies know they can take advantage of a plaintiff's immediate need for funds.
Therefore, one would expect that recoveries would go up as trial approached.
Although Rosenthal recognized that different plaintiffs might make different tradeoffs between time and money, id. at 36, he accepted the time of settlement as
the time that reflected the plaintiff's decision about what tradeoff to make between
time and money. To the extent any plaintiff was manipulated by his lawyer to
accept a settlement at a different time than he otherwise would have, Rosenthal's
data would not reflect that potential "loss" to the plaintiff.
234 Bellow, supra note 183, at 109 n.7.
235Id. 108-09. See also Hosticka, Legal Services Lawyers Encounter Clients:
A Study in Street Level Bureaucracy (June, 1976) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis in
M.I.T. library).
230 See, e.g., A. BLUbmERc, supra note 182, at 26-31; Skolnick, Social Control
in the Adversary System, 11 J. CoN-ix.cT REsOLUTION 52 (1967). For anecdotal
evidence, see Alschuler supra note 152; Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. GIN. L. REV. 1 (1973).
237 Stein, Probate Administration Study: Some Emerging Conclusions, 9 BFs.
See also Project, The Unauthorized
ThOP., PROB. & Tn. J. 596, 603-04 (1974).
Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YArE L. J. 104
(1976) (pro se representation preferable to professional representation for certain
types of simple divorces).
238 Furthermore, the profession lacks agreed-upon standards of quality. See
note 195 supra.
239 Structural changes in the delivery of services create new problems, particularly problems of rationing services, see Mechanic, The Growth of Medical Technology and Bureaucracy: Implications for Medical Care, 1977 MzuxANx MEM.
Ftr Q. 61 (Winter 1977), but whether they create new quality-of-care problems is an open question. Clients, however, may feel that bureaucratization of
legal-services delivery creates quality problems. See J. CASPER, supra note 195;

Casper, Improving Defender-Client Relations, 34
A.

BRmFCASE

114 (1977).

NATI

LEcAL
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But see S. BrAFL, supra note 195, at 89-110.
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inherent in such arrangements provides an incentive to devote the
appropriate amount of hours to a case, or the appropriate effort per
hour.240

Further, at least anecdotal evidence shows a tendency in

corporate practice to overdeliver legal services.2 1 This unnecessary
work is similar to low-quality work in that the value of the services
2
the client receives is not equivalent to the payment he makes.
Although the quality problems may be different in hourly fee
practice, they may still exist. If quality problems are less serious in
these types of practice, this difference may be due more to the ability
of clients to monitor the lawyer's work than to any disparity in fee
structures. And increasing ability to monitor work is part of what
243
informed consent is about.

240 H. LEmNSNU, BEYOND ECONONIC MAN 95-117 (1976) (decision about
effort turns on a variety of factors, but some inefficiencies are always present);
Clermont & Currivan, supra note 181, at 543 ("the lawyer has no direct economic

incentive to work . . . the number of hours his client's best interests dictate").
241 See N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1977, § D, at 1, col. 2 (A panel of businessmen
at an ABA meeting criticized high and unnecessary legal costs. One panelist
stated: "Lawyers, especially in New York, travel like Nuns-in pairs or three at
a time." Id.); N.Y. Times, June 16, 1978, § D, at 4, col. 1 (Practicing Law Institute program for in-house lawyers on how to control legal costs of outside counsel). See also M. WESSEL, THE RuLE OF REASON 126-79 (1976).
24 2
See Anderson, supra note 75, at 752 n.38.
The medical field has a comparable problem: the performance of unneeded
surgery. A congressional report estimated that 17% of the surgical procedures performed in the United States during 1974 were unnecessary. SUBcoMM. ON OvERsIGHT AND INvSTIGAIONs OF T=E HousE Comm. oN INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
CommERcE, REPORT ON COST AND QUALrrY OF HEALTH CARE: UNNECESSARY SURGERY 30, 94th CoNe., 2d SEss. (Subcomm.Print 1976).

Another possible indicator of quality problems is withdrawal from the market
See Anderson, supra note 75, at 752, n.39. Whether such withdrawal has occurred
with legal services is a controversial question. First we have no agreed-upon definition of "need for legal services." See B. CunnAN, supra note 148, at 9; cf. Mayhew, Institutions of Representation: Civil Justice and The Public 9 LAw & Soo'y
REv. 401 (1975) (question of legal needs not static but related to structure of
institutions of representation). Second, even if we agreed there was a "legal need"
present, individuals have a variety of alternatives besides lawyers for satisfying that
need. They could negotiate for themselves, see Ross and Littlefield, Complaint As
a Problem Solving Mechanism, 12 LAw & Soc'y REv. 199 (1978); submit their
dispute to another agency, see Steele, Fraud Dispute and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer Complaints, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1107 (1975); or simply
decide to "avoid" resolving it, see Felstiner, The Influence of Social Organization
on Dispute Processing, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 63 (1974). Third, even if we had
agreement that a legal need was unsatisfied, we would still have to discover why
people were not going to lawyers before we could conclude there was "market deterioration" attributable to quality problems. People may not be going to lawyers
because they do not value the end products of the legal system, rather than because
See Galanter, Delivering Legality:
of anything directly related to lawyering.
Some Proposals for the Direction of Research, 11 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 225 (1976);
cf. MacCauley, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
Am. Soc. REv. 55 (1963) (contract law not usually needed in business relationships). Or it may be because of cost problems that would only be exacerbated by
the solution offered here. See Schwartz, How Can Legal Education Respond to
Changes in the Legal Profession, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 440, 451-52 (1978).
243 See text accompanying notes 263-66 infra.
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2. Superior Knowledge
The superior knowledge of lawyers is the generalized technical
information and the experience brought to bear on their clients'
problems. The client possesses superior knowledge of another sortknowledge of the facts and circumstances of his case. To the extent
that this information is historical, the lawyer may elicit it through
skillful interviewing. The client, however, also possesses unique
knowledge regarding his goals and values as related to his case, information that even a skillful interviewer may not be able to elicit.
Settlement, a decision allocated to the client by present law,
illustrates this point. The relatively simple decision to accept or
reject a settlement offer of $2,000 in a personal-injury case involves
the valuation and comparison of monetary and nonmonetary factors,
including the risk that the client will lose at trial. The client must
compare an immediate payment of $2,000 with a future payment
that may be greater or less than $2,000. How the client will value
the future payment will depend on when he would receive it, 244 on

the spread of the possible outcomes,2 5 and on his degree of risk
aversion.2 46 For example, assume his lawyer tells him that, if he
refuses the offer, he has a sixty-percent chance of receiving $4,000
and a forty-percent chance of receiving nothing.2 47 The value of
this sixty-percent lottery to the client depends upon the client's
attitude towards risk. A client who is strongly risk-averse may prefer
the certain $2,000; one who prefers risk may take the chance of
getting $4,000.241
Other factors to be considered include the client's feelings about
going to trial. Does he place positive value on "telling his story,"
or is he concerned about feeling foolish? What does settlement
24 4

As a fixed payment is pushed farther into the future, its present value deCHIPLSTEIN, CoRPoRATE FINANCE 32-33 (1972).

creases, V. BRulNEY & M.
245 Id. 63-64.

240 See H. AIFFA, DECISION A.ALYsis (1968). Further, it is likely that the
lawyer's and client's risk propensities will diverge because the client is a one-shot
player. See note 181 supra.
247 The problems involved for the lawyer in reaching this calculation are extremely difficult. It is my experience that in practice we either overestimate our

ability to make such judgments or throw up our hands and confess that we can
only guess. Very little work has been done on how lawyers might refine predictive
judgments. See G. BELLOW & B. MouLToN, supra note 163, at 1004-17 (discussing ways lawyers might begin thinking about making such predictions).
248

Risk propensity is not a static concept-it is dependent upon circumstances

as well as an individual's nature. A client's present needs for funds, his alternative uses of the money, and his ability to borrow may all influence his attitude towards risk.
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mean for his self-image-"chickening out," vindication, or a "wise"
tendency not to prolong a dispute unnecessarily?
A sensitive lawyer might, through appropriate probing, uncover
the values at stake in his client's settlement decision. 249 More difficult will be eliciting the precise weights the client attaches to each
of the factors governing that decision. Although the literature on
decision theory is voluminous, there is little evidence that a lawyer
can completely elicit such information.sO The client will always
25 1
know more than he can tell.

What is the significance of the client's superior knowledge of
his own values? Perhaps this knowledge is merely another reason
why settlement decisions belong to the client. Such decisions frequently require the weighing of almost incomparable values. Because the lawyer cannot know the relative weights of the competing
values for his client, he cannot be sure that his decision will satisfy
his client's real needs.
The same difficulty can arise in connection with other tactical
choices. The decision to seek a continuance may involve a trade-off
between the client's tolerance of anxiety and an opportunity for
greater gains. Whether to call a particular witness may involve
more than technical questions of evidence: the client may want to
avoid subjecting the witness to a public attack on his credibility or
to harrassment at the hands of the opposition. 252 The decision to
try a case to judge or jury may involve not only considerations of
which decisionmaker will be more favorable, but also client preference regarding the audience for his story. In addition to technical
questions of jurisdiction and venue, choice of forum may also be
affected by the client's convenience and tolerance of delay.
The basic problem is that the division between subject matter
and procedure is inevitably artificial. It is based upon a false view
of an ends/means dichotomy. A client in a civil suit may want
2 49
See D. BINDER & S. PICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COuNSELING cs. 8
& 9 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BmnmER & PICE] (discussion of counseling techniques designed to elicit these client concerns).
250 In Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, Behavioral Decision Theory, 28 ANN.
BEv. PsycH. 1, 21-24 (1977), the authors review the research and decide that it
provides no clear conclusion. Accord D. BINDER & S. PRicE, supra note 249, at

148-53 (based on authors' experience).

See also Simon, supra note 126, at 41

(given positivist assumption that ends are "subjective, individual and arbitrary,"

cannot meaningfully understand clients' values).
lawyers
25

See M. PorA-m, Tim TACrr DIMMNSION 4 (1966).

See notes 40-46 supra & accompanying text. Or the client may want to
present his story his way. See State v. Pratts, 145 N.J. Super. 79, 366 A.2d 1327
(1975), aff'd, 71 N.J. 399, 365 A.2d 928 (1976), discussed in Freedman, Professional Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 202-03
(1978).
252

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

102

[Vol. 128:41

money, but he may want that money at the least cost in terms of
personal embarrassment and delay. A criminal defendant may want
liberty, but he may also want to tell his story, obtain absolution, or
protect a friend. These other ends may not rise to consciousness at
the time of the initial lawyer-client consultation. They may not
occur to the client, or to the lawyer, until particular means are
selected for achieving the ostensibly primary end of money or
freedom.
Further, a client often comes to a lawyer without fixed, unambiguous ends in mind. Just as patients may approach physicians
with nothing more than generalized demands for improved health, 253
clients may approach lawyers with nothing more than the desire for
advice about their problems. For such clients, the formulation of
concrete goals will depend upon what they are told they can get, 254

which in turn depends upon the lawyer's assessment of what means
are appropriate for their situations. That judgment is likely to be
influenced by the lawyer's values and his sense of role.255 For
example, a client who receives an eviction notice may come to a
lawyer for help about "this." Whether "this" comes to mean defending the eviction, finding housing, obtaining more time to move,
or resolving the dispute with the landlord may depend as much on
the lawyer's selection of means as on the client's fixed ends.256 Allocating the choice of means to the lawyer can, in effect, determine
the ends that the client will pursue.
As discussed above, even a lawyer who recognizes the existence
of subsidiary ends would be hampered in making satisfactory procedural decisions by the client's inability fully to communicate his
values to the lawyer.257 Beyond this difficulty is another problem
akin to the "dwarfing of soft values" problem, which occurs in costbenefit analysis. 258 In theory, emotion-laden or subjective goals can,
and perhaps will, be taken into account; in practice, however, the
separation between subject matter and procedure discourages consideration of these ends. The separation of decisionmaking authorsupra note 5 at 129.
See G. BF.LLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 163, at 233-34;

253 See Schneyer,
25 4

cf. Anderson,
supra note 75, at 760 n.67 ("fiduciary is frequently responsible for defining what
the client's interests are and for deciding how to maximize them").
255 See J. CASPER, LAWYERS BEFORE THE WARrEN Coi-aT passim (1972);
Redmount, Attorney Personalities and Some Psychological Aspects of Legal Consultation, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 972, 982-88 (1961).
256Cf. Fitzgerald, supra note 185, at 185-87 (describing housing litigation
in Chicago in which clients influenced lawyers to use different means).
257
See text accompanying notes 250-51 supra.
258 See, e.g., Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 Pim. &
66 (1972); Tribe, supra note 146, at 627.
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ity along artificial means/ends lines may communicate an implicit
value judgment that "procedural" decisions do not implicate legiti259
mate client ends.
In summary, then, two major considerations suggest that the
lawyer's technical expertise may not produce optimal results. First,
the lawyer's self-interest, and his concern for the interests of other
clients, may weaken his loyalty to any particular client. Second,
many of the decisions that must be made on the way to resolving a
client's problems require the balancing of client values. These
considerations are not sufficient, of course, to prove conclusively that
an expanded rule of informed consent would be superior or even
equal to professional decisionmaking. One may concede that
lawyers have some incentive to take advantage of their clients and
still contend that the existing set of social controls works well
enough to keep the harm minimal.20 One may also concede that a
client cannot communicate his entire value structure to the lawyer
and still contend that the lawyer's experience in working with
clients keeps him sufficiently informed about typical client values
to allow him to make informed decisions. 261 Only the client who
has highly aberrational values will be harmed by the lawyer's informed guesses, but devising a system that will accommodate extreme cases is always difficult and frequently not worth the effort.
The presumption in favor of client decisionmaking, 262 the problem
259 This "judgment" that lawyers are superior decisionmakers, at least regarding the "procedures" involved in a lawyer-client transaction, may also affect the
possibility of clients making settlement decisions-a decision present law clearly
assigns to them. First, it reinforces the notion that lawyers know best, thereby
giving legitimacy to lawyers who believe their job is to persuade their clients to
accept their judgments about settlement offers. Second, it reinforces for clients
the notion that their role is simply to trust their lawyers, making it less likely that
they can assume decisionmaking authority even when it is offered to them.
2 60
Cf. H. LEmENSTEN, supra note 240 (economic definition of maximization
is unrealistic when applied. to individuals working for others; virtually all agentprincipal relationships involve some inefflciency). If Leibenstein is correct, the
possibility of cheating only leads to the question whether in an imperfect world the
level of cheating is optimal.
261
See Schneyer, supra note 5, at 133. This is less likely to be true, however, if the value structure of professionals as a class has certain biases. For example, it has been noted that physicians have a bias towards treatment. See, e.g.,
Mechanic, supra note 239, at 64; Scheff, Decision Rules, Types of Error, and Their

Consequences in Medical Diagnosis, 8

BEuAvIoRA.

SCIENcE

97 (1963).

But see

Wildavsky, Doing Better and Feeling Worse, 106 DAEDALus 105, 108 (1977)
("The patient's simple rule for resolving uncertainty is to seek care up to the level
of his insurance."). Similarly, lawyers may have a bias towards legal solutions.
Our "due process" solutions to problems may be due to our bias towards procedural changes rather than an honest estimate of client needs. See Trubek, Book
Review, 1977 Wis. L. Rha. 303, 309-312 (1977). Of course, this "vice" may also
be a defect of this Article, which can be viewed as advocating procedural solutions
to substantive problems.
2 2
See notes 114-32 supra & accompanying text.
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of disloyal professionals, and the client's inability to communicate
his values to the lawyer do indicate, however, that the informedconsent principle may be an improvement over the present system,
assuming that the client can make the necessary decisions. The
client's competence to make decisions is the focus of the following section.
3. Decisionmaking Under Informed Consent
Professional disloyalty and superior client knowledge appear to
be problems that can be ameliorated by informed consent. Disloyalty results, in part, from monitoring problems, 263 and informed
consent can be a form of monitoring. The lawyer is required
periodically to justify decisions to his client. The process of thinking through alternative courses of action and explaining them to a
client encourages self-scrutiny and fosters greater self-awareness of
the factors influencing the lawyer's judgment, thereby improving
his decisionmaking. 26 Allocating decisionmaking authority to the
client obviously takes advantage of the client's superior knowledge
of his own values.
Whether the informed-consent model can serve as the basis of
the lawyer-client relationship depends on the client's receipt of
reliable information and ability to make the necessary decisions.
Although, at the start of the lawyer-client relationship, most clients
lack the information and expertise to value decisionmaking control
and to evaluate the lawyer's promised performance, 265 they are not
therefore unable to fulfill their role in a relationship based on informed consent. Informed-consent doctrine does not require that
the client actually make the final decisions. It does require that, at
the proper time, a decision be brought to the client and that the
information needed for evaluation be disclosed. The client then
chooses whether to delegate the decision to the professional,26 seek
further consultation, or make the decision himself. Thus, the client
becomes the monitor of the lawyer's actions.
Performing this task requires less expertise than does evaluating
the lawyer's statements in the initial meeting. Information and
conclusions reported to the client may suggest a problem and the
263

See Anderson, supra note 75, at 753; Reder, supra note 114, at 220-22.

See Capron, supra note 5, at 371, 374-75 (one function of informed consent is to encourage self-scrutiny by physician-investigator). Monitoring might also
work by simply forcing the professional to pay attention to the client's needs.
2635 See notes 142-43 supra & accompanying text.
2 66
See note 160 supra. See also D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 6, at 151-61
(discussing the functioning of an informed-consent model in the lawyer-client
264

relationship).
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advisability of obtaining further information or a second opinion. 67
Concern may be triggered by unexplained gaps or inconsistencies in
the lawyer's reports, or simply by the manner in which the information is conveyed. Less knowledge is needed to recognize these
problems than to solve them. 68
A more important consideration is the educative value of the
lawyer-client relationship. At the beginning of the relationship, an
inexperienced client operates in a void. He cannot be expected to
evaluate the whole of a relationship that may involve many decisions
and stretch over a long period of time. Informed-consent doctrine
allows the client to receive information in small doses and to make
less global decisions.2 69 Informed consent, if it leads to periodic
meetings between lawyer and client, can help bridge the information
gap between them. Thus, over time, the client's ability to monitor
the lawyer's progress and to make decisions should improve.
The considerations outlined above indicate that clients may be
better able to perform decisionmaking tasks under a system of informed consent than under traditional forms of contracting. Remaining, however, is the question whether clients can adequately
perform their role even with the "help" provided by informed
consent.
In discussing this question, examination of a decisionmaking
dialogue between lawyer and client may prove useful. Assume the
client is a black woman in her twenties who has a civil rights claim
against the police for an illegal search. The question under discussion is in which court to sue.
Client: Why did you ask me here today?
Lawyer: Well, I have worked enough on your case to
be ready to file a court action, assuming that's what you
still want, but we have to decide what court to file in.
Client: What are the options?
Lawyer: Well, we can go into state court; because the
jury selection is limited to Philadelphia County, we are
likely to get a more favorable jury-more blacks and more
267

See Buchanan, supra note 113, at 384-85 (1978).

268 Inferential support for this conclusion comes from Rosenthal's study of the
relationship between the degree of clients' participation in personal-injury cases
and the cases' outcomes. His data show a statistically significant correlation between client participation and satisfactory case results. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note
6, at 39 & n.15. Rosenthal's four measures of client participation involved forms of
monitoring, rather than actual decisionmaldng by the client See id. 32-33. Thus,
Rosenthal's study suggests that monitoring is both feasible and beneficial.
269
See note 163 supra.
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young people. The other option is federal court-there
the case is likely to be heard sooner; it's somewhat easier
for me to litigate in, and it's somewhat easier to get information through discovery.
Client: I don't know-what do you think?
Lawyer: Well, the trade-off is the more favorable jury
in state court versus the additional information we can get
in federal court. The major additional information we
are likely to get is the police investigative file. Once in a
while, that turns up something-maybe in one out of ten
cases. That still probably leaves state court a better forum
in terms of winning the case. But, for a jury trial there,
we might have to wait up to five years, probably at least
four. We can get a jury trial in federal court in less than
two years, maybe even one year.
Client: Time is somewhat important to me. How
much difference would the difference in juries make?
Lawyer: It's hard to say. I haven't had that much
experience with state juries in these kinds of cases, but, in
a close case like yours, where credibility is everything, it
could be significant.
Stopping the dialogue here, is it plausible that a client can
make an intelligent decision with this information?
One major hurdle is not client incompetence, but the poor
quality of information provided. The information about the difference in the likelihood of victory between state and federal courts
is extremely vague. While precision is not required, something
more focused than "it could be significant" is surely possible..2 70 The
270 For example, the lawyer could check court dockets and talk to other attor-

neys to broaden his experience. He then could attempt to refine into crude probabilistic data his intuition that the difference in courts could be significant. See
G. BELLow & B. MOULTON, supra note 163, at 1004-17, 1039; D. Bun-a & S.
PRacE,

supra note 249, at 140-44.

If after going through this process he still could

only conclude, "Who knows-I sure don't-therefore when I say I mean it could
be significant, I mean it is plausible to me that it will make a difference," then
the lawyer should decide whether it is a problem of competence or genuine un-

certainty. If the problem is one of competence, the lawyer either should not handle
the case or should bring in a more experienced lawyer. See ABA CODE OF PaoNnsIf the problem is genuine uncertainty, decision
SIONAL BE soNssmmrrY, EC 6-3.
theorists tell us the lawyer can guide his choice with "standards," such as assuming
each "state of the world" is equally likely, being a pessimist or optimist, or thinking about how he or the client would feel if the choice turned out to be wrong
("the criterion of regret"). See H. RAIFFA, supra note 246. Of course they don't

tell us which "standards" to use. My point, however, is not that lawyers should

teach their clients decision theory, although questions such as, "If you took this

choice how would you feel if it did not work out," should be asked of clients, but
rather that once a situation of genuine uncertainty exists, the client's choice of
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client's impression that time is somewhat important is also vague.
If the conversation were to continue, one would hope that both
lawyer and client would be able to clarify their meanings. 27 1
Assuming this clarification, can the client trust the lawyer's information? She certainly does not have the knowledge to evaluate
its validity.272 Has the informed-consent problem merely shifted to
a different place? Replacing lawyer decisionmaking with client
decisionmaking merely changes the problem-from potential conflicts of interests to client reliance on the lawyer's good faith in
communicating information. What, if anything, has changed?
First, the conflict-of-interest argument attempted only to question the assumption that clients' interests always receive priority
and thus to urge the discovery of ways to insure that lawyers'
abilities are being used on their clients' behalf. Many lawyers do
place their clients' interests first. If the information these lawyers
provide is unreliable, the fault lies with their lawyering skills, not
with their motivation. But lawyers, like others, are subject to conflicting drives 2 73 -in this case, self-interest and service orientation.
Lawyers who would otherwise succumb to their self-interests may be
deterred from providing incomplete or misleading information by
the disclosure required by informed consent. Other lawyers may
become aware of their self-interested actions by the necessity of exstandard should apply. It is the client's optimism or pessimism that should be
relevant. The strongest rebuttal to this seems to me to be that there is no genuine
uncertainty: lawyers always have hunches that they cannot articulate and their
hunches will be better than their client's spasm of uninformed decisionmaking.
See Schneyer, supra note 5, at 133-34. Issue is then joined over whether these
lawyer's "hunches" justify strong lawyer decisionmaking control or simply a recommendation from the lawyer.
271 One might assume that lawyers who have to "practice" clarifying their
meaning to many clients would become more skilled at communicating to the
client than clients, who are one-shot players, would become skilled at communicating to the lawyer. For this to become a reality, however, lawyers would have to
make an investment in learning to communicate with clients. As one observer
has noted, lawyers can be viewed as interpreters between the langauge of the law
and the language of their clients. Most of the training lawyers receive, however, is
for translating the client's world into legal language, not translating the legal world
for their clients. See O'Barr, The Language of the Law--Vehicle or Obstacle,
Duke University Law and Language Project Research Report No. 12, at 33-34
(unpublished paper 1977). See also Wasserstrom, supra note 7, at 23-24.
272 For example, assume that among the considerations in the decision whether
to file suit in federal or in state court is the possibility of abstention, see, e.g.,
Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. 1Eqv. 590 (1977). Even
with a fairly elaborate exposition of some difficult doctrinal questions, see Field,
Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine,
122 U. PA. L. Ruv. 1071 (1974), few clients can evaluate a lawyer's conclusion
that abstention is likely or unlikely. Thus, in choosing the forum, or in delegating
that decision to the lawyer, the client must rely on the lawyer's estimate of the
probabilities.
27 3
See H. LEmu-NsT =, supra note 240, at 72-76, 93-94.
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plaining their thinking. The more the dialogue between lawyer
and client forces lawyers to confront the conflict between self-interest
and service orientation, the more likely they will be able to conform
their behavior to the client-centered model espoused by the legal
profession. 274 Informed consent cannot rid the world of dishonest
lawyers. It can, however, improve the quality of clients' understanding 275 by prodding well-intentioned lawyers to provide full
and dispassionate explanations of the legal process.
Second, informed consent might ameliorate the problem of the
questionable trustworthiness of the information communicated from
lawyers to clients. The doctrine might initiate a dialogue within
the legal profession about appropriate ways of informing clients and
might thereby influence its ideology and values. The opposite
effect is, however, also possible, on the theory that trust induces
trustworthy behavior and, correspondingly, that distrust becomes a
self-reinforcing prophecy.2 7

6

What is needed is an appropriate line

between trust and monitoring,277 one drawn closer to the monitoring side of the spectrum than is the present line.
Assuming that these information difficulties can be solved, the
question remains whether the client is competent to make the decisions. Returning to our hypothetical dialogue, nothing is inherently incomprehensible about the trade-off between a better
chance of success in state court and the cost of greater delay. Indeed, the question of choice of forum has no right answer.2 78 Be2 74

See L.

FESTINGER, A

THEORY

OF

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

passim (1957).

Of course, the conflict might simply cause lawyers to modify their values.
AamRGis & D.

Cf. C.

SHON, THEORY IN PRACTICE: LNCREASLNG PROFESSIONAL EFFEcTIVE-

NESS 30 (1974) (recognition of inconsistencies between professional's espoused
theory and his actions is a learning mechanism).
275 Although the ultimate goal is understanding by the client, not simply a
flow of words from lawyer to client, the informed-consent medical cases have not
focussed on the client's understanding but rather on whether the physician fulfilled
the formal requirements of disclosure. See the discussions of this issue in Capron,
supra note 5, at 404-418; Meisel, supra note 1, at 113-23. But see Goldstein supra
note 11, at 692-95 (warning of the possibility of infringement of the patient's autonomy if the focus is on the patient's understanding).
276 See A. Fox, BEYOND CONTRACT: WORK, POWER
(1974); H. LEmENSTE n, supra note 240, at 260-61.

277 See Burt, The
HAsTrNGs CENTER REP.

A ND

TRUST

RELATIONS

Limits of Law in Regulating Health Care Decisions, 7
No. 7, 29 (Dec. 1977) (arguing that both the traditional
conception of physician authority and the "reformist" doctrine of patient control
have dangers). Rigid rules one way or the other may inhibit sharing of roles and
responsibility. But cf. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAnv. L. REv. 1685 (1976) (analyzing rhetorical uses of concepts of
individuality and altruism in private-law opinions, treatises, etc., and concluding
that these opposed rhetorical modes reflect irreconcilable visions of society).
27
s See Wexler, Expert and Lay Participationin Decisionmaking, in Participation in Politics: NOMOS XVI 186, 188-89 (J.Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1975)
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cause of the client's superior knowledge of her own values, she is not
only equally competent, but likely more competent, than the lawyer
to strike the balance.
Furthermore, although the proposition that such information
is understandable to the average person cannot be empirically verified, it seems to be implied by the ability of the average person to
make the decisions required in daily life. 279 The situations that
prompt clients to seek legal advice are stressful, however, and will
perhaps impair client competence to make decisions.280 Furthermore, litigation and involvement with lawyers is not ordinary life.
Unless the number of clients whose decisionmaking capacities are
adversely affected by these psychological forces is so great that the
costs of informed consent to them outweigh the gains to other
clients,281 though, these arguments serve only to emphasize the importance of the process used in informing clients. A strong rightsbased argument might reject as irrelevant even evidence of psychological dysfunction. The weaker version of the rights-based
argument suggested here simply contends that the possibility of
psychological inability to make decisions is not sufficiently plausible
to warrant rejection of informed consent.
Finally, the choice-of-forum question discussed above seems no
more difficult than the settlement decisions that current law assigns
to clients. A similar balancing of likelihood of victory against extended delay is involved in both situations. The conclusion that
the client should make both decisions thus seems compelling, unless
clients' control over settlements is ended or a distinction is drawn
between settlements and other decisions involving similar values.
(distinguishing between simple questions, which can be answered with enough information, and complex questions, which involve tradeoffs of values and which information alone cannot answer). Wexler argues that we do not answer complex
questions; we decide them. Id. 193-94.
279 Many important consumer decisions, such as buying a house, involve tradeoffs between accepting a known product and spending time and effort to search for

something that might be better. See, e.g., Stigler, The Economics of Information,
69 J. PoLrricAL EcoN. 213 (1961).
280 See Capron, supra note 5, at 377-92 (discussion of various barriers to
patients' capacity to make choices, including the impact of psychological forces and
the relationship with the physician).
281

An intermediate approach would allow lawyers to take over decisionmaking
authority when, in their judgment, the client's decisionmaking capacity is impaired
or not functioning appropriately because of the pressures of the situation.

See

D. BnmER & S. P~icE, supra note 249. The danger here is the problem of overextension. If lawyers could better recognize which clients are competent to make
decisions than clients themselves can, and if lawyers would not use "inability to
make intelligent decisions" as a justification in inappropriate cases, then perhaps
this intermediate position would have merit. Given lawyers' propensity to view
themselves as "experts" and the tendency to equate "wrong" decisions with incapacity, I have my doubts about creating such an exception.
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Although settlements are perhaps more likely to involve client
values and client conflicts with their attorneys, the only reason for
drawing a line between settlements and other similar decisions seems
to be administrative convenience: the need to have a clear demarcation between client and lawyer decisions. For some people, this
justification might be sufficient to overcome the presumption in
favor of client decisionmaking, but, as the subject-matter cases illustrated, a limitation of client decisionmaking to just settlements is
likely to be unstable.28 2 Pressures will emerge for courts to treat
similarly situations that result in clients losing their claims. The
purported administrative ease is therefore illusory.
The other proposition, that lawyers should control all decisions,
including settlements, requires even stronger justification than the
existing set of rules. But this brings us full circle. Clients have not
been proven incompetent. Even assuming the lawyer has more experience in dealing with uncertain predictive data, the major conceptual difficulty is not comprehending the information, but making
the trade-off between an increase in the probability of success and a
loss of time. This type of question has no right answer. Hence,
competence is somewhat beside the point: the issue is who should
make this trade-off. The client knows better whether he wants to
perform the balancing himself or delegate that task to the lawyer.
The lawyer's guesses about the client's desires in this respect are
likely to be wrong.28 3 Informed consent can therefore improve
lawyer-client decisionmaking by allowing the client's values to control and by putting the client in a position to monitor the lawyer's
performance.
D. The Problem of Cost
Of course, the switch to a rule of informed consent would involve certain costs: the costs of increased lawyer and client time
discussing decisionmaking and making collaborative decisions; the
costs of enforcing the client's right to information; 284 the possible
282 On the difficulty of drawing the line between subject matter and procedure, see note 110 supra.
283 Studies of physicians show that they generally underestimate their patients'
desire for information and ability to understand information. See McKinlay, supra
note 19, at 3; Pratt, Soligmann, & Reader, Physicians' Views on the Level of Medical Information Among Patients, in PATMNTS, PHY IrCNs & ILLNss 222 (E.
Jaco ed. 1958). See also Waitzkin & Stoeckle, The Communication of Information About Illness: Clinical, Sociological, and Methodological Considerations, in
PsYcHosocms
AsPEcTs oF PasicAL ILLNEss 180 (Z. Lipowski ed., 8 ADvANCEs

PSYCHOSOMAnC MED. 1972).
284 The primary cost here would be the time and effort spent litigating
informed-consent issues.
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costs of limiting lawyer autonomy; 285 and, if increased client control
prolongs hearings, the costs of increased court time.2 8 These costs
may be substantial, but perhaps not as large as expected. Multiplication of the cost of the initial meeting between lawyer and client
by the number of subsequent meetings almost certainly would overstate the total cost in terms of the lawyer's and client's time. As the
relationship progresses, the client should become more familiar with
the lawyer, the case, and the legal process. The exchanges between
lawyer and client should thus become more efficient and less timeconsuming.2 7 Furthermore, a rule of informed consent might encourage lawyers to become more skilled at conducting decisionmaking discussions with clients. Clients too might have an incentive
to educate themselves about the legal process. Both developments
ultimately could reduce the costs of informed consent.
Moreover, cost alone should not be determinative. Clients do
not currently make informed choices between cost and other values,
and some system must therefore be devised for educating clients
about the value of decisionmaking authority. Such a system inevitably has costs. 2 8 The question, then, is not whether the costs
exist, but whether they are justifiable. Some of the reasons are
those already discussed: the ineffectiveness of market controls in
regulating the lawyer-client relationship,8 9 the capacity of informed
consent to ameliorate the problem of professional disloyalty,2 9 0 and
the opportunities the doctrine affords to take advantage of the
client's superior knowledge of his values.20 1
Using again the example of a client deciding whether to file in
state or federal court, a discussion such as the one sketched above
might take a half hour of a lawyer's time.29 2 Clients might well be
willing to pay a minimum of twenty-five to fifty dollars for the
opportunity to decide whether they wish to incur delays of up to
285 See notes 305-06 infra & accompanying text.
286 See text accompanying notes 328 & 332 infra. This increased time would
be a cost to the public, as well as to the lawyer and client.
287
See note 149 supra.
2 88
See generally G. CA.LaBnEsi & P. BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICFs 80-88 (1978).
2 89
See notes 140-53 supra & accompanying text.
290 See text accompanying note 262 supra.
201 Id.
292 Based on my own experience, a half hour is a realistic estimate, even
though the dialogue set out takes only several minutes. The studies from medical
literature are inconclusive as to time. One early study reports that in most cases
disclosure took less than ten minutes. See N. HasmHEY & S. BusHxoFF, INF RimD
CONSENT STUnY 35-36 (1969).
But given the importance this Article places on
the process of informing the client, and that study's lack of attention to the
question of whether the patients actually understood what they were told, it does
not make sense to extrapolate from it.
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five years before trial.29 8 The present system usually does not give
them the opportunity to make that choice. 294 Informed consent, by
contrast, affords clients the option of deciding that participating in
any given decision is worth the cost. The relevant question, at least
in cost-benefit terms, is whether the cost of discussing this option
should be imposed upon every client in order to insure that some
2 95
clients have the choice.
Even if balancing the possible benefits of informed consent
against its costs does not yield a clear resolution in favor of the
doctrine, 296 the inquiry should not come to an end. The client's
interest in making decisions affecting his case, because it is his case,
must also be considered. Such decisionmaking involves important
aspects of personal freedom 297 and should thus be protected absent
a clear showing that the costs are prohibitive 298
295 Fifty dollars an hour is a realistic rough estimate of a lawyer's hourly fee.
See Clermont & Currivan, supra note 181, at 533 n.5. Estimations of additional
costs, such as enforcement costs, are completely speculative. The important point,
however, is the plausibility of the assertion in the text that clients will be willing
to pay for the opportunity to make the decision.
294The practice of lawyers is not to bring such decisions to clients. See
D. RosENTHAi, supra note 6, at 113.
295 The costs of discussing the option would be much lower than the costs of
making the decision. Imagine a different beginning to our dialogue discussed
earlier:
Lawyer: We now have to decide what court to file in. Choosing state
court would mean a long delay but might mean a better chance
of winning. If you leave the decision to me, I will go to state
court, but if the delay is important to you, we can discuss it.
This is your decision, if you wish, but if we do discuss it, it may
take a half hour or so, which, as you know, costs $25 of my time.
What do you want to do?
This discussion would take a few minutes. It may not be all that a "rational"
decisionmaker would want to know in order to decide whether to engage in further
discussion, but it sufficiently conveys the nature of the decision involved. The
possibility of "waivers," see note 182 supra, presents significant implementation
problems, however. By indicating his preference among the available options and
by emphasizing the increased cost to the client of discussing those options, the
lawyer might convince the client that further discussion would be a waste of money.
296 First, even if one agrees that the above example rings true, it might be
argued that the number of discussions involved in any given case might make
informed consent too costly. Second, informed consent might be most needed with
clients who could least afford the extra cost, because affluent repeat-player clients
already monitor their lawyers' performance. But see M. WESSEL, supra note 241,
passim.
297 See note 113 supra & text accompanying note 116 supra.
298 Therefore, the analysis being applied here might be said to be an impure
theory that attempts to take account of both cost-benefit analysis and rights. See,
e.g., Barry, Book Review, 82 YALE L.J. 629, 652 (1978); Epstein, Nuisance Law:
Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEcAL SrUn. 49, 76 (1979);
Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic Theory of Law, 62 MTNN.
L. REv. 1015, 1035-48 (1978).
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E. The Lawyer's Interests
Because the lawyer is his client's agent, his only legitimate interest is arguably serving the best interests of his client. Decisionmaking problems, then, would arise only when a client decided on
an action which the lawyer judged to be contrary to the client's best
interests. This narrow view of the lawyer's interest seems misguided
in two respects. A system of rules that ignores the lawyer's own
interests may have little chance of adoption. 299 Moreover, if the
lawyer does have legitimate interests, ignoring them would be as
objectionable as ignoring those of the client.
What are these legitimate interests? The lawyer has an interest
in autonomy; an interest in his identity as a lawyer; a craft interest
in not being forced to do substandard work; and an interest in not
being forced to violate his own standards of professional responsibility or those of the profession.
1. Lawyer Autonomy in Performing Work
Professionals, by definition, are those who have control over
their work.30 0 A rule of informed consent limits such control. The
need for this limitation does not detract from the legitimacy of the
lawyer's demand for control,30 1 a demand composed of several related elements. It includes the demand for control over hours and
economic terms, over evaluation of work, and over performance.
This last aspect is the focus of this section; the others, however,
deserve some brief comments.
The demand for control over hours and economic terms is
the core of economic bargaining. As such, it raises issues to be
299A major difficulty with adopting a rule of informed consent is the problem
of implementation. See text accompanying notes 389-97 infra. To the extent such
implementation is dependent on professionals themselves, id., a strategy of trying
to understand and to accommodate their legitimate needs seems more likely to
facilitate adoption than one that simply dismisses them.
300 See, e.g., E. FRmnsoN, supra note 229, at 44-45 ("autonomy of technique
is at the core of what is unique about the profession"); E. HUGHES, MEN AND
THem WoRK 78-80 (1958) (formal status of a profession reflects society's grant of
a license and mandate to control the profession's work).
301These demands derive from the lawyer's role as worker. See, e.g.,
F. BLUBERc, ]NnusTRLkr DxasocRAcY (1969); A. Fox, supra note 276; D. JENKNs,
Jon PowE (1973). As Fox states: "Work is . . . one of the major sets of roles,
relations, and structures which provide, or fail to provide, the individual with
scope for the development of his personality." A. Fox, supra note 276, at 46.
But there is an inescapable tension in this position. The professional may still
have more control than the ordinary worker. See id. 33-34. But if one believes
that all workers should have more control over their work, one's goal should be not
to turn professionals into machines, but to bring them closer to the desired norm,
taking account not of the definitional aspects of professionalism, but of the work
professionals do.
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negotiated between employer and employee.30 2 The professional's
demand for this type of control should carry no more weight than
that of any other worker; unless, therefore, all workers have unilateral control over these aspects of employment, the professional
should be no exception. 30 3 To the extent that the monitoring required by informed consent gives the client more power to control
these aspects of a lawyer's work, such monitoring does not infringe
a legitimate interest.
Professional control over evaluation of work traditionally has
served to protect professional autonomy, but this consideration does
not justify it. The major argument for giving professionals greater
control than other workers over evaluation of their work is that
professionals' work involves specialized knowledge and techniques,
which can only be judged by other professionals. 3°4 This interest
in evaluation by peers, even if legitimate, is not infringed by a rule
of informed consent.
A professional's control over the way he performs his work may,
however, be justified by considerations of autonomy. The literature
on work and workers contrasts control over the decision to do a
particular task with control over the decisions involved in performing that task. 30 5 Controlling the latter decisions greatly curbs a
worker's discretion. Although specifying the task to be performed
can likewise have that effect, it frequently leaves the worker large
discretion over choices of techniques, over ordering of subtasks,
and so on. Discretion and autonomy are not synonymous; at some
302 A. Fox, supra note 276, at 298; E. FRumsoN, supra note 229, at 367;
Oldham, Organized Labor, the Environment, and the Taft-Hartley Act, 71 MicH.
L. Rv. 936, 981-1002 (1973).
303 Freidson suggests that governmental control of medicine will not violate
the core of autonomy that defines a professional, as long as the professional retains
control over the technical spheres of his practice. See E. FnEIDsoN, supra note 229,

at 45, 345. This is not to say that control over economic factors is unimportant.
Indeed, such control may be of first importance. See McKinlay, The Business of
Good Doctoring or Doctoring As Good Business: Reflections on Freidson's View of
the Medical Game, 7 LNT'L J. HxarAm SERvicEs 459, 467 (1977) ("there are
different levels of control operating and the amount of control that physicians exert
may actually be quite limited when viewed in relation to the industrial and financial
forces . . . and the controls that they exert.").
3 04
See Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participationin Regulation of the

Legal Profession, 62 MiNN. L. REv. 619, 628-30 (1978).
There may be a fairness argument here as well.

Only those who have been

involved in this profession or work can truly understand the conflicting considerations. See Hughes, Mistakes at Work, 17 CAN. J. EcoN. & POL. Sc. 320 (1951).
305 See A. Fox, supra note 276, at 16. Allan Donagan draws a similar distinction between the patient's authority to decide on a course of treatment and the
physician's authority to decide how a course of treatment is to be carried out.
Donagan, Informed Consent in Therapy and Experimentation, 2 J. MED. & PHIL.
307, 313 (1977).
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point, however, limits on discretion interfere with a worker's autonomy in a very basic way.
First, meticulous control over how a worker does a task denies
his capacity to do the job. To an auto mechanic, for example, a
knowledgeable car owner might not merely say, "The car is not
running; please fix it," but might specify both the task he wanted
performed-"Fix the carburetor"-and how to perform that task"First, turn that screw, then remove that part and soak it in oil, ... "
At some point, the specificity of the instructions infringes the mechanic's sense of being a mechanic. He is then justified in asserting
that the owner does not want a mechanic, but merely a tool. The
mechanic may choose to be such a tool, but that is a choice the
mechanic should have; society should not impose it on him.
Second, the more external control exerted over the way one
does a task, the closer such control comes to dictating one's physical
movements, at some point becoming control over the worker's body.
Because control over one's body is a fundamental aspect of the
notion of autonomy, 80 maintaining control over the way one does
a task is similarly fundamental.
Finally, being told how to do a task with great specificity is
reminiscent of childhood, denying the adult potential for competence.3 07 Being told to do a particular task may be distasteful,
but, in some sense, it affirms one's ability to do the task.
The distinction between being ordered to do a task and being
told how to do it does not correlate precisely with the absence or
existence of autonomy. But the closer a rule comes to prescribing
the exact steps a worker must take, the more the prescription infringes the worker's sense of autonomy. Thus, despite its definitional difficulties, the distinction between task and performance of
task is, by and large, a useful tool. The notion of task has a certain core that resists endless subdivision; it implies something that
potentially involves more than one action.
2. The Lawyer's Interest in Identity as a Lawyer
A lawyer has an interest deriving from the scope of the definition of "lawyer." Actions required beyond that scope may deny
his identity as a lawyer. As Freidson has written with regard to
doctors:
30

OSee note 113 supra.
307Cf. E. FhErDSON, supra note 207, at 123-24 (doctors must not be treated
as if they were schoolchildren).

116

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 128:41

[Physicians'] knowledge and technique . . . set limits past
which they cannot go without ceasing to be physicians.
While the physician anxious to please can offer a moneyback guarantee like any reputable village healer without
damaging his medical technique, he cannot substitute a
poultice of cow dung for an injection of antibiotic in the
treatment of a bacterial infection. When his patients are
markedly different from him, he cannot satisfy them without giving up his profession.308
Similar limits may characterize the lawyer-client relationship.
For example, are legal-services lawyers who object to performing
the role of social worker justified in trying to set limits on that
role? 309 What of the lawyer who is asked to engage in political
lobbying or picketing?3 10
Because our notions of lawyering are so elastic, 31' such questions do not have hard and fast answers. These issues involve the
scope of what an individual offers when he presents himself as a
lawyer. Ideally, any discrepancy in the concept of "lawyer" between
lawyer and client should be worked out at the beginning of their
relationship. If these differences are not explored at the outset,
disputes that arise later should not be resolved by allocating decisionmaking authority along subject-matter/procedure lines. Rather,
courts should examine closely the undertaking by lawyer and client.
They should require the lawyer to inform his client of the limits on
representation. A rule of informed consent imposes this requirement.

31 2

111-12 (1970).
See J. Katz, Routine and Reform: A Study of Personal and Collective
Careers in Legal Aid 36-39 (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Sociology, Northwestern U., 1976) (describing the conflict between legal-services lawyers and their
clients over performance of routine "social work" tasks).
310 Id. 210; cf. Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049,
1064-65 (1970) (lawyer's description of his feelings on accompanying a group of
women to a welfare oflice to demand an emergency check and to a hospital to
demand treatment of an infant).
311 As Katz points out, some of the activities that legal-services lawyers label
social work are performed in private practice. J. Katz, supra note 309, at 30.
Lawyering is not a static concept. The lawyer's role as intermediary may lead him
to perform all sorts of tasks. Cf. Hazard, Reflections on Four Studies of the Legal
Profession, 13 SocrAL 1aoBrms: LAw & Soc'y Sup. 46-47 (1965) ("At the
bottom, the lawyer's role is as limited and as limitless as the short and simple annals
of the poor; at the top, his role embraces the challenge, opportunities and frustrations of the largest political and economic enterprises of which society is
capable.").
312This requirement derives from the proposition that a lay standard should
be used to determine the scope of the lawyer's duties. See text accompanying notes
386-96 infra.
308 E. FREmSON, PROFESSIONAL DOmINANcE
309
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3. The Lawyer's Interest in Craft
The lawyer's third major interest in controlling decisions is to
protect his sense of self-esteem as a lawyer. Although related to both
autonomy and ethical interests, this interest is distinct from both.
It stems from a sense of craft and pride in one's work. 13 The lawyer,
directed by his client to make an argument the lawyer deems untenable, may feel that the instruction infringes his autonomy, and
he may feel morally bound not to present frivolous arguments.31 4
But he also has an interest in not being compelled to produce what
he considers substandard work.
4. The Lawyer's Interest in Professional Responsibility
Finally, the lawyer has an interest in not being forced to make
decisions that conflict with either the profession's or his own 315 code
of professional responsibility. Expansion of the role of client decisionmaking might increase the number of instances in which a
lawyer will be asked to violate these sets of rules.
Assume a case in which a lawyer does not want to present the
testimony of a witness because he believes the testimony would be
false. Assume further that the Code does not prohibit presentation of the evidence, but leaves the decision to the lawyer's discretion.310 Present case law suggests that the lawyer need not ask the
313
See T. VEBLEN, THE INSTINCT OF Wos. smp (1914). The sense of
pride and craft is related to the performance of rituals at work that help distinguish
the craft from the outsider's perception of it. See Hughes, Mistakes at Work, 17
Cr.J.EcoN. & POL. Sc. 320, 324 (1951).
314 This obligation may stem from the lawyer's own sense of what is morally
required, or from a decision to accept the dictates of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that prohibit presentation of such claims. See ABA CODE OF PnoFESSiONAL BEsPoNsmLT,
DR 7-102, 2-109, 2-110; cf. FED. R. Crv. P. 11
(signature of attorney on pleading certifies that "to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay."). See also text accompanying notes 336-39 infra.
315 One's own code is the complex of rules that an individual accepts as
governing his behavior as a lawyer. It includes personal rules and rules derived
from the profession. Thus, it is not necessarily congruent with the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Every lawyer has such a code, whether explicitly
acknowledged or not. See Alderman, Three Discussions of Legal Ethics, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 452, 452-53 (1977); Flynn, Professional Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty to
Self, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 429.
316The present Code prohibits "knowingly" using perjured or false testimony.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIoNAL tEsPoNsiBmrrY, DR 7-102(A)(4). See also ABA
Co .s. oN Pno ssONA.L En-cs, IN1 osA.L OPINION No. 150 (1974) (lawyer may

not present witness who will testify to what counsel knows to be untrue).

Whether

the lawyer has discretion not to introduce testimony when he merely believes the
testimony will be false is not clear. One position is that DR 7-101(B)(2), which
provides that a lawyer may refuse to participate in conduct that he believes to be

unlawful, gives the lawyer this option. See Morgan, supra note 230, at 737. But
see Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 202, at 373 (arguing that Morgan overstates
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client whether to offer the testimony. 317 If, however, informed-consent doctrine allocated the decision to the client, he could insist
that the witness be called.3 18 Informed consent may therefore create
additional ethical conflicts for the lawyer.319
Informed consent, however, would not necessarily require
presentation of the testimony. Under that doctrine, after discussing the issue with the client, the lawyer could decide not to call
the witness because of suspected perjury. He would then have to
justify that conclusion to the client. If the latter insisted on calling
the witness, the lawyer could be allowed to withdraw. The availability of that option turns on the Code's rules governing substantive behavior. 320 Respect for an individual's autonomy requires an
open exchange of views, although not necessarily acquiescence in
321
anything that person desires.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY, EC 7-26
("lawyer should . . . present any admissible evidence his client desires to have

the lawyer's discretion); ABA

presented unless he knows, or .

..

should know, that such testimony .

.

. is false,

fraudulent or perjured").
317 See text accompanying notes 42-79 supra.
318At that point, the possible conflict between the instructions rule and the
subject-matter/procedure rule would have to be faced. See text accompanying notes
32-33 supra. In any event, once the decision is brought to the client, the client
ultimately can assert control by discharging the lawyer. See ABA CODE OF PRoFESSIONAL REsPoNsmiLrr, DR 2-110(B)(4). However, whether the discharge is
justified ("for cause") may determine what compensation the lawyer is entitled to
recover for his services. Under one line of cases, if the discharge is without cause,
it constitutes a breach of contract for which the attorney may recover damages, the
measure of which is the fee specified in the contract. Where the discharge is for
cause, the recovery is limited to the reasonable value of the services rendered up to
the time of discharge. See, e.g., Warner v. Basten, 118 Ill. App. 2d 419, 255
N.E.2d 72 (1970); Thomas v. Mandell & Wright, 433 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968), rev'd, 441 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1969).
Under the other line of cases, whether the discharge is for cause is irrelevant;
the attorney's recovery is limited to the reasonable value of the services rendered.
See, e.g., Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 3d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1972);

Covington v. Rhodes, 38 N.C. App. 61, 247 S.E.2d 305 (1978).
819 But see text following note 325 infra (arguing lawyer has to face this conflict even under the present rules).
320For example, the Code's substantive rules on presenting such testimony
could be redrafted to make it clear that the lawyer could withdraw if the client
insisted on presentation of the testimony. See note 376 infra.
321 But see Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976). Fried defines a friend as one
-who adopts another's interests as his own, id. 1071, a definition implying that the
lawyer, as friend, does for the client all that the client would do for himself. But
Fried acknowledges that friendship involves trust and care, id., 1075, and that the
lawyer's loyalty qua friend is limited to what the rules of advocacy permit, id. 1081.
Therefore, the position in the text is not necessarily inconsistent with Fried's. The
decisive question becomes what the rules of advocacy should permit.
For a critique of Fried's use of the lawyer-as-friend analogy, see Dauer & Leff,
Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L.J. 573 (1977); Simon, supra
note 126, at 106-13.
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The lawyer may well decline to withdraw and instead accede
to his client's wishes. 322

Moreover, withdrawal, while solving the

individual lawyer's ethical dilemma, creates its own problems. The
client would then proceed without a lawyer-an alternative which
raises the problems of pro se representation 3 23-or find a lawyer
willing to present the testimony. 24 If these are the consequences
of informed consent, what has been gained?
First, fostering these lawyer-client conflicts may actually lead
to less unethical behavior. As William Simon argues, lawyers,
rather than confront differences with their clients, may impute
selfish motives and ends to them.32 Under present practice, therefore, the lawyer might present possibly false testimony on the unquestioned assumption that the client so desires. Informed consent
offers two possibilities for change: the lawyer may discover that his
assumption was wrong, or the client, after discussion with the
lawyer, may decide against presenting the testimony.
Second, the lawyer's relationship with the client demands a
dialogue. 326 Discussion helps insure that the lawyer's rationale is
the purported moral ground, rather than some other. In addition,
the client may be able to allay the lawyer's concern about the
veracity of the witness.
Finally, the lawyer should be grappling with this ethical
dilemma without regard to a rule of informed consent. Even if the
lawyer makes the decision himself, he has to balance his obligation
of zealous representation against the obligation not to present testimony that he believes false. Informed consent may bring this
problem to the surface, but it does not create it. The present system, in contrast, tends to obscure this dilemma, with the result that
both the lawyer and client try to deny responsibility. Leff and
Dauer have characterized the situation this way: "Client: 'That's up
to my lawyer (and anyway, I can't be responsible since I don't understand all that stuff).' Lawyer: 'The choices aren't mine, and the
system demands that I protect my client.' "327 Informed consent
322
See generally J. C uAn, supra note 138; J. C~raN, LAwYERs' ETIcs
(1966) (presenting evidence that economic pressures will lead practitioners to
violate ethical norms).
3 23
See Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se
Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157 (1972).
324 See M. FRExDmAv,, LAwYmS' Ermcs IN AN AnvmisAsy SYSTEm, 33 (1975).
325 Simon, supra note 126, at 53-59.
326 See Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL.
L. REv. 669, 690 (1978) ("Whatever the client's own moral standards, the client
is entitled to expect an honest response from the lawyer.").
32
7 Dauer & Leff, supra note 321, at 583 n.40.
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offers the possibility of forcing both lawyer and client to look
seriously at the question of responsibility.
Whether or not this issue is confronted, the lawyer's interest in
not being forced to engage in unethical behavior is not necessarily
threatened by the doctrine of informed consent. Perhaps instead
the rule will force the legal system to delineate more clearly how the
328
lawyer is to serve two masters: client and justice.
F. The Public's Interests
The public has its own interests in the choice of a decisionmaking rule. The House of Lords suggested in Rondel v.
Worsley,329 for example, that allowing clients to sue lawyers for not
following directions might cause lawyers to neglect the duties they
owe the courts and the public. In that case, the Lords held barristers immune from liability for litigation errors, 330 reasoning that
because "[t]he line between proper and improper conduct . . . is

by no means easy to draw in many borderline cases," 331 exposure
to liability might lead counsel to engage in such dubious tactics as
misleading the court, casting unfounded aspersions on the other
33 2
party, or withholding evidence.
This argument against adopting a rule of informed consent is
similar to that discussed above regarding the increased pressure on
the lawyer to violate ethical codes. Increased client authority poses
the danger of clients pressuring their lawyers to engage in dubious
tactics, and adding the threat of malpractice suits could lead some
lawyers to succumb to client pressure.
On the other hand, even under the present rules, lawyers may
approach the limits of ethical behavior because of their perceptions
of clients' wishes.3 33 The impact on this behavior of a change in
328

Id. 583 n.41.

329 [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1666.
330oThe facts were hardly favorable to a contrary decision. The plaintiff in
Rondel v. Worsley, [1967] 3 W.L.R. 1666, was a defendant in a criminal case
who had employed the barrister-defendant on a dock brief. (Under the English
rule, the barrister had to accept Rondel as his client.) Rondel had been charged
with causing grievous bodily harm. The main error alleged to have been committed
by the barrister was in failing to establish that the injury was caused by Rondel's
biting the complaining witness, rather than by his using a knife. The malpractice
suit was not brought until six years after the criminal trial, and two amendments of
the complaint were necessary to fashion even a possible claim.
31Id. 1674.
332 Id.

333See Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L.
REv. 1031 (1975).
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the allocation of decisionmaking authority is not self-evident. As
argued earlier, a rule of informed consent may test the assumption
that clients want their lawyers to engage in unethical behavior. If
clients do not behave as hypothesized, pressure for unethical behavior may not increase, but may in fact be reduced. Moreover, a
system that allows parties to present their disputes should not then
take away their control of the dispute because of mistrust of their
way of handling the matter. Instead, the appropriate substantive
limits on the presentation of disputes should be confronted directly.
Clients can be given more decisionmaking authority and, at the
same time, the responsibility for placing limits on the exercise of
that authority.
The public also has an interest in the efficient operation of the
court system. If ethical conflicts between lawyer and client lead to
increased pro se representation, the court system may operate less
efficiently.s 4 In addition, broader client decisionmaking might
necessitate delays during trials to enable lawyers to give clients sufficient information to make decisionsass Finally, such a change
might lead to the introduction of evidence and issues that, at present,
lawyers screen out.
Pro se litigation is bothersome, but its burdens fall more heavily
on clients than on courts. 336 Any inefficiency it creates seems susceptible of control through the adoption of appropriate judicial
management techniques. Similarly, delays for consultation are
fully amenable to control by the trial judge.3 37 The problem of
introduction of evidence and information that lawyers now screen
out might be a bit more serious. Clients, because they do not understand the concept of relevance or the danger that overinclusiveness
can dilute the persuasive power of a case, will want to present more
material than will lawyers. The potential cost of overinclusion still
seems quite small, involved only in those few lawyer-client transactions that reach trial, and then only when clients disregard their
lawyers' advice. Moreover, judges retain the ability to screen out
irrelevant evidence. Finally, lawyers, with their emphasis upon
procedure, may actually create more delay than would occur if
See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 323.
335 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. 95 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
336 See Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits
in the Federal Courts, 92 HAv. L. RFv. 610, 624-25 (1979).
337 Trial judges have enormous discretion in granting continuances and in controlling potentially disruptive courtroom behavior. See Chused, supra note 7, at
649-53, 682.
334
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clients were allowed broader decisionmaking power.338 Overall,
therefore, the efficiency that would be lost due to a switch of rules
seems minimal.
If a broader client decisionmaking rule would adversely affect
the "correctness" of the results of litigation, the public might legitimately be concerned that informed consent will lessen the impact of
legal rules. 38 9 As argued earlier, whether the informed-consent
doctrine would produce worse results is debatable, particularly it
"correct" means what the parties desire. Alternatively, if "correct"
corresponds to substantive law, the present system allows so many
possibilities for deviation from this goal that rejection of the
informed-consent rule on this ground seems a strange place to begin
3 40
reform.
The public might also be interested in preventing non-feepaying clients from placing unreasonable demands upon their
lawyers. Paying clients will limit their demands to those which pass
their own market test. Clients who do not have this rationing incentive may, however, place unlimited demands on their lawyers.3 4 '
This is a serious problem. Any legal-services lawyer or public
defender has had to face difficult decisions regarding the use of his
time. Allocating decisionmaking authority according to the subjectmatter/procedure line is not, however, a rational solution to this
problem. At present, legal-services lawyers tend to ration their time
by giving more services to the most aggressive clients, 342 though the
most aggressive (or knowledgeable) client may not be the most deserving. The subject-matter/procedure line may be used to justify
failure to accede to client demands, but the individual lawyer must
still develop his own criteria for making such decisions. He must
decide, for example, whether one or two or ten depositions is enough
33 8
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 58 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring)
(suggesting that the provision of counsel will "exacerbate delay . . . [because of]
the common tactic of counsel of exhausting every possible legal avenue, without
due regard to its probable payoff.").
339
See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STmums 399, 402-10 (1973). For example, suppose a
party chose to have a witness testify for reasons unrelated to the outcome of the
case, and suppose that this witness increased the likelihood of a "wrong result"
because the witness prejudiced the jury against the party. (Indeed, it was for this
reason that the lawyer would not have offered the witness.) Although the client
may have been willing to bear this cost, from the system's perspective of producing
correct substantive results, this choice produced an additional cost which was not
properly accounted for by the client
40
c See Frankel, supra note 333.
341 For a general discussion of rationing problems in the nonmarket areas of
delivering medical services, see Mechanic, supra note 239. See also Bellow &
Kettleson, supra note 202, at 353-62.
842
See Hosticka, supra note 235.

1979]

INFORMED CONSENT AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION

123

in a particular case. Leaving these decisions to the lawyer's discretion neither rationally allocates resources nor satisfies legitimate
client demands.3 43 As with ethical limitations, open confrontation
with the choices involved is a better way of resolving these problems
than simply giving the lawyer control over procedure and tactics.
IV. APPLYING THE THEORY
A. Who Makes What Decisions: The Client'sInterests
The previous section examined the various interests at stake in
the allocation of decisionmaking authority between lawyer and
client. It concluded that, when a client's values are likely to be
implicated, or when professional disloyalty is suspected, it is reasonable to presume that an informed client would elect to have the
decision in question submitted to him. Broader decisionmaking
powers would be afforded to a client than under the subject-matter/
procedure rule, because client values and potential lawyer conflicts
are likely to be involved in many of the decisions that traditionally
have been labeled procedural. 344 The next step, however, is not to
replace the subject-matter/procedure line with another definitional
categorization, but to begin to consider specific lawyering decisions
and allocate them either to the lawyer or client in accordance with
the above framework.3 43 The following examples are not intended
to be an exhaustive taxonomy, but only a more modest effort at beginning to apply the analysis developed in the previous section.
One basic value that will be important to clients involved in
litigation is the opportunity to present their stories.3 46 The "pro3 43

See Bellow, supra note 183; Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 202, at 361-62.
See notes 179-86 supra & accompanying text.
M But see ETmIcs AND AVocA CY, supra note 32, at 14 (distinguishing between strategic decisions, which are the client's to make, and tactical decisions,
which are the lawyer's). See also G. BELaow & B. MouLToN, supra note 163, at
53 (technical decisions are the lawyer's); White, supra note 10, at 75 (ends are for
client; means are for lawyer). The approach taken in the text is preferable to
those noted here because the latter rely on vague dividing lines, and because it is
more fruitful to allocate decisions on the basis of the particular interests involved.
346
This does not mean that most clients will not trade their right to present
their stories for a satisfactory outcome through negotiation, but only that if no
satisfactory outcome is forthcoming, control over presentation of the stories behind
their disputes seems likely to be important to most clients. Cf. Casper, Having
Their Day in Court: Defendant Evaluations of the Fairness of Their Treatment, 12
LAw & Soc'
REv. 237, 246-48 (1978) (defendants in criminal cases who plead
guilty are somewhat more likely to feel they were treated fairly than defendants
who go to trial, but of those who went to trial 14% felt unfairly treated because
unable to present their side of case). Moreover, the more the dispute involves
issues of principle, the more likely the client is to place high value on this
opportunity. See generally, Crowe, supra note 185; Upham, Litigation and Moral
Consciousness in Japan: An Interpretive Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution Suits,
10 LAw & Soc'y REv. 579 (1976).
S44
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cedural" decisions of which claims to argue and which witnesses to
call should thus belong to the client. Selecting the forum and a
jury or non-jury trial are also part of presenting one's story. Apart
from that rationale, however, the choices of forum and decisionmaker should be allocated to the client because they frequently in347
volve a trade-off between delay and other values.
Decisions relating to the initiation of a suit, to pre-trial motions,
and to discovery may be tainted by professional disloyalty and therefore should be made by the client. The decision to file a lawsuit
may be influenced by the lawyer's perception that filing cements the
attorney-client relationship, induces the client to pay a fee, or
facilitates handling the client. 348 Motion practice and discovery
4
decisions directly involve the trade-off between quality and cost.2 e

In fixed-fee cases, a lawyer may have an incentive to underutilize
motions or discovery, whereas the opposite may be the case in large
hourly fee litigation.
A third group of situations present more difficult problems of
classification. For example, the decisions whether to accept or strike
a juror or to cross-examine a particular witness relate to the client's
presentation of his story. On the other hand, allocation of these
decisions to the client might entail delays at trial for lawyer-client
conferences and greater client control over the way a lawyer performs his tasks. On balance, decisions that can be anticipated before
trial-the general type of jury to be selected 350 or whether to crossexamine particular witnesses-should be reserved for the client.mL
The implementation of these decisions should be left to the lawyer.
Continuances present similar problems of accommodating competing interests. Normally, a short continuance is of no significance.
In some situations, however, the delay may be significant to the
47

See text accompanying note 278 supra.
348 See Brown & Shaffer, Towards a Jurisprudence for the Law Office, 17
Am. J. Juius. 125, 135 n.27 (1972).
349 See J. JEA s, TnLAL ADvocAcY 140 (1975) ("any motion regardless of its
merit triggers two events-a bill to a client, a delay in the case"); M. WEssEL,
supra note 241, at 164 (on the costs of discovery).
350 The text does not answer the question whether a client's instructions should
3

control the selection of a particular juror. It merely argues that the lawyer must
bring that decision to the client. Although the lawyer should not be allowed to
act contrary to his client's explicit instructions, the unanswered question is whether

the difference in opinion should allow the lawyer to withdraw.

See text accom-

panying notes 361-73 infra.

351 Even if ordering a lawyer to do a cross-examination is perceived as ordering a lawyer how to do a task, it does not involve such control that his identity

as a lawyer is threatened, or that his movements or actions are being dictated in
such a way as to constitute an infringement of his body. Being told to ask questions in a particular manner would threaten those interests, however.
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client. In addition, lawyers may agree to continuances in order to
preserve their relationships with opposing counsel or with the
judge.352 Here, then, a de minimus rule that excludes short continuances from mandatory client decisionmaking makes the most
sense.
The decisions discussed above cluster into units which maximize the client's ability to monitor the lawyer and which minimize
expense. For example, decisions whether to sue, what claims to
make, and which court to sue in will obviously arise at the early
stages of litigation; decisions about discovery at the next major planning stage; and decisions about what evidence to present at trial at
the final planning stage. 353 Moreover, with each of these decisions,
meaningful client decisionmaking is feasible if the lawyer gives the
54
client enough accurate information.
Finally, the decisions likely to implicate client values are those
involving what tasks to perform, rather than how to perform particular tasks. Even if a client chooses the witnesses to be called at
trial, for example, the lawyer still determines the order of proof and
the details of eliciting testimony, including the framing of questions.
Similarly, even if the client determines the general scope of discovery, the lawyer, in implementing that plan, still has control over
drafting particular discovery requests, asking questions at deposition,
and the myriad details surrounding discovery. Therefore, applying
the criteria formulated above will, in most cases, not infringe the
lawyer's autonomy.3 55
Outside of litigation, the issue usually is not whether the client
has authority to make decisions, but whether the lawyer has supplied the client with adequate information. 56 At least some nonlitigation decisions have, however, been viewed as technical questions solely for the lawyer. This allocation of authority should be
reexamined under the rules suggested here. The specificity of
language in an agreement is one such decision. Determining the
degree of specificity involves technical questions relating to use of
language, mixed technical and judgmental questions relating to
352 See Shuchman, Relations Between Lawyers, in ETmIcs AND ADVOCACy,
supra note 32, at 73, 92.
353 Cf. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 273-76 (discussing the need for client and

lawyer to confer at various stages of a case).

354 See text accompanying notes 270-77 supra.

355 Similarly, a lawyer's conflicts with clients are more likely to arise over
whether to do a task than over the exact details of implementation.
35B See Brown & Brown, What Counsels the Counselor? The Code of Professional Responsibility's Ethical Considerations-A Preventive Law Analysis, 10 VAL.
L. REv. 453, 460 (1976).
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recognition of the lack of specificity, and mixed technical and judgmental questions relating to correction of the lack of specificity.
This last decision should be the client's. When imprecision is
recognized, the decision whether to cure it can turn on various
factors: the ability to draft more precise language in light of future
contingencies; the willingness of the parties to agree to more specific
language; the costs of remedying the imprecision; the risk of the
deal falling through if changes are made; and the potential future
difficulties caused by such imprecision. 357 Making this decision requires as much weighing of subjective values as does balancing risk
versus gain in the settlement situation. A lawyer should thus be
required to ask his client about material imprecision in agreements. 358
B. Who Makes What Decisions: The Lawyer's and the
Public'sInterests
This section has thus far looked at decisionmaking largely from
the client's perspective. Accommodation of the interests of the
lawyer and the public must also be considered.
As discussed above, the lawyer's autonomy interest can largely
be satisfied by the informed-consent rule itself; 3,1 the lawyer's identity interest can be accommodated by the initial lawyer-client agreement. 60 In some cases, however, the competing interests cannot be
so neatly reconciled. Guidance then comes not from the rules of
informed consent, but from those governing withdrawal from representation and those setting limits on lawyer's behavior.3 1
The Code of Professional Responsibility distinguishes between
mandatory and permissive withdrawal. The mandatory-withdrawal
rules serve primarily to protect the public's interests; permissive3 57

See Comment, Attorney Malpractice in California: The Liability of a Lawyer

Who Drafts an Imprecise Contract or Will, 24 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 422, 433-34
(1976).

358 See id. 436. Contrary to the position taken here, however, the Comment
advocates adoption of a professional standard of materiality.
359

See notes 300-07 supra & accompanying text.

360

See notes 308-12 supra & accompanying text.

361

It is assumed that these standards suggested for incorporation into the Code

would also be incorporated into the informed-consent doctrine for litigation purposes. Although there is no necessary relation between the two sets of standards,

using the Code provisions to discuss the relevant considerations seems the most
natural way to present these issues. Further, as discussed later, meaningful
implementation of informed consent most likely will require changes both in legal
doctrines and in the Code. See text accompanying notes 400-08 infra.
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withdrawal rules reflect an attempt to accommodate the interests
62
of the lawyer.
I A lawyer must withdraw from representation when (1) his
client is taking steps, either within or without litigation, "merely
for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person,"
(2) "his continued employment will result in the violation of a
disciplinary rule," (3) "his mental or physical condition renders
it unreasonably difficult for him to carry out his employment effectively," or (4) "he is discharged by the client." 363 These rules
rely primarily on other disciplinary rules to set the standards for
mandatory withdrawal. This structure makes clear that, rather
than allocating decisionmaking to lawyers because of distrust of
clients, substantive rules governing conduct can be used to protect
important public interests. The latter approach may create more
conflict within the lawyer-client relationship and may lead to more
instances of pro se representation. For the reasons articulated
earlier,3 these potential costs would be worth bearing.
The lawyer's craft and professional-responsibility interests
would be served by a liberal provision for permissive withdrawal.
More latitude may, however, encourage lawyers to threaten withdrawal in order to coerce clients into accepting their decisions on
matters properly left to clients.3 6 5 Termination of an existing
lawyer-client relationship often imposes substantial financial and
psychological costs upon the client. The client incurs the time
362These distinctions are not as neat as the text may imply. Permissivewithdrawal rules operate in areas that involve public interests, and public interests
may be the factor that, after balancing the concerns of the client and the lawyer,
influences us to grant the lawyer the freedom to withdraw. Similarly, while
lawyers generally have an interest in maximizing their latitude, see Morgan, supra
note 230, at 737, in certain instances they might prefer mandatory rules because
mandatory rules help insure that everybody conforms to certain standards of behavior,
thereby making the practice of law less costly because one does not always have to
police the other lawyer. See Shuchman, supra note 352, at 93-94. Still, when
public interests are sufficiently great, we would expect a rule requiring mandatory
withdrawal, because a rule of permissive withdrawal implies that either choice is
acceptable. A rule of permissive withdrawal does not simply delegate to the
lawyer the decision to enforce the public interest. If that were our policy, we
would formulate a rule that told the lawyer that if he determined that conduct
violated a particular standard, albeit a vague one, he had to withdraw.
363ABA CODE oF PROFESSiONAL REsPoNsmI-rY, DR 2-110(B). Before withdrawing, the lawyer has a duty to take reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice
to the rights of his client. Id. DR 2-110(A)(2). Withdrawal is also constrained
by requiring the lawyer to seek approval of the court when a case is pending before
a tribunal, id. DR 2-110(A), and because the lawyer faces possible liability for
breach of contract.
364
See notes 316-39 supra & accompanying text.
365 See Alschuler, supra note 152, at 1192; Brown & Brown, supra note 356,
at 475.
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and expense of securing new counsel and educating him about the
case. Psychological costs may include reliving embarrassing or
uncomfortable incidents with a new person or feeling abandoned
in time of need. In addition, fully educating a new lawyer may
be impossible in some cases because of lapses of time or because
the first lawyer was a participant in an ongoing transaction. The
lawyer's need for business might limit coercive use of withdrawals,
but the possibility of coercion would remain. The rules on permissive withdrawal must therefore be precisely drawn to strike the
appropriate balance between preserving the client's decisionmaking
power and protecting the lawyer's interests. 366
Several of the present Code provisions are too vague to perform this function. A lawyer may withdraw (or request permission from the court to withdraw) when the client renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer effectively to carry out his job, or,
in matters not pending before a tribunal, when a client "insists"
that the lawyer engage in conduct contrary to the lawyer's judgment
3

and advice.

67

Taken literally, the "disagreement with judgment" provision
would allow a lawyer to withdraw at the slightest disagreement with
a client. Even if "judgment" connotes a serious disagreement, the
lawyer interests involved should be addressed more precisely. Similarly, "unreasonably difficult to carry out employment" may be
interpreted to mean disagreement over the decisions allocated to
the client, albeit perhaps important ones. Again, specific language
referring to particular kinds of disagreement should be drafted.
How might the lawyer interests be more precisely addressed?
The craft interest lies in the integrity of one's work and one's reputation. The first question is whether this interest is strongly implicated in all, or only some, of the decisions a client might make.
Should an attorney, for example, in the midst of his representation
of a client, be able to say, "Look, I don't want to force you to proceed otherwise, but I won't participate in drawing up this silly
366

At their boundaries, the lawyer's interests in autonomy and craft are
sufficiently vague to warrant concern about overextension. For example, Freidson

describes vividly the problems the administration of a prepaid group medical
practice had in controlling doctors' hours because the issue was perceived by the
doctors as one of work autonomy. See E. FmnosoN, supra note 207, at 27-28, 227.
With regard to the craft interest, David Riesman has described the "fantastically
unutilitarian character" of the briefs written for the Appeals Bureau of the New

York District Attorney's Office, where he worked as a lawyer. In open-and-shuf
cases, the briefs still included erudite citations of cases and elaborate arguments.
Riesman, Toward an Anthropological Science of Law and the Legal Profession, 57
Am. 3J.6 Soc. 121, 133 (1951).
7ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL R5sPONSzI-'sLTf,
DR 2-110(C)(1)(c) & (e).
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document. If you persist, I will have to withdraw."? Although
the attorney's reputation is involved, the answer should be no. The
connection between the attorney's reputation and the client's ends
is too tenuous. The legal system does not generally hold attorneys
responsible for the ends their clients pursue; even if a change in
policy could be justified when serving important public interests, 0 8
the lawyers' interests are insufficient justification. Lawyer coercion
of clients for paternalistic reasons would be too likely. In addition,
the lawyer is not totally unprotected. He may simply decline employment at the beginning of the relationship,8 69 and he retains
his power to influence a decision by expressing his views.
With regard to decisions that more directly involve the lawyer's
performance of his lawyering tasks, the lawyer's craft interest may
be greater. In some instances the Code protects those interests
without need for the "disagreement with judgment" provision; in
others, new, more specific provisions would be useful. For example,
the Code allows a lawyer to withdraw when his client insists on
presenting claims or defenses that are not warranted under existing
law and cannot be supported by good-faith arguments for a change
in the law. 0 This provision may not adequately protect the
lawyer's interests. Some claims, though supportable by good-faith
arguments, might impinge upon a lawyer's sense of craft or con371
cern for reputation. Further, the vagueness of the standard
368

See generally Schwartz, supra note 326; Simon, supra note 126.

369 "A lawyer is under no obligation to act as adviser or advocate for every

person who may wish to become his client; but... [he] should not lightly decline
proffered employment." ABA CoDE OF PNOFEssIONAL RESPONSmnIY, EC 2-26.
Given this freedom, it is possible that the harder we make it for attorneys to
withdraw, the more attorneys will try to protect themselves at the inception of the
relationship by either screening clients, increasing fees, or trying to impose
conditions.
370ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmLTY,

DR 7-102(A)(2)

prohibits

advancing such claims "knowingly." DR 2-110(C)(2) permits withdrawal when
continued employment is likely to result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
371There is no case law directly interpreting DR 7-102(A)(2). But courts
have had considerable difficulty in drawing lines between meritorious and nonmeritorious claims. The federal courts, for instance, have failed to establish workable standards for screening out frivolous cases filed in forma pauperis under 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976). See Catz & Guyer, Federal In Forma Pauperis Litigation: In Search of Judicial Standards, 31 Rurczas L. REv. 655, 676 (1978). In
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) the Supreme Court, dealing with the
issue of withdrawal by counsel from frivolous criminal appeals, avoided setting
any standard. Instead the Court adopted the procedural solution of requiring
counsel to file a brief with the court referring to anything in the record that might
support the appeal. Id. 744. And in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434
U.S. 412 (1978), the Court decided that costs and attorneys' fees could be awarded
to prevailing defendants in cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 20OO0e-5(k) (1976), when the original claim was unfounded,
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is unfair to those lawyers who might not be allowed to withdraw
because others believe the claim can be supported by a good-faith
3 72
argument.
These objections are not persuasive. If reasonable lawyers consider an argument plausible, then it is unlikely to jeopardize
seriously the lawyer's reputation. Moreover, if the unfairness argument is considered serious, a subjective standard would both alleviate the vagueness problem and protect a particular lawyer's sense
373
of craft which happened to be higher than the norm.
Similarly, the lawyer has an interest in not presenting untrustworthy proof. EC 7-26 of the Code provides that a lawyer should
present "any admissible evidence his client desires unless he knows
or ... should know, that such testimony is false, fraudulent or per-

jured." Because its knowledge requirement is so strict,3 74 this provision may not sufficiently protect the lawyer's interest. Although
there are general provisions of the Code that might allow a lawyer
more discretion than does this provision, 75 the issue should be addressed more directly. For example, a lawyer could be allowed to
request withdrawal if his client insisted on presenting testimony the
376
lawyer strongly believed would be false, fraudulent, or perjured.
meritless, frivolous, or vexatiously brought. Id. 421. Subsequent lower court
cases have done little to give content to this vague directive.
The problem, of course, is not susceptible of easy solution. Not only do we
have the possibility of an infinite variety of factual situations, but any strict line
The
discouraging claims has the possibility of keeping out meritorious ones.
difficulties are accentuated fiurther when market mechanisms for screening are
lacking.
372
See Schwartz, supra note 326, at 681-83 (discussing a comparable problem
with regard to a standard prohibiting the lawyer from using unfair, unconscionable,
or unjust means, or helping the client to achieve unfair, unconscionable, or unjust
ends).
37 3
See Goldsmith v. Pyramid Communications, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 694
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). If the subjective standard were adopted for permissive withdrawal, we would still utilize an objective standard for mandatory withdrawal.
Here, the public interest lies in discouraging frivolous litigation. Therefore, a
lawyer's subjective belief in the validity of a claim would not justify continued
representation when reasonable lawyers did not think a good faith argument could
be made. Further, even with a subjective standard for permissive withdrawal, the
lawyer would have an obligation to first research the case law and consider applicable
secondary sources. Moreover, it is not a subjective belief in the wisdom of the
claim that is relevant, but rather whether respectable arguments can be made for
the claim.
374 For a discussion of the possible interpretations of "knowledge," see M.
Freedman concludes that the Code
FRExNz
, supra note 324, at 51-57 (1975).
has set a standard that is almost impossible to meet. Id. 57. See also Schwartz,
supra note 326, at 686.
3 75
See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-101(B) (2) (the
lawyer may "refuse to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be unlawful") (discussed in note 316 supra).
376 If the use of the subjective standard is objectionable, the standard could be
changed to require that the lawyer have a reasonable basis for his belief. The rule
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Another set of situations involves clients' directions regarding
trial preparation. A client might order a lawyer to take steps the
lawyer thought unwise or unnecessary. For paying clients, cost
should be a sufficient deterrent, but criteria must be developed for
deciding how much is enough in a particular nonpaying client's
case.377 When the client's directions are primarily for purposes of
delay, however, the Code should not merely allow the lawyer to
3 73
refuse, but should require refusal.
A problem arises at the other extreme when the client asks
the attorney to forego steps he would normally take in implementing
the chosen course of action. For example, assume the client requests the lawyer to forego additional investigation or legal research. If the lawyer reasonably believes that such investigation is
necessary to minimally competent lawyering or to discover any
underlying ethical problems, he should not be forced to deliver
shoddy services. The profession must adhere to minimum standards
of competent performance, but the "disagreement with judgment"
or "unreasonably difficult to carry out employment" .79 provisions
are not needed to protect this interest. A provision would be sufficient that allowed withdrawal when the client prevented his attorney from "carrying out his employment in a minimally competent manner by restricting the lawyer's scope of investigation."
Much of the above discussion applies also to the lawyer's interests in not being compelled to participate in decisions that violate
his or the profession's standards of professional responsibility.
Again, this interest is important, perhaps deserving of more protection than given in the present Code, but the standard of "disagreement with judgment" is not the answer. Its breadth presents the
possibility of overreaching, and its lack of explicit reference to moral
or ethical grounds for withdrawal undercuts the very values it was
likely designed to protect.38 0 If the lawyer is to have the freedom
either explicitly or by implication should include a requirement that the lawyer
engage in reasonable investigation before acting on this belief.
377
See note 343 supra & accompanying text.
3
78The Code does not deal very directly with delay. It prohibits taking
actions merely to harass another, ABA CoDE oF PRoFEssioNAL BEsPoNsIBmrr,
DR 7-102(A)(1); knowingly advancing unwarranted claims, id. DR 7-102(A)(2);
and asking questions that a lawyer has no reasonable basis to believe relevant and
that are intended to degrade the witness, id. DR 7-106(C) (2). All of these actions
may be ones that also cause delay, but a provision dealing directly with actions
taken primarily for delay seems warranted.
379 Perhaps the "unreasonably difficult to carry out employment" provision was
meant to apply to this situation, although it seems more likely to have been aimed
at clients the lawyer thinks are meddlesome.
88 There is some evidence that the "disagreement with judgment" provision
may have been inserted in the Code to allow a lawyer who is not in litigation to
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to withdraw because of his moral disagreement with his client's
means or objectives, the Code should say so. Nothing in a rule of
informed consent would prevent the lawyer from acting in accord38 1
ance with such a provision.
When a matter is pending before a tribunal, the situation is
more complex. The court's interests enter the picture, and the
client's ability to secure other counsel without suffering harm is
diminished. The Code recognizes this difference. The provision
allowing withdrawal for "disagreements with judgment" does not
apply to matters pending before a tribunal; withdrawal from representation is then subject to the consent of the court.38 2 The
requirement of judicial consent creates two problems. First, a
lawyer who seeks to withdraw without harming his client is frequently put in an untenable position. Revealing his reasons for
wanting to withdraw inevitably harms his client; 38 failure to
reveal them, however, will prevent withdrawal. Verification of the
lawyer's reasons seems necessary, but institutional mechanisms for
doing so must be developed. The possibilities include assignment
of a separate judge to hear withdrawal motions or withdrawal on the
basis of a sealed motion, subject to sanctions if upon subsequent
review withdrawal is found unjustified.
The second difficulty is the delay created by withdrawal. In
criminal cases, judges frequently have been very reluctant to allow
withdrawal, even when both lawyer and client desired termination
of their relationship. 384 They have created "shotgun marriages,"
withdraw for ethical reasons. See Report of the Joint Conference on Professional
Responsibility of the Association of American Law Schools and American Bar
Association, 44 ABA J. 1159 (1958) ("The reasons that justify and even require
partisan advocacy in the trial of a cause do not grant any license to the lawyer to
participate as legal adviser in a line of conduct that is immoral, unfair or of
doubtful legality." Id. 1161.) EC 7-3 of the Code explicitly recognizes the
lawyer's two different roles. ABA CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-3;
See also id. EC 7-8.
381 See text accompanying notes 316-28 supra.
382ABA CODE OF ProFEsSIONAL RESPONSmnITy, DR 2-110(A) (1).
3s Whenever a lawyer has to reveal that his client has a frivolous case or is
about to commit perjury, it is obvious that such information will influence the
judge, and even in a jury case, this influence may be significant. It is my experience that the feeling of doing more harm to the client than simply ceasing
representation is a strong deterrent to asking the court's permission to withdraw
from representation.
384 These are usually cases in which a defendant with appointed counsel asks
for new counsel because of a disagreement with his present lawyer. For example,
in People v. Wilson, 43 Mich. App. 459, 204 N.W.2d 269 (1972), the defendant
complained that his lawyer had not made himself available to discuss the case and
that the lawyer-client relationship was so strained that the client was afraid to give
his attorney the names of his potential alibi witnesses. The trial judge refused to
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unreasonably elevating the concern about delay above the interests
of lawyer and client.8s5 If the Code were worded more precisely,
as suggested here, courts would properly be obliged to give more
credence to requests for withdrawal to reflect these more particularized interests.
In some situations, however, a lawyer may have good grounds
for permissive withdrawal, but switching lawyers would cause an
intolerable delay or the problem would likely recur with the second
lawyer. Clients should then be forced to choose between proceeding pro se and accepting less control over the lawyer. Such cases
involve only a narrow band of possible attorney interests: principally, not being excessively directed in the execution of lawyering
tasks; not being forced to do substandard work; and not being required to do something morally objectionable. Judicial consent to
withdrawal in these situations would be an appropriate trade-off
for expanding client decisionmaking in other spheres.
C. What Information Should be Communicated?
Allocating decisionmaking authority is only half of the informed-consent problem. The other half is devising a standard for
determining what information the lawyer should communicate to
his client. The Code provides that a lawyer should take the initiative to insure that his client has been informed of all relevant considerations.38 6 Though a good starting point, more must be said
than that the burden is on the lawyer to initiate decisionmaking
hold a hearing on the merits of these claims and gave the defendant the choice of
proceeding pro se or with the lawyer. On appeal of the conviction, it was held
that denial of the defendant's request without investigation of his claims was an
abuse of discretion.
Wilson and other cases require the trial judge to investigate disagreements
between counsel and client before ruling on a substitution request when the defendant raises substantial grounds for substitution. See, e.g., United States v. Woods,
487 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970).
But when such a hearing is held, the defendant must show good cause, such as an
irreconcilable conflict which might lead to an unjust verdict, before substitution
of counsel will be allowed. Mere disagreement over trial tactics is not suflicient.
See, e.g., United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 985-87 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 926 (1973); United States ex rel. Torry v. Rockefeller, 361 F.
Supp. 422, 425-26 (W.D.N.Y. 1973); People v. Williams, 2 Cal. 3d 894, 905-06, 471
P.2d 1008, 1015-16, 88 Cal. Rptr. 208, 215 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 919
(1971).
385 Concern over disruption of trial calendars is one major reason courts give
for this rule. See, e.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 470 F.2d 837, 844 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1973); United States v. Birrell, 286 F. Supp.
885, 894 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom., Legal Aid Sod'y v. Herlands, 399 F.2d 343
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1033 (1969).
386 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-8.
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discussions. The Code should specify what information is relevant
or material 82 '
First, the lawyer should have an obligation to identify for his
client the alternative courses of action. In some cases this will be
easy-to sue or not to sue-but, in many cases, the set of options
will be larger. Whether a particular option should be communicated by the lawyer depends on a combination of professional
expertise and client standards of materiality. Professional expertise determines the range of possible options; 388 the client's needs
determine whether a particular option should be communicated.
Once alternatives have been identified, the lawyer's next obligation is to evaluate the likely consequences of each alternative, disclosing as clearly as possible the certainty or uncertainty of his
judgments. Again, the degree of communication is determined by
the professional expertise and the client's needs.
Adoption of this approach would work significant changes in
present law. The line of cases that protect lawyer "judgment," for
example, hold that, if average lawyers have differing views of the
law, then no opinion within the spectrum of accepted views can be
considered negligent.389 This rule fails to impose on the lawyer
any obligation to tell the client of the uncertain status of the law.
In contrast, the standard above would require such disclosure whenever the uncertainty would be relevant to a client's decision. 9 0
The operation of the proposed standard can be illustrated by
examining the malpractice case of Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance Co. 91 In that case, the clients wanted to dispose of
certain estate property as soon as possible. Taking a judgment of
possession under Louisiana law allowed them to do so, and they
were advised that that action would not affect the valuation of the
property for federal estate tax purposes. When the lawyer gave this
38

7 The question of what standard to use to judge materiality also arises. This
Article advocates a client-oriented standard, rather than a professional-oriented one.
See text accompanying notes 16-25 supra. This fails to answer the question
whether the lay standard should be objective or subjective, see Capron supra note
5, at 408-18, but it seems more important to resolve the professional-versus-laystandard question first and only then to attempt to define more precisely what is
meant by material information. See Note, Restructuring Informed Consent: Legal
Therapy for the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 79 YALE L.J. 1533, 1561-62 (1970).
Indeed, if the objective standard of materiality includes the obligation to inquire
into whether a client has particular needs, the differences between the objective
and subjective standards will be small. See also note 430 infra.
388 Katz, supra note 1, at 169.
389 See notes 99 & 206 supra.
390 For example, it is hard to imagine a settlement decision in which such
information would not be material.
391366 F. Supp. 1283 (M.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1974).
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advice, no cases were on point, and the advice was in accord with
standard practice.
About seventeen months later, however, a court decision contrary to the lawyer's advice cost the clients about $14,000. The
clients sued for malpractice. In finding for the defendant, the
Smith court's premise seemed to be that the standard for disclosure
was professional practice at the time the advice was given. 92 The
question whether the clients would want to know that no cases upheld the lawyer's view and that risk was involved was brushed aside.
In the court's view, "there are two kinds of lawyers, one who tries to
scare his client to death, and others . . .who exercise their profes-

sional judgment to the best of their ability and have confidence in
their judgment." s31 The court never wondered whether these
clients would have preferred to have been "scared." Under the
proposed standards, the lawyer would have been obligated to disclose that his advice was unsupported by case law because this information was material to the clients' decision to take a judgment
of possession. Failure to do so would have subjected the lawyer to
liability for malpractice.
The disclosure principle advocated here would also affect the
case law involving a lawyer's duty to warn of future factual contingencies. For example, in Wright v. Williams,394 the clients, who
were purchasing a boat, consulted the defendant-lawyer to review
the purchase agreement. They did not tell the lawyer that they
intended to use the boat for commercial purposes. After the purchase was final, they discovered a technical clause in the agreement
that prevented that use of the boat. In dismissing the malpractice
suit against the lawyer, the court held that, absent expert testimony
showing that clients were customarily warned about this clause, the
lawyer could not be held liable. 39 5 The standards set forth above
392 Id. 1286. The court did state that if there are reasonable grounds for the
attorney to believe that the advice was questionable, he is obligated to so advise
his client. Id. 1290. But it went on to ignore this question. It ignored plaintiff's
witnesses, who testified that they thought a risk was involved; and it ignored
several cases which held that the definition of distribution turns on the shifting of

the economic benefits of the property transferred, rather than on the technicalities
of state law. See Hertsche v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 347 (D. Ore. 1965),
aft'd, 366 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1966); Prell v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 67 (1967).
Instead, the court relied on the absence of cases directly on point and on the fact
that other attorneys gave similar advice to conclude that defendant's ultimate conclusion about the law was reasonable.
393 Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 366 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (M.D.
La. 1973), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1974).
39444 Cal. App. 3d 802, 121 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1975).

395 At one point the appellate court states that when plaintiffs were asked the
purpose for which the vessel would be used, they replied pleasure. Id. 196. But
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place the responsibility for initiative on the lawyer and define
relevance from the perspective of the client. They look to the
reasonable expectations of the client, not solely to the standard
of the profession, and they would change the result in Wright.
Rather than place the burden on the client to know enough law to
tell his lawyer the relevant facts, this approach assumes that the
lawyer, not the client, should know the potential relevance of particular facts.3 96
D. Problems in Implementation
Even if changes such as those suggested above were made in the
current malpractice law and in the Code, several substantial barriers
to their effectiveness would remain. Two will be briefly addressed:
one is a doctrinal problem; the other goes to the validity of the
whole effort.
The doctrinal problem is similar to that faced in the medical
cases: the requirements of proving causation and damages limit the
possibility of a successful suit. The problem comprises three interrelated aspects. First, the plaintiff may have to prove that he
would have decided differently had he been advised properlyand that the outcome would have been different if he had made the
decision in question. 397 Second, familiar notions of causality require that the client show that he would have won the original
law suit but for the lawyer's error; in the malpractice suit, the client
must therefore, relitigate the first law suit as well, presenting the
evidence that was, and would have been, presented there.398 Third
the findings of fact at the trial court were more ambiguous. Id. 197.

If the plain-

tiffs had been asked the boat's intended use, the case would present the somewhat
more difficult question of whether they should have been informed that if they

ever intended to use it for business they would not be able to do so. Given that

such a restriction would affect the value of the boat it would seem that clients

should be so informed.
396 This is not to say that there would not be difficulties in deciding how far
a lawyer must go in anticipating risks. In Bank of Ancortes v. Cook, 10 Wash.
App. 391, 517 P.2d 633 (1974), for example, the lawyer prepared a homestead
declaration for his client for purposes of a Washington exemption statute. The

declaration was not filed until after the client had moved to another state and was
held to be invalid on that ground. The client had moved suddenly, three days
after consulting the lawyer, and although he had been considering moving at the
time, he did not so advise the lawyer. On these facts, judgment was entered for
the lawyer on a malpractice claim because the lawyer could not reasonably have

anticipated that the client would move. Looking at this case from the client's perspective does not make it an easy one. But it demonstrates the relevance of the
client's expectations about the effect of the lawyer's advice on the client's future

behavior. See the discussion of this issue using the Bank of Ancortes case in L.
BnowN & E. DAUER, supra note 93, at 232-62.
397
3 98

See text accompanying note 25 supra.

See note 33 supra.
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is the problem of damages. Even where causation has been shown,
proving damages due to errors in litigation has also been held to require retrying the original law suit within the malpractice case.399
These problems can be alleviated partially with recognition of
an independent action for failure to secure informed consent as a
dignitary injury. In such an action, harm would be considered
inherent in the failure to allow the client to make the decision.
Whether the plaintiff would have decided differently or whether
the harm caused other injury need not be considered. 400 This rule
might encourage nuisance suits, but a more substantial objection
is that, even with this change, the likelihood of substantial recovery
seems slim enough to discourage even meritorious suits.
The causation problem must therefore be faced more directly.
Professor Capron has suggested a subjective standard to determine
whether a client would have decided differently. 0 1 Such a proposal fits the theory offered here; the more a decision involves conflicting values for a particular client, the more plausible that the
client would have decided differently. Even if this suggestion were
402
adopted, the extent of its impact is difficult to discern.
Moreover, the problem of the suit-within-a-suit requirement
remains. This requirement is intended to ascertain the effect of
an action that did not take place.40 3 In the malpractice case, the
client is required to reenact the first lawsuit as he thinks it should
have happened in order to prove that the alleged defect caused the
earlier loss. Although this requirement has been criticized as unfair to clients,40 4 it dispenses with the client's need for expert testimony, and it is reasonably calculated to answer an unanswerable
question. In cases in which this reconstruction is impossible, the
client should have the option of presenting expert testimony. 405
The suit-within-a-suit requirement has, however, been misapplied with regard to damages. Even when the lawyer's conduct
399 Id.
400 See Goldstein, supra note 11, at 691; Katz, supra note 1, at 163; Biskin,
supra note 15, at 603-04.
401 Capron, supra note 5, at 408.
4 02
Piskin, supra note 15.
4 3
0 R. MALLEN & V. LEvrr, supra note 33, § 133, at 200.
404 Note, A Modern Approach to the Legal Malpractice Tort, 52 IND. L.J. 689,
692-95 (1977).
405 See Warwick, Paul & Warwick v. Dotter, 190 So. 2d 596 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966).
Several medical cases hold that expert testimony showing increased risk of bad
results is sufficient to get to the jury on issues of proximate cause. See, e.g.,
Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1977); Daniels v. Hadley Memorial

Hosp., 566 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977), Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d
1280 (1978).
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clearly caused the client's loss, the client has been asked to prove
the value of that loss by showing that he would have won the first
suit. This is a difficult burden, not only because there was no
original lawsuit, but also because the requirement mistakes the nature of the client's loss. A lawsuit is a chance to win a sum of
money; it is only an all-or-nothing proposition after the fact. Before
verdict and judgment, its value reflects an estimate of the probability
of winning multiplied by the likely recovery. 406 Therefore, in
those cases in which only damages are at issue, a client should not
have to prove that he would have won the first law suit. The client's
financial loss should be measured by the pre-judgment value of that
407

suit.

These suggested modifications would make the causation and
damages requirements less of a hindrance to the successful implementation of an informed-consent requirement. Even the most
favorable doctrinal changes, however, may not enable the rule of
informed consent to affect the actual allocation of decisions between lawyer and client. Will such a doctrinal change reflect-and
reinforce-a growing commitment by lawyers to the values behind
informed consent, or will they simply lead to an exchange of meaningless words and forms? 4 08
These questions are, of course, difficult to answer. Studies
from the medical field are inconclusive. 4 9 More general "impact"
studies suggest that the impact of changes on behavior depends
upon knowledge of the legal changes, the likelihood and severity
406 G. BELLOW & B. MourTON, supra note 163, at 1004-17; See Reder, supra
note 114, at 552-53 (in taking case, lawyer looks at uncertainty of amount of
recovery).
4
07 The approach advocated here is consistent with that suggested by Professor
McCormick. C. McCoRNMCK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAv OF DAMAGES § 31 (1935).
Contra, Fuschetti v. Bierman, 128 N.J. Super. 290, 319 A.2d 781 (Law Div. 1974).
408 See Katz, supra note 1, at 141-42 (discussion of this issue with reference
to doctors).
409 See, e.g., B. GRAY, HxmLrA \ SuBjcTs IN MEDICAL EXPERMMENTATION 67,

107 (1975).
Grays study measured patients' comprehension of the information
they received from their doctors. Women who were subjected to an experimental
method of inducing labor were asked questions about the consent procedures followed. Forty percent of them did not realize that they were involved in an
experiment, despite having signed a consent form that revealed the experimental
nature of the project, and 41% did not realize that any risks were involved. Gray
concludes that the lack of comprehension was attributable in most instances to the
manner of communication and to the doctors' failure to inform subjects that there
was an alternative, nonexperimental way of inducing labor. Id. 209-22. See also
Novack, Plumer, Smith, Ochtill, Morrow & Bennett, Changes in Physicians' Atti-

tudes Towards Telling the Cancer Patient, 241 J. AMA 897, 898 (1979) (in 1961
only 12% of physicians surveyed generally told the patient about diagnosis of
cancer; in 1977 98% reported general policy is to tell the patient). The reasons
for this change are not evident from the study report.
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of enforcement, and the congruity of the change with the values of
the relevant actors. 10 The first of these variables-knowledge of the
legal change-presumably would be at a maximum when lawyers
were the regulated group.411 The likelihood of enforcement depends primarily on the behavior of clients. They have the responsibility to mobilize the legal system. If clients do not enforce their
right to participate, because that right is not important to them,
perhaps they do expect and prefer to delegate decisions to the
professional. Lack of enforcement for this reason is of no concern.
Nonenforcement, however, due to lawyers' unwillingness to inform
clients of their right to make decisions, or to the ineffectiveness of
institutional enforcement mechanisms, is another matter. Lawyers'
control over these factors will strongly affect the chances that clients
will have of exercising control over lawyers. Absent some commitment to the values of sharing decisionmaking with clients, lawyers
will not likely relinquish this control.
The third variable then-the congruence of the change with
lawyers' values-is especially critical. This variable directly affects
both the degree of enforcement and the amount of enforcement
needed. It is also central to the question whether changed behavior
will result in meaningful change in the allocation of decisions between lawyer and client. Successful implementation of client
decisionmaking is dependent on the quality and spirit of the interchange between lawyer and client. Understanding by the client,
not simply a flow of words from lawyer to client, is the important
end.
The easy assumption that formal means-a change in lawcannot achieve these nonformal ends 412 is too facile. Formal
changes may affect values, but they must first induce a dialogue
about decisionmaking authority. If, in the course of this dialogue,
a rule of informed consent is perceived solely as a threat, it will
provoke not much more than defensive and evasive action. If the
rule is perceived, however, as protecting a core of legitimate lawyer
authority and expertise and as offering opportunities to rethink
historic dilemmas, then the dialogue may provoke genuine response. If the change is linked to a general rethinking of pro410 See Robertson & Teitelbaum, Optimizing Legal Impact: A Case Study in
Search
of a Theory, 1973 Wis. L. Rgv. 665, 712.
411
But see J. CAuuN, supra note 138 (suggesting lawyers' knowledge of
ethical standards is not very high).
412 Cf. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due Process,
in DuE PRocEss 148-50 (G. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977) (contrasting formal
hearings required by procedural due process and informal explanations of official

action).
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fessional-responsibility issues, to a general change in the mechanisms
for monitoring lawyer behavior, and to a general change in attitudes
toward consumer control, behavior will more likely emerge. Finally,
if these changes are reflected not in tort doctrine alone, but in corresponding changes in the Code of Professional Responsibility and
in increased attention to these issues in legal education, 413 the formal
change in law may help effect meaningful change in reality.
CONCLUSION

This, then, is the case for applying the doctrine of informed
consent to the lawyer-client relationship. The lines of decisionmaking authority drawn by the Code and the cases are vague, the
reasons for drawing them questionable. Expansion of the client's
decisionmaking role is justified by the assumptions of our legal
system; it is supported by the possibility of lawyers' disloyalty to
clients and clients' inability to communicate their values to lawyers.
But a workable doctrine of informed consent must do more than
address the needs of the client. It must be formulated to accommodate as well the legitimate interests of the lawyer and the public.
Indeed, the role and response of the lawyer are crucial. For the
doctrine can be successfully applied only if lawyers are able to
relinquish some of their traditional prerogatives, recognize that their
identities as lawyers will not be threatened by expanded client decisionmaking, and perceive that shared decisionmaking is the solution to dilemmas that have long plagued the profession.
The dialogue encouraged by informed-consent doctrine can be
the means by which the often competing interests of lawyer, client,
and public are exposed and considered, if not always reconciled in
particular cases. 414 In this respect it represents a sharp and desirable break with the present conception of the lawyer-client relationship. This Article is presented in the hope of stimulating a
different sort of dialogue-by and between lawyers themselvesabout whether that break will be made.
413 Cf. Katz, The Education of the Physician-Investigator,98 DAEDuLus 480
(1969) (devising programs in medical education to increase awareness of ethical
problems in doctor-patient relationships).
414 This is not to say that exposure of conflicting interests will effect a reconciliation, but merely that open acknowledgement of conflict is a necessary first step
toward its resolution. Open acknowledgement of conflict is desirable notwithstanding the possibility of divisive effect in some cases.

